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CHAPTER - I 
A - MUTAHHARJ'S LIFE AND TIMES; A BRIEF SKETCH 
Martyr Murtada Mutahhari was born in 1920 at FarimSLn 
located about sixty kilometers away from Mashhad, He was reared 
In religious surroundings. He received his early education under 
his father's giiidance and supervision who was a spiritual and 
pious man. At the exceptionally early age of twelve, Mutahhari 
began his formal religious studies at the teaching institution 
in Mashhad, \rtiich was then in a state of decline, partly because 
of the repressive measures directed by Rida Khan the first Pahlavi 
autocrat, against all Islamic Institutions. But in Mashhad, 
Mutahhari discovered his great love for philosophy, theology and 
mysticism, a love that remained with him throughout his life and 
came to shape his entire outlook on religion; as he explained in 
his own words: 
"I can remember that when I began 
my studies in Mashhad and was still 
engaged in learning elementary *Arabic, 
The philosophers, mystics and theologians 
Impressed me far more than other scholars 
and scientists, such as inventors and 
explorers. Naturally I was not yet acquainted 
with their ideas. But I regarded them 
as heroes on the stage of thought."^ ' 
(*) - For references please see notes at the end of each chapter. 
Accordingly, the figure in Mashhad who aroused the 
greatest devotion in Muthhari was Mirza Mahdi Shahidi Radavi, 
a teacher of philosophy. But Radavi died in 1936 before 
Mutahhari was old enough to participate in his classes, and 
partly for this reason he left Mashhad the following year to 
;join the growing numbers of students congregating at the teach-
ing Institution in Qum. Mutahhari was able to benefit there 
from the instruction of a wide range of scholars. He studied 
Fiqh and Usui - The core subjects of the traditional curriculum 
with Ayatullah Hu^ Jjat Kuhkamari, Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Damad, 
Seyyid Muhammad Riza Gulpayagani, and Haj Sayyid Sadr al-Din 
Sadr, But more inrportant than all was Ayatullah Burujirdl, 
Mutahhari attended his lectures from his arrival in Qum in 1944 
until his departure for Tehran in 1952, and he nourished a deep 
respect for him. Fervent devotion and close affinity character-
ized Mutahhari*s relationship with his prime mentor in Qum, Imam 
Ruhullah Khomeini, When Mutahhari arrived in Qum. The Imam 
was a young lecturer (mudarris), 
In about 1946, Imam Khomeini began lecturing to a small 
group of students that included both Mutahhari and his roomate 
at the Fayziya Madrasa, Ayatullah Muntaziri, on two key philoso-
phical texts, the Asfar al-Arba'a of Mulla Sadra and the Sharh-i-
Manzuma of Mulla Hadi Sabzavari, 
Finally, among the teachers to whose influence Mutahhari 
was exposed in Qum, mention must be made of the great exegete 
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of the Quran and philosopher, ^Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn 
Tabataba'i. Mutahharl participated in both Tabatabai*s classes 
on the Shifa* of Avi-cinna from 1950 to 1953 and the thursday 
evening meetings that took place under his direction. The 
subject of these meetings was materialist philosophy, a 
remarkable choice for a group of traditional scholars, Mutahharl 
himself had first conceived a critical interest in materialist 
philosophy, especially Marxism, soon after embarking on the 
formal study of the rational sciences. According to his own 
recollections, he began, in about 1946, to study the persian 
translations of Marxist literature published by the Tudeh party, 
the Major marxist organisation in Iran and at that time an 
important force on the political scene. In addition, he read 
the writings of Taql Aranl, the main theoretician of the Tudeh 
party as well as marxist publications in Arabic emanating from 
Egypt. Mutahharl himself describes this situation: 
"I was willing to learn materialist 
thought and its logic through original 
sources. In 1946 I became familliar 
with their books translated into persian 
and Arabic languages published by 
Tudeh party, and also other marxist 
works. I devoted meticulously to study 
the books written by Taql Aranl whose 
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major work was Materialistic Dialecticg 
He came to master the whole subject of materialist philosophy, 
This mastery made him an important contributor to Tabatabei's 
circle and later, after his move to Tehran, an effective 
combatant in the ideological war against marxism and marxist 
influenced interpretation of Islam, 
Numerous refutations of marxism have been essayed in 
Iran, but almost all of them fail to go beyond the obvious 
incompatibilities of Marxism with religious belief and the 
political failures and inconsistencies of marxist political 
parties* Mutahharl, by contrast, went to the philosophical 
roots of the mather and demonstrated with regorous logic the 
contradictory and arbitrarily hypothetic nature of the key 
principles of marxism. His polemical writings are characterized 
more by intellectual than rehetorical or emotional force, 
In 1952, Mutahhari left Qum for Tehran and began teaching 
philosophy at the madrasa-yi Marvi in Tehran. Mutahhari found 
a broader and more satisfying field of religious, educational 
and ultimately political activity. In 195^, he was invited to 
teach philosophy at the Tehran university, where he taught for 
twenty two years. After the Islamic Revolution in Iran he was 
appointed chairman of Concil of Cultural Revolution, Mutahhari's 
services to the Islamic Revolution were brutally cut short 
by his assassination on may 1, 1979, The murder was carried 
out by a group known as Furgiai, which claimed to be the 
•X. 
protagonist of a "progressive Islam,"-"^  
Mutahhari*3 Times; 
From the beginning of the twentieth century to the present 
time art, literature, politics and philosophy have been influenced 
T) 
by a particular mode of thought which may be called westernization 
or occidentosis (gharb zadagi) as called by Jalal Al-Ahmad. This 
pattern of thinking penetrated deeply into all spheres of life 
in the east, particularly in Iran. Even those intellectuals v^o 
were opposed to this mode of thinking were compelled to take 
account of it because of its pervasive influence. The main 
characteristics of this tendency can be enumerated as follows: 
(1)« A loss of confidence in one's own self resulting in the 
phenomenan of self-alienation among the eastern intellectuals. 
(2). Denial of Islamic identity and enqjhasis on nationalism in 
its most flagrant and artificial form imported from the west. 
(3)« Disillusionment with the conventional oriental modes of 
social life and a firm belief in the western forms of culture and 
society. The Iranian writer Jalal Al-Ahmad considers westernization 
as a plague from the west and says: 
I speak of "Occidentosis" as of 
tuberculosis. But perhaps it more 
closely resembles an infestation of 
weevils, have you seen how they 
attack vAieat ? from the inside. 
The bran remains intact, but it is 
just a shell, like a cocoon left 
behind on a tree. At any rate I am 
speaking of a desease: an accident 
from without, spreading in an 
environment rendered susceptible to 
it. Let us seek a diagnosis for this 
complaint and its causes - and, if 
possible, its cure, 
R 
It must be summed up that it was a common belief that 
there was no way to progress except to follow the west and 
its ideology. Predominance of such thinking in intellectual 
circules was a challenge to the muslim world, which was in a 
state of decline culturally, politically and intellectually, 
The ensuing problem of how to make an effort to reconcile 
western thought and culture with Islamic thought had gained 
importance, Muslim thinkers, such as Jamal Al-Din Asadabadi 
popularly known as Al-Afghani, wrestled with this problem, 
The western philosophy too had of course, gained adherents 
whose continued influence culminated in the post - Second 
World war period in the exponents of recent wgstem thought 
such as the Egyption thinker A,R,Badawi who expounded exist-
entialism and wrote such works as Existential Time (1943), and 
others who wrote treatises on logical i)ositivism, 
In Iran westernization in its servile form gained staunch 
adherents. Some of them are M.Malakom Khan, F.A.Akhund Zadeh, 
Nizam Al-Dawleh, and Taqi Zadeh, They were educated in the 
west and returned to Iran to bring in their wake a change in 
the intellectual and cultural life of Iran that was nothing 
but a blind imitation of the west. They called themselves the 
followers of certain western thinkers such as J.J.Rousseau, 
Montesquiev and Luther, Some of them were of the view that 
Iranians should give up religion in order to pave the way for 
social progress and economic development as the west allegedly 
did, while some others came to realize that it was almost 
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impossible to eradicate religion, for it was deeply rooted 
in the minds of people. Therefore they advocated, "Islamic 
protestantism" similar to the western one that arose in 
Germany, Following is the declaration made by M.Malakom Khan 
which indicates the great impact of westernization. 
In the matter of adopting modern 
civilization and the fundamentals of 
intellectual and scientific progress, 
you have no right to invent some thing 
new. You ought to learn from the 
westernes everything in all the crafts 
and industries, from explosives upto 
shoe-making. We have been and are 
dependent on learning these things 
(from the west), 
The unawareness of the fact that the western ideas and 
inventions which came into being were in response to certain 
social, political, and cultural conditions in Europe, caused 
these west-oriented people to adopt the western culture 
uncritically and present it as the only remedy for the East's 
maladies. They held that Iran could have been ushered into an 
era of renaissance only through imraitating the west. 
The other current which endangered the cultural heritages 
and the identity of Iran constituted the emergence of marxism, 
Marxism made inroads in Iran covertly and overtly. It covertly 
appeared in the guise of Islam i.e. tinged with Islamic color 
and bearing the stamp of Islamic terminology for enhancing its 
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acceptabilities. Mutahhari labelled this kind of marxism as 
hypocritical or a deceptive form of \^[jfx\sYn^ It overtly appeared 
as a scientific philosophy and ideology supporting the struggle 
against all forms of exploitation, injustice and inequality 
by means of which it attracted intellectuals infatuated with 
modern western terminology. Adherents of this view attempted 
to gain the sympathesis of the oppressed people of Iran. But 
their area of influence remained confined to a negligible 
minority of educated persons. They could manage to organize 
small groups, which did not prove to be effective in a consider-
able way. From the very beginning they were destined to fail, 
for they had no direct contact with the masses, v/ho were deeply 
religious in their way of life and their modes of thinking. 
The Shah*s measures to suppress and eliminate the leftist 
tendencies contributed to their ineffectiveness to some extent. 
But it was actually the campaign launched by Islamic writers 
which eleminated them and their influence from Iran's intellect-
ual as well as political scene. Imam Khomeini was very explicit 
from the very beginning of his revolutionary movement, which 
gathered momentum during the 196O and culminated in the 1970, 
that there was no question of Joining hands with the marxists 
of any brand in any political alliance. Mutahhari's writings 
were also directed mainly against this overt encroachments of 
marxist philosophy upon Iran's intellectual activities. The 
history of the present century in Iran is the history of fierce 
ideological clashes which made a lasting impact on philosophical, 
social and political thought. If one goes into the details 
of this process, he will find the emergence of various responses 
to the onslaught of western thought in Iran, praticularly after 
the failure of the 1953 coup de*tet« which brought back the shah 
to power with the aid of the U.S.A. 
IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE IN RETROSPECT; 
JamsQ. Al-Din Asadabadl (1838-97) popularly known as 
Al-Afghanis noticed the eruption of scientific knowledge in the 
west, which brought in its wake a materialistic philosophy. He 
atten^ted to save the Muslim world from this negative impact 
of the west which threatened the identity of muslims through 
a process of westernization. He even compiled a book named 
In Refutation of Naturalism in which he dealt with this problem, 
Unfortunately he lacked philosophical insight and could not rise 
above polemics. Otherwise his work would have been more 
influential. One of his moves was to write letters to the 
religious leaders of Iran and other countries, exposing the 
criminal and fearful consequences of western colonisation. The 
letter that he wrote to the late Mlrza Shirazi proved to be a 
turning point in the history of Iran. Mirza Shirazi after 
learning what happening in Iran, began to think of tackling the 
problem. The first step he took was to oppose the tobacco 
concession. Seventeen months had passed since the Government 
had signed the contract in favour a British company, which, could 
be a means of the British domination over Iran. On 19th Dhi 
Al-Hi;iah 1308 (27th July 1929), Mirza Shirazi sent a telegram 
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to Naser Al-DIn Shah and declared his opposition to the Tobacco 
concession. At the same time he issued his final decree (Fatva) 
of prohibition. When it reached Tehran, the news created an 
uproar in the capital like an explosion and its message spread 
every where within tv/o hours. This revolutionary step in 
boycotting the use of Tobacco in any form as a protest against 
the Tobacco concession to Britain by Iran, which could have 
brought Iran at par with British colonies, was not only a 
crushing blow to British colonisation, but it also gave a fresh 
impetus to the subdued struggle against the self-centered 
despotic Qa;jar dynasty. Later it assumed the form of the 
Constitutional Movement, which became successful and struck a 
decisive blow on the tyrannical Qajar regime. This was the 
first step that ultimately led to overthrowing the Qajars, 
In the Constitutional Movement too, the role of the 
militant*ulama in the struggle against western imperialism has 
been epoch-making. Among the distinguished leaders whose names 
have been impressed on the pages of the history of revolution 
and the awakening of the Iranian people because of their 
endeavour, and crusades, three brilliant and everlasting 
personalities stand out. They are Mirza Shlrazl who paved the 
way for the awakening of the people by his clear sightedness 
and wisdom to ;)oin the wave of uprising: Sayyid Muhammad Tabatabai 
and Sayyid Abdullah Behbahani, 
J l 
Ahmad Kisravl, the well known historian of the Constitutional 
Movement, even though violently opposed to the "Ulama", writes in 
this connection, 
"The Constitutional Movement was 
started by Messers Tabatabai and 
Behbahani and other Ulaaa, but the 
newspapers attributed it to people 
like mushir Al-Diwaleh." 
At the same time some other "ulama also put up a fight, 
such as shaykh Fadlullah Nuri, Sayyid JamaQ. Waiz Isfahanl, Meilik 
Al-Mutakallimin, Sheykh Muhammad Khiyabanl, Thiqat Al-Islam, 
alongwlth the western-oriented intellectuals. 
The British plotters were so desperate that they attempted 
to deviate the Constitution Movement from the right direction 
through their west-oriented supporters in Iran. As a consequence 
of this deviation Shaykh Fadlullah Nu]?i raised his banner against 
the western style danocracy, for which he was dubbed as a 
reactionary and was consequently hanged by the order of a govern-
ment led by the west - oriented members of parliament. As Hamad 
Algar i)ointed out, Jalal Al-e Ahmad the persian writer was the 
first person to correctly evaluate Fadlullah Nurl*s contribution 
to the cause of revolution. We quote here Jalal's views regarding 
Fadlullah Nurl: 
"I look on that great man's 
body on the gallows as a flag raised 
over our nation proclaiming the 
triumph of occidentosis after two 
hundred years of struggle, 
Under this flag we are like strangers 1^ 
to ourselves, in our food and dress, 
our homes, our manners, our publications, 
and most dangerous, our culture. 
We try to educate ourselves in the 
European style and strive to solve 
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every problem as the Europeans world." 
Muddares (1288/1870-1357/1938) another well knovm figure 
of the period of struggle against the Qajars which culminated in 
the einergence of Rida Khan as the dictator - King brought to 
power by the British a>sents, registered his name in the contempo-
rary history of Iran in the ranl<:s of the most raillitant fighters 
for democracy. He too was executed by the order of Rida Khan. 
During the same age the Jungle Hoveinent led by Mlrza Kuchik 
Khan Jangall attracted not only the attention of Iranian rulers 
but also called for international intervention. Kuchik Khan 
established a sort of a mini Islamic socialist state in the 
Jungle of Rasht (gilan) which was dreaded by Rida Khan who 
conspired v;ith the post Revolution leaders of U.S.S.R. to get 
him murdered. The rise of the jungle movement threatened the 
British and Russians, both nev/ pada. 
The history of recent participation of "Ulama in 
political life of Iran is headed by Ayatullah Kashani. He 
in the company of his father went to Iraq in 191 A. When 
the world war I started and English army annexed the 
region of Iraq, he was among those who fought against 
British occupation of Iraq, The freedom fig ;ters v/ere 
able to stop the advance of the invading forces at the P^ ut-Al-
Amira Zone. V/hen the v;ar ended lie returned to Iran and resumed 
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his extensive combat against the western powers, particularly 
the British, He is acclaimed as the moving spirit behind the 
nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, which was led by 
Dr.Mussediq politically, while Ayatollah Kashani was at the 
vanguard of religious support to it. It was actually Kashani 
who persuaded Mussadiq to adopt a firm policy of nationalization. 
He was made the majlia speaker during the Mussadiq's government 
after the shah was forced to escape from Iran, This movement 
was crushed by an American coup, detat (1953) which had been 
planned well in advance by the CI,A, Once again the shah, 
brought back by imperialism, was installed as the main actor in 
the arena of Iranian politics in order to save his new western 
master, now the U,S,A, He imposed the rule of terror and 
suppression and repressed all democratic ideas and protests. He 
created the dreaded savak and an army armed from nails to teeth 
with the most sophisticated weapons and instruments of death 
and torture. People were killed callously and all opposition 
was crushed ruthlessly. Again a struggle against American 
influence got momentum gradually which reached its peak in the 
blood-drenched uprising of the 15th khurded of 13^2 (6 the 
June- 1963) in which the U,S,A, played the key role, (It was 
actually the Americans that laid down and executed all the 
internal and external policies of the shah). That date was a 
turning point in the anti-colonial and anti-despotic struggle 
of the Iranian nation which was led by Ayatollah Ruhullah Al-
Musavl Al-Khumeini first from Qum, and later from Turky and 
Iraq during his exile from Iran, 
l'^ 
The Fadaiyan-e-Islam movement was formed under the 
leadership of Nawwab Safavi. He organised his group to confront 
the hired agents of foreign powers and the danger posed to Islam 
by an imposed culture. They started an armed struggle against 
the pahlavi regime in 13^2 (1963-64). They assassinated Hasan 
Ali Maji§ur, the Prime Minister at the time* His crime was that, 
he signed the Capitulation Agreement, 
The late Ayatullah Taleghanl, honoring the memory of 
Dr, Mussadiq, said on 12 Isfand 1357 (1978) at Ahmad Abad: "It 
was the Fedaiyans of Islam who paved the way for the national 
Q 
front and Dr. Mussadiq." 
Mutahharl while he was a student and fledgling teacher 
in Qum, had sought to instil political consciousness in his 
contemporaries and was particularly close to those among them 
who were active in the political arena. After his move to 
Tehran he collaburated with the freedom movement of Iran but 
never became a leading figure in the group. His first confront-
ation with the Shah regime came during the uprising of Khurdad 
15-1342/June 6, 1963. When he showed himself to be politically 
as well as intellectually a follower of Imam Khumeini. He was 
accordingly arrested and held for forty three days. After his 
release he participated actively in the various organizations, 
In November 1964, Imam Khomeini entered on his fourteen years 
of exile spent in Turky and then in Iraq, and throughout this 
period Mutahharl remained in touch with the Imam directly and 
indirectly. When the Islamic Revolution of Iran approached its 
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truimphant climax in the winter of 1976, Mutahhari 's services 
to the Islamic Revolution war were b r u t a l l y cut short by his 
a s sa s s ina t i on on May 1, 1979. 
G 
B - MATERIALISM t A CHALLAIJGE TO ISLAM 
The problem regarding materialism and its challange to 
Islam is traceable to the very beginning of Islam. During the 
life time of the Prophet Muhammad(s) a group of people held 
materialistic ideas as Quran referred to them in the following 
verse: 
And they say "What is there but our life in 
this 'v^ rld? we shall die and live and 
nothing but time can destroy us." But of that 
they have no knov/ledge, they merely 
conjecture. (S.XLV: 24)^ 
The term "Dahr" means world or nature. A man who believes 
that nature is self-sufficient, is called a dahri, that is a 
naturalist. Greek philosophy made an impact on the Muslims 
after the Abbasids came to power in the second half of the 
second Hijrah century. Muslims also came in touch with various 
cultures and schools of thought and apparently non-muslims also 
could express their beliefs and ideas freely. V/e find references 
to polemics and discussions held with naturalists in the 
traditions of Imam Jafar Al-Sadiq(A). During those days even 
materialists were free to sit in the mosques and conduct 
discussions regarding the existence of God, man, fate and so 
on and so forth. 
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Abd Al-Karlm Ibn Abl Al-Awja* was an atheist and he had 
formed his groijp. One of the companions of Imam Al-Sadiq(A), 
Mufaddal ibn Umar, reported to the Imam Ibn Abi Al-Awja's 
arguments against the existence of God, In refutation of 
those arguments the Imam delivei^ ed detailed lectures in many 
sittings, which were compiled by Mufaddal in the form of 
Tawbld gd-Mufaddal (13)» However, atheism or naturalism coiald 
not be presented by any thinker in a systematic form at that 
time* 
To trace the origin of materialism we have to go back 
to Greek philosophy in which Democritus, Epicurus, Lucritius 
the author of De Rarum Nature gave a systematic form to 
materialism. But in the later centuries due to the all embracing 
influence of religion materialism remained suppressed to a great 
extent. It found new supporters and ideologues in the 17th and 
the 18th century thinkers who inspired by the advancement of 
natural sciences, forwarded a philosophy of nature based upon 
the notion of the primacy or matter and self-sufficiency of 
nature. Their approach was mechanistic and dogmatic. 
The French positivists, who founded the Social Sciences, 
were materialists. In Germany this tendency found many an 
exponent among whom Ludwig Faurbauch was the most eminent, 
Faurbauch made an effort to raise materialism from the dogmatic 
and mechanistic level. He was a Hegelian in the first phaSe 
of his career. Afterwards he made use of Hegelianism to develop 
a materialist philosophy, Karlmarx and Fredrich Engels were 
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Inspired by Faurbauch in synthesising Hegelian dialecties into 
a new form of materialistic philosophy, known as dialectical 
materialism, Sidney Hook, the author of the book From Hegel to 
Marx says: 
"What fundamentally separates Marx from 
Feuerbach is his historical approach and 
his concrete analysis of those factors of 
social life which appear in Feuerbach only 
as abstractions. Another way of putting 
this is to say that Marx differs from 
Feuerbach even where he adopts Feuerbachian 
principles in the stress he places upon the 
dialectical method and the concrete application 
he makes of it# On several occasions he 
specifically reproaches Feuerbach for his 
lack of dialectic and goes so far as to 
attribute to him a share of the responsibility 
for the neglect by contemporaries of the 
rational kernel of Hegel*s method. Faurbauch 
had simply repudiated Hegel*s philosophy 
without attempting to disengage Hegel*s 
methodological insights from his systematic 
errors. Marx himself died before he could 
write the materialistic dialectic in which 
he had planned to criticise, in immanent 
detail, the logic of Hegel. But the methodology 
of his work as well as his explicit criticisms 
of Feuerbach suffice to provide the main 
10 
outlines of his philosophy." 
It may be added that Karl Marx was critical of the 17th and 
18th century mechanism, which he regarded as amateurish and 
dogmatic, while he was influenced by greek materialism, which 
11 had advanced a moral vision too. 
J 9 
Materialism is a monistic philosophy holding matter as 
the primary staff and spirit to be secondary, a by product of 
matter* By dialectic they hold there is endless motion in 
nature. All physical objects and phenomena are in fliix, 
Matter and motion were considered to be the ultimate principles 
of the ifirorld by old materialist schools also, but Marxist 
philosophy adds to these two principles a certain process of^ 
development governed by the laws of dialectics; 
(1)» The law of contradiction 
(2). The law of quantitative changes giving rise to 
qualitative changes. 
(3)« The law of the Unity of Opposites 
(4). The law of the negation of negation. 
These laws govern not only natural phenomena, but also 
determine the process of social and historical changes. Dialect-
ical materialism forms the metaphysics of this philosophy, while 
historical materialism deals with the laws of social change 
leading to the evolution of human society. Historical materialism 
holds material conditions as the basis of all social developments. 
Material conditions are essentially economic, that is, modes of 
production and distribution of the products of human labour 
upon which the society is built up. The super structure of 
society representing qualitative changes in human thought such 
as Religion, art, cultural creativity. Law etc., is determined 
by the economic, that is quantitative changes. At a particular 
stage a particular social structure gives rise to its contradiction 
which is called the negation of negation, for instance feudalism 
'"0 
giving rise to capitalism, and in its turn giving birth to 
socialism* Dialectic is the logic and methodology of Marxism 
and as well as its metaphysics. This philosophy claims to be 
scientific, open to discoveries of new truths with the advancement 
of science, but in practice the Marxists turned it into a 
dogmatic and even a mechanistic approach to human issues by 
refusing to see new developments in the world, particularly in 
socialist societies and states, 
Marxism was introduced to Iranian intellectuals in the 
later half of the 20th century through Arabic and Persian 
translation of the Marxist works, published by the TUdeh party, 
the major Marxist organization in Iran at that time. In addition 
the writings of Taqi Arani, the main theoretician of the tudeh 
party played an important role in this regard. 
Marxism appeared mainly as propaganda. Later on it assumed 
denagogic form with an emotional appeal for the young and raw 
people of both the working class and intellectuals. Advocates 
of this view raised slogans that caught the attention of students, 
writers and workers. They tried to convince the disgruntled 
elements of society that religion was the root cause of all 
their deprivation and sufferings therefore it is to be rooted 
out in order to pave the way for a just social order. The 
direct attack on religion could lead to alienation of the people 
as their way of life was deeply rooted in the religious spirit. 
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Therefore they followed a policy which was aimed at 
projection religion in a bad light by means of the distortion 
of Islamic personages and their ideas, they put forward Hafiz 
12 
as a materialist and atheist, Where as Hafiz was one of the 
greatest poets of the muslim world expressing the Islamic out-
look of the world in a beautiful artistic manner. They presented 
other personages like Zakariyya Razl, Ibn Al-Mugaffa and Umar 
Khayyam also as materialists. They maintained that Mansur HallaJ 
1 ^  
was not only a materialist but also a dialectcion.^ It means 
a thousand years before Marx and Engles there was a man who 
had evolved an ideology similar to Marxism despite living in an 
age when the development of the modes of production had not 
reached a stage favourable for such a thinking. An obvious 
contradiction, for they are of the view that man's thinking is 
conditioned by the economic relations of society. The question 
which arises here is: How did Karl Marx and Mansur Halla;3 
living in different stages of the development of material 
conditions of life, arrive at the same ideology ? 
They believe that Mansur's Sgying "I am Ck)d»( ) 
amounted to the negation of God. He was believed to be a 
dialectician, because he said, "There is life after my life" 
( ) which, they maintained, meant an assertion of 
the law of negation of negation. 
Realizing that such attempts were counter productive, 
they adopted a different course of ideological propaganda. They 
tinged materialism with Islamic concepts and made it appear as 
>y-
bearing the stamp of Islamic ideology for enhancing its 
acceptability. Martyr Mutahhari believed that it posed a 
grave danger to the ideology and teaching of Islam. 
A brief exposition and analysis of the Marxist approach 
to Islam and its attempt to reconcile Marxism with Islam need 
our attention at this stage. The Marxists believe that the 
will of God is revolutionary and His mode of thinking is based 
on the wish for the victory of exploited lower classes over 
exploiters and upper classes. Therefore, in order to realize 
His will He (God) formed a great party consisting of all 
revolutionary and progressive human beings, against which the 
party of exploiters struggle. They ddevided all human being 
in two groups: The oppressed (mustazifin) and the oppressors 
(raustakbirin). They also include all the prophets in the 
former. In this type of misinterpretation of Islam and the 
Quran, the former was done by Marxists in general, and the 
ideologues of the Sazman-e Mujahidine Khallq (M.K.O.) in 
particular. It would not be out of place to say that some 
truely sincere muslims also were trapped by this jargon of the 
so-called revolutionary Islamicists. They presented the Quran 
as a Text book of The Philosophy of revolution. Any one who 
subscribes to this "revolutionary interpretation" is entitled 
to be a member of this party. Regarding the concept of God 
they believe God is absolute end of evolution; and that the 
world through its evolutionary movement moves towards this 
:^3 
absolute end. They go on to show that Muslims from tlie very 
beginning were divided in these two poles: A short history 
of the worlds a Russian publication, has described Imam 
"A11"(A) and his sons Imam Al-Hasan and Imam Al-Husayn(A), 
to be the champions of the interests of the landless Muslims. 
The blind followers of this interpretation of Muslim history 
go further than their teachers. For instance, according to 
them, after the deatn of the Frophet(S), Fatimah's House 
became the center of deprived and exploited people of Madinah 
and some of the companions of the Prophet(S) like Abu-Dhar, 
Migdad and Bilal, v/ho were from lower class, v/ent there for 
guidance. Fatima(s) and her family v/ere also included by 
Iranian Marxists among the oppressed people. Martyr Mutahharl 
discussed these misconceptions and misinterpretations in a 
comprehensive manner in "Ilale-e Girayish be Maddlgari" 
(Reasons for the turn to materialism) and "History and Society." 
'r:A 
C - MDTAHHARI'S WORKS AND THEIR THRUST 
19 The following is a complete list of Mutahhari's works : 
(A). Publications; 
1. Usul-e Falsafeh v/a Ravish-e Riyalism (The Principal 
of philosophy and the Method of Realism), in five 
volumes, (Qum, Sadra publication, Volume I (1953), 
volume II (195A), volume III (1956), volume IV (1985), 
volume V (1971). This book is v/ritten by *Allameh 
Tabatabai and introduction, footnotes and commotar}^ is 
given by Mutahhari. 
2. Ilal-e Girayish beh Maddlqarl (Reasons for t ;e turn 
to Materialism), (Qum, Sadra publications, 1978). 
3. Ashnai ba Ulume-e Islaml (An Introduction to the 
Islamic Sciences),(Qum, Sadra publications): 
a). Falsafeh wa mantig (Philosophy anci Lofric), 1979. 
b). *'lrfan wa Kalam Clrfan and Kalam), 1980. 
c). Fiqh v/a Usuale-e Fiqh (Fiqh and the principles of 
Fiqh), 1979. 
d). Hikmat~e Amall (Practical V/isdom). 
4. Muqaddameh-yi bar Jah'an bini-'yi Islaml (An Introduction 
to the Islamic •;orld viev;), (Qum, Sadra Public^'tions); 
a). Jamiah wa Tarlkh (History and Society), English 
translation separately by Maliqah qarai entitled 
History and Society (Tehran, Sazeman-e Tablighat-e 
4^ r 
I s l a m i , 1986) and by R. Comptaell under the t i t l e 
of S o c i a l and H i s t o r i c a l changes ( C a l i f u r n i a , Mizan 
P r e s s , 198A). 
b ) . Insan wa Iman (Man and F a i t h ) , 1978. 
c ) . Insan wa Sarnawisht (Man and h i s D e s t i n y ) , Engl ish 
t r a n s l a t i o n , R. Cornpbell. 
d ) . Insan d a r Quran (Man i n t h e Quran) , 
G ) . Jahan b l n l - y i Tawhidl (Mone the i s t i c World v i ew) , 
1978, Eng l i sh t r a n s l a t i o n , R. Cornpbell. 
f ) . Wahy wa Nabuwwat ( R e v e l a t i o n and Prophethood) , 1978. 
g ) , Zindagl-ye Jawld ya Hayat~e Ukharawl (The L i fe 
E t e r n a l ) , 1979, Eng l i sh t r a n s l a t i o n , M.Sohrabi and 
Z.Kasaian (Tehran University Press, 1982), 
5. a). Sharh~e Manzumeh (A Commentory on Mulla Hadi Sabzawari's 
Sharh-e Manzumeh) in two volumes, (Tehran, Hikmat 
Publication, 1981). 
b). Sharh-e Mabsut-e Manzumeh ( A Detailed Commentory on 
• • • • 
Sharh-e Manzumah), in two volumes, (Tehran, Hikmat 
Publications, 1983). 
6. Nadqdi bar Marxism (A Critique of Marxism), (Qum, Sadra 
Publication), This book is collection of 45 Lectures. 
?• Khadamat-e Mutaqabel-e Islam wa Iran (Mutual Services of 
Islam and Iran), in two volumes. English translation, 
Prof. Wahid' Akhtar and All Qull Qaral, (Tehran, Saseman-e 
Tablighat-e Tablighat-e IslSmi). 
J^G 
8, Nlzame-e Ijuquq-e Zan dar Islam (The System of V/omen's 
Right in Islam, (Qum, Sadra Publication, 1966), This 
book is collection of 33 articles published in 
Zan-e Ruz magazine, English translation, *Vorld Orga-
nization for Islamic Services, Tehran, 
9. Adl-e Ilahi (Divine Justice), (Qum, Sadra Publication, 
1970). 
10. Sayrl dar Nah.1 al~Bal5gheh (Glimpses of the Maiij al 
Balagheh), (Qum, Dar al-Tabllq Publication, 1972), 
This book is collection of articles published in 
Maktab~e Islam Journal, English translation, 'All Qull 
Qaral, (Tehran, Sazman-e Tablighat-e Islaml). 
11. Nihdatha-yi Sad Saleh-yi Isiami Akhlr (The Islamic 
ffovements in the Last one hundred years), (Qum, Asr 
Publications 1978), Translated into English. 
12. Insan-e Kamil (Perfect Man), (Tehran, Committee 
Inqilab-e Islami). 
13. Akhlaq-e Jinsi (Sex Ethics), (Tehran, "uhammadl 
Publications, 1965), This book is collection of seven 
articles published in maktab-e Islam journal, 
translated into English. 
14. Khatm-e Mabuwwat (End or Completion of Frophethood) 
Tehran, Sherkat-e Sahami-ye Intisharat, 1968). 
\ll 
15. Payambar-e Umml (The Illitcrat Prophet(s)), (Tehran, 
Sheralcat-e Sahaml-ye Intisherat). 
16. Cdam wa Inqllab-e I4ahdi az dldgah-e Falsa£e-yl 
Tarlkh (The Mission and Revolution of Imam r-iahdi(A) 
from the View point of Philosophy of History), 
(Mashhad, wahy publications, 1975). 
17.Maskl'fih-yi Hi .jab (The Question ol Covering of -Voman), 
(Tehran, sherkat-e sahami-yi intisharat, 1968), This 
book is collection of lectures. 
18. Imdadha-yi Ghaybl dar zindafii-yi Bashar (Unseen 
aids in Human life), (Tehran, intesh'ar'at-e lilami, 
1975)f This book is collection of two lectures 
delivered in 1965-67). 
19. Jazibeh wa Dafieh Imam All (A) (Attraction and 
Repulsion concerning Imam 'Ali(A) ), This book is 
collection of four lectures. 
20. V/ilaha wa V/ilayat ha (Friendships and Divine 
Guardianship), (Tehran, huseyni-yeh irshad 
publication, 1970). 
21. Shahid (Martyr), (Tehran, Hikmat Public-ticns) 
22. Kitab suzl-yi Iran v;a Misr (Burning of Books in 
« 
Iran and Egypt), (Tehran, Husayniyeh-yi irshad 
publication, 1968), This is colioction oi two 
lectures delivered in I968. 
;r'8 
23. Das tan-e Rastan (Stoi-ios oi the Truthf u] Is), in 
two volumes, (Qum, Sadra Publications, volume I 
(1950), Volume II, (1954). This book gained the 
first prize as year book by Unesco in 19o5. 
24, Masaleh-yi Nifaq (The Question of Hypocracy), 
(Tehran, Islamic Republic Party, 1980). 
25. Hadal wa Zinda^i (Life and its Goal), (Tehran, 
Islamic Republic party, 1980). 
26. Tamasha^ah-he Raz (The Arena of Secret). 
27. Ashnai ba Quran (Introducting the Quran), (Qxom, 
Sadra Publications, 1980). 
28, Shinlikht-e Quran (Knowing the Quran), Tehran, Sadra 
Publications, 1980), 
29. Guftarha-yi Manavl (Spiritual Discourses), (Qum, 
Sadra publications, 1982). 
30, Himaseh-yi Husaynl (The epic of Husayn(A) ), in two 
volumes, (Qum, Sadra publications, 1902). 
31, Islam wa Nlyazha~ye Jahan-e Imrez (islam and Contem-
porary Needs), (Tehran, Islamic Republic party, 
1982). 
32, Hag wa Batil (Truth and Falshood), (Tehran, Sadra 
Publications, 1982). 
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33. Slma-yl Islam (The Mien of Is lam), (Qum, Dar a l -
Tabligh, 1969). 
34. Guftar-e Mah (Discourses of the Month), (Tehran, 
Sadra Pub l i c a t i ons ) . 
35. Unsur-e Amr-e beh Maruf wa Nahy az Monkar dar 
Nehzat-e Hosaynl (The Role of the Pr inc ip le of 
Enjoining good and Forbiding ev i l in the Movement 
of Imam Husayn(A) (Tehran, Islamic Republic par ty 
p u b l i c a t i o n s ) . This book i s co l l e c t i on of s ix 
l e c t u r e s . 
36. Guftari dar bareh~yi Jumburi-yi Islami (A discourse 
on the Islamic r e p u b l i c ) , Qum, Sadra Pub l i ca t ions ) . 
37. Masaleh-yi Bimeh (The Question of Insurance) , (Tehran, 
Mlqat pub l i ca t i ons , 1982), 
38. J ihad (Holy war) , (Qum, Sadra Pub l i c a t i ons ) . 
39. Mabahith-e I q t i g a d i (Economic I s s u e s ) , (Qum, Sepah-he 
pasdaran I s l a m i ) . 
40. Hi.1 r a t wa Jihad (Migration and Holy war) , (Tehran, 
Islamic Republic pa r ty , 1981). 
4 1 . Pah Guftar (Ten Discourses) , (Tehran, Hiknat 
pub l i ca t i ons , 1977), This book is co l l ec t i on of nine 
l e c t u r e s and one a r t i c l e s (1960-62). 
30 
a). Taqwa (Piety) 
b). Athar-e Taqwa (The Sings of Piety). 
c). Asle-e Amr beh Ma'ruf wa Nahy Az Munkar (The 
Principle of Enjoining good and forbidding evil). 
d). lotihad. 
e), Ihya-yi Fikre-Dinl (The Revival of Religious 
thought)• 
f). Farizeh-yi 'Ilm (The Function of knowledge). 
g), Rahbari-ya Nasl-e Jawan (Guiding of the New 
Generation)• 
h). Khitabeh wa Minbar (a) (Sermon and the pulpit). 
i). Khitabeh wa minbar (b) (Ibid). 
J). Mushkil-e Asaasl - dar Sazraan-e Ruh"anniyat (The 
fundamental problem concerning the institution 
of spirituality or clergyship). 
42. Blst Guftar (Twenty Di scourses), (Tehran, Sadra Publi-
cations, 1979), This book is collection of twenty 
lectures delivered in 1959-61. 
a). "Adalat Az Nazar-e Imam 'Ali(A) (Justice from 
Imam 'All's view point). 
b). Bahthe-e 'Adalat dar Kalam-e Islam (The issue 
of justice in Islamic 'ilmeal-kalam). 
c). Ahamiyat-e Hugug v/a biahamiyato-e dunya) (The 
importance of I'ighcs and v/orthlessness of the 
v/o rid) • 
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d) • Mablini-yeh awvaliyyeh-ye Hugguf; Az Wazar-G 
Islam (The foundations of rights: An Islamic 
view). 
e ) , 'Adalat Ya Musav/at ( Jus t i ce and e q u a l i t y ) . 
f ) , Sa'y v/a kushish v/a Razzaqiyyiat-e Khuda) 
(Endeavour and e f for t ann the providership of 
God). 
g ) . Imai.. 3adiq(A). 
h ) . Fav/aid-e Gi ra f t a r l wa Shadaid (The advantages 
of d i f f i c u l t i e s and ha rdsh ips ) . 
i ) . Fav/aid v/a Athar-e Iman (Benefits and signs of 
f a i t h ) . 
j ) . Nazar-e Din Dar Bareh-yi Dunya (The r e l i g i o u s 
view of the v/orld). 
k ) . Nazar-e Islam Dar Bareh-yi ' l ira (The Islamic view 
of knowledge). 
1 ) . Pursishha-ye Dini (Theological ques t ions ) . 
m). 'Aql wa Dil ( i n t e l l e c t and the Hear t ) . 
n ) . Qur'an wa Mas'aleh-ye Tafakkur (The Quran and 
the i s sue of contemplat ion) . 
o ) . Darsi Keh Az f a s l - e Bahar Bayad Amukhat ( the 
lesson to be l e a r n t from the spring season) . 
p ) . Tarz-e I s t i d l a l - e Quran Beh Mas'aleh-ya Hayat 
Bar Tawhld (The Qur'anic argument for the l i f e 
of monothesm). 
q ) . Dua (Supp l i ca t ion ) . 
:\2 
r ) . Dastgah-e Idrki -ye Basher (The systeni of liu:ian 
perception). 
s). Irikarha-ye Blja (Pointless negntions). 
43. Fitrat (Nature), (Tehran, Islamic asbocation of 
civil engineering student). 
44. Ilhami az Shykh al-Talfeh (An Inspiration from Shaykh 
al-Taifah), (Karaj, Karaj Press, 1970). 
45. Al-Tahsil (An annotated edition of Balinaniyar's work) 
(Tehran, Tehology College of Tehran University, 1970). 
46. Maqalat-e Falsafi (Philosophical Essays), (Tehran, 
hikmat publications, 1980). 
47. Nazargah-e Islam piramun-e Moziglri-ye Tabaqatl (The 
position of Islam concerning class struggle), (Tehran 
Islamic association of civil engineering students) 
48. Takamul-e Litimai-ye Inslin dar Tarlkh (Social evolution 
of Man in History), (Mashhad, Islamic republic party 1976 
49. Falsafeh-ye Akhlaq (Philosophy of Ethics), (Tehran, 
Bonyad-e 15 Khordad publication, 1983). 
50. Riba, Banl^ , Bimeh (Usury, Bank and Insurance). 
51. Talim wa Tarblyyat dar Islam (Education and Training in 
Islam). 
52. Tawhld (Rahha-ye ithbat-e wujud-e Khuda), Divine 
unity: Proofs of God's existence), 
53. Sirat-e Nabawi (The Prophet's Vissage) (Qum, Sadra 
publications, 1982). 
B - UNPUBLISHED WORKS; 
(1). Falsafeh-ve Tarlkh (Philosophy of History). 
(2). Iqtesad-e Islaml (islamic Economics). 
(3). Mas'aleh-ye Shinakht (Issues in episteraology) 
(4). Mas'aleh-ye Bardap;! (The Question of Slavery). 
(5). ^Irfan-e Hafiz (Sufism of Hafiz), 
(6). Imamat wa Rahbari (iraamat and Leadership) 
(7). Sirat-e Pavambar(S) (The Visage of the Prophet(S). 
(8), Darsha-yi Az Asfar (Lectures on the Asfar Al-Arba'ah 
of Mullah Sadra). 
(9). Insan Az Nazar-e Islam wa Marxism (Man in Islam and 
Marxism). 
(10), Agahlhli-ye Ins'an (Awarenesses of Man). 
C - Theses and dissertations for M.A. or Ph.D.degree written 
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under his supervision or with his assistence. 
Ph.D.Theses; 
(1), Muhammad Husayn Dlya'i Bigdeli: Falsafat ul-Ijaz 
(Philosophy of Miracles); 3, 19, 1965. (March 19) 
(2). Ismail Waiz Jawadi: Huduth wa Qidam (Contingency and 
Eternity); 6, 3I, 1967. (June 31) 
(3)« Muhammad Jawad Bahunar (E2c-Prime Minister of Islamic 
Republic of Iran from 5th August 1981 to 31st August 
1981): Igalat-e Insan Az Nazar-e-Quran (The Quranic 
view of humanism). 11, 20, 1969. (December 20). 
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(4). Fath All Akbari: Muqayeseh wa Tatbiq-e Mantiq-e 
Arastul Islam! Ba Mantiq^e Riyadi-ye Jadid ( A 
comparative study of Islamic Aristotelian logic 
and new mathematical logic); 5, 16, 1977. (May 16). 
(5). Sayyid 'All Danishwar: 'Illat wa Ma'lul Az Nazar-e 
Falsafeh-ye Qadim (Cause and effect in ancient 
philosophy); 5, 19, 1970. (Hay 19). 
(6), 'All Shafai: Tabqiq Par Ara-ye Falsafai-ye Ibn-e 
Rushld wa Muqayesh Ba Ara-ye Ibne-e Sina (A Comp-
arative study of the views of Ibn-e Rushd and Ibn-e 
Sina); 5, 17, 1971. (May 17). 
(7)« Hasan Khwajeh Nuri: Jabr wa Ikhtiyar Az Nazar-e-
Mazhab wa Maba'd Al-tabl'ah (Determinism and 
Freedom from Religious and Metaphysical View Points); 
11, 23, 1972. (November 23) 
(8). H^ayn Khalll: Afarlnish Az dld-e Falsafl Wa Nazar-e 
Falasefeh-ye Islami Par Bareh-ye An (Creation: 
Philosophical approach with reference to Muslim 
philosophers); 1, 14, 1972. (January 14). 
(9). Ghulam Husayn Neginl: Mugayeseh-ye Ara-ye Arastu 
wa Ibn-e Sina Par Ilahlyyata-e bi al-manl Al-Akhag 
(Comparative study of the metaphysics (Theology)' of 
Aristotle and Ibn-e Sina); 2, 22, 1972.(February 22) 
:]r^ 
(10), Muhammad Taql Shari'afi (No relation with the 
famous Dr. *A11 Shariatl): Tahlil wa Barrasi~ye 
Mantiq-e Suhraward! wa Muqayeseh-ye An Ba I^ Iantiq-e 
Arastui (An Analysis and study of Sohrawardi's 
logic and its comparison with Aristotelian logic); 
3, 23, 1973. (March 23). 
(11). Ahmad Tawana; Barrasi wa Tahqlq Par Bareh-ye 
Kitab-e Muhassal Khwajeh Tusi (A critical study 
Of Khwajeh Tusi's "Muhassal"); 5, 31, 1973.(May 31). 
(12). Asghar Dadbeh: Tahqlq Par Nazariyyat-e Khasseh 
Filsuf-e Qani'-e SIzdahum Marhum Aqa ' All Mudarris 
Zanzawi (A special study ofa thirteenth century(H) 
philosopher's views Late 'All Mudarris Zanzawi'); 
5, 31, 1973. (May 31). 
(13). Ahmad Khusrowjerdi: Ara-ye Khasseh-ye Sadr ul-
Muta ' a l l i h ln Par ' I lm a l -nafs Ba Tawa.LJuh Beh Ara-
ye Mutafakkaran-e Pigar (A specia l study of Sadr 
u l - M u t a ' a l l i h i n ' s views concerning Psychology and 
a comparative study of o ther t h i n k e r s ' views); 
5, 11 , 1974. (May 1 l ) . 
( l 4 ) . Sayyid Muhammad Husayan Bih i sh t l (Chief of Supreme 
Court from 1979 martyred on 30th June 1981): 
Mas'aeleh-ye Ma ba 'd a l -Tab i ' ah Par Quran (Metaphy-
s i c a l I ssues in the Quran); 1, 21 , 1974. (January21) 
8n 
(15). •Abdullah Shaklba: Athar wa Afkar-e-Falsafl-ye Sayyld 
Sadr Al»Dln Dashtaki (Sayyid Sadr Al-Din Dashtaki's works 
and views); 2, 2, 1974. (February 2). 
(16), Sayyid Hasan Asadl: Bayan-e Maqgud-e Falasifeh Az Aslat-e 
« 
wu.jud wa Ishtirak (Philosopher's object concerning the 
meaning of the primacy of being and its plurality); 
2, 17, 1974. (February 17) 
(17). Muhammad Rida Mashai: Jawahlr Al-Sighar"e Sallbeh; 
2, 29, 1976. (February 29). 
(18). Ghulam Husayan Ibr"ahlml Dinarii: Qawald~e Kulll-ye FalsafI 
Par Falsafeh-ye Isliiml (General Principles in Islamic 
philosophy); 11, 30, 1976. (January 30) 
(19). Sayyid Mahdi Imami Al-'Aridl: Bakht wa Ittifaq Az Nazar^e 
Falasifeh (Fate and Chance from philosopher's view-point) 
5, 14, 1977. (May 14). 
(20). Masha' Allah Talachiyan: Dawari Mlyan-e Ibn-e Rushd wa 
Ghazzall (The evalution of the differences between Ibn-e 
Rushd and Ghazziai); 12, 12, 1977. (December 12). 
(21). Sayyid Husayn Khab Nama: Maad Az Nazar-e Falasifeh Islaal 
(Muslim philosopher's view concerning the "Resurrection"); 
5, 15, 1979. (May 15) 
(22). Hurmuz Bahmanpur: Tanasukh wa Tahawwul-e Tarlkhlye An 
(Transmigration of Soul and its historical development) 
M. A. DISSERTATIONS: 
(l). Ahmad 'Ali Karlml': Tar.jumah-ye Maqltleh-ye chaharum Az 
Maba'd Al-Tabiah-ye Arastu (Translation of the fourth 
thesis from Aristotle's Metaphysics); 1-1-1972.(Jan. 1) 
(2), 'All Baba Shahbazl* : Istilahat^e Falsafl-ye Durrat Ul-
Ta.1 (Philosophical Terminology of "Durrat ul-Ta;)); 
5-27-1978.(May 27). 
(3)« Muhammad Hadi Burumand: Ladhdhat wa Alam Az Dldgah-he 
Rawan Shinasl wa Falsafeh (philosophical and psychological 
views on pleasure and pain) 6, 11, 1975.(June 11) 
(4), *Ali Asghar Qutbi': Mas'aleh-ye Tan'ahl-ye Ab*aad wa 
Barahlril Keh Az Taraf-e Falasifeh Par Bareh-ye An Aqameh 
Shudeh Ast (The'problem of the finitude of dimension and 
philosopher's arguments in its favour).(June 13, 1973). 
(5). Hablbullah Kazimzadeh: TarMumeh wa tahqlq-e Illihlyvat 
Kitab-e Muhassal (Translation of the Theology (Part) of 
•Muhassal*); 6, 14, 1973. (June 14). 
(6), Muhammad Hadi Abd-e Khudal : Azaliyyat wa abadlyyat-e .iahan 
wa ishtibahkar1-ve Falasifeh Par bareh-ye Masnu budan-e 
Jahan (Eternity of the world and the errors of philosophers 
regarding its createdness); 6, 19, 1973.(June 19). 
(7). Sayyed Hashim Ahmadl 'Alun Abadi Harakat wa Takamul-e 
Maw.iudat (Motion and evolution of beings); 6, 20, 1973. 
(8), Muhammad Hasan Bharl Blna BaJ: Tar.jumeh wa Tahqlq-'e 
kitab-e Miba*d Al-Tabiah-ye Arastu Ba Tafslr-e Ibn-e 
« ^ n 
Rushd (A study and translation of Aristotle's metaphysics 
with addition to Ibn-e Rushd's commentary); 6, 24, 1973. 
(9). Husajm Khusrowabadl: Tarjumeh wa Tahqlq-e qismatl Az 
Kitab-e Talwltjiat (A study and and translation of a portion 
"Talwihat"); 11, 25, 1973.(November 25) 
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(10), Rahmat Allah Qadiyan: Tar.iumeh shast-o Seh Safheh 
Sharh Al-Hldavah-e Mulla Sadra (The Translation of Sixty 
three pages of Mulla Sadra*s "Sharh Al-Hidayah"); 
6, 18, 1974,(June 18). 
(11), Parviz Puyan: Tar.1umeh-ye Labab Al-Ishgtr"at~e Imam 
Fakhr-e Razl ( The Translation of Imam Fakhr-e Razi*s 
"Labab Al-Isharat).(June 24, 1974) 
(12). 'Abd ul«Mahdi Rashidl: Falasfeh Chlst (What is Philosophy); 
6, 26, 1974.(June 26). 
(13). Habib Ruhanl: Tar.iumeh wa Tahqlq Az Kltab-e Sharh Al-
Hidayah (A study and translation of Sharh Al-Hidayah); 
7, 5, 1974.(July 5). 
( 1 4 ) . Sayyed Hasan I f t ika rzadeh : Tar.iumeh va Tahqlq~e qismatl 
Az Kltab»e Sharh Al'-Hadayah (A Study and t r a n s l a t i o n of 
« 
a portion of Sharh Al-Hidayah); 7, 6, 1974.(July 6). 
(15). Ghulam Rida Safal: Tar.iumeh wa Tahqlq Aflatun Fi Al~Islam 
(A study and translation of "Aflatun Fi Al-Islam"); 
10, 15, 1975.(October 15). 
(16). Izzat Saidfar: Tar.iumeh Bakhshi Az Kitab-e Sharh Al~ 
Hidayat); 1, 20, 1975. (January 20). 
(17). Gulbaba Saldi Kilishml: Tar.iumeh wa Tahqiqe Mutarihat-e 
Falsafl Beyn-e Katibl wa Tusl (A study and translation 
of philosophical disputes between tusi and kitabi) A^"ns•)• 
(18). Ibrahim Tadayyun: Tar.iumeh wa Tahqlq-e Aflatun~Fl Al-
Islam ( A study and translation of "Aflatun Fi Al-Islam); 
7, 1, 1975. (July 1) 
(19). Sayyid Mustafa Ruhanl: Tar.iumeh wa Tahqiq-e Risaleh-ye Tahsil 
al-Saadat al-Farabl (Translation of Farabi's Treatise Tahsil 
al-Saada-^); September 22, 1975. 
on 
(20). Muhammad Naslrl: Tar.lumeh wa Tahglg-e Aflatun Fi-Al-Islim 
( A study and translation of Aflatun Fl Al-Islam); 
10, 15, 1975. (October, 15)c 
...The clarification of the ideological content of the 
revolution and its demarcation from opposing or competing 
schools of thought have necessarily depended on the written 
word, on the composition of works that expound Islamic doctrine 
in systematic form, with particular attention to contemporary 
problems and concerns. In this area, Mutahhari's contribution 
was unique in its volume and scope. Mutahharl wrote assiduously 
and continuously, from his student days in Qum down to 1979, 
"the year of his Martyrdom. Much of his output was marked by 
the same philosophical tone and emphasis already noted, and he 
probably regarded as his most important work Usul-i Falsafa wa 
Ravesh-1 Riallsm ("The principles of philosophy and the method 
of realism"). The record of Tabataba'i's discourses to the 
thursday evening circle in Qum, supplemented with Mutahhari's 
comments, but he chose the topic of his book in accordance not 
with personal interest or predilection, but with his perception 
of need; wherever a book was lacking in some vital topic of 
contemporary Islamic innerest, Mutahhari sought to supply it. 
Single handedly he set about constructing the main elements, 
of a contemporary Islamic library. Books such as "Adl-i Ilahi 
("Divine Justice"), Nizami Ijuquq~i Zan Par Islam ("The system 
of women's right in Islam"), Mas'ala-yi Hi .lab ("The question 
of the veil"), Ashna'i ba Ulum-1 Islami (An introduction to the 
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Islamic Science"), and Muqaddima bar .lahanblril-yi I si ami ("An 
introduction to the word view of Islam") were all intended to 
fill a need, to contribute to an accurate and systematic 
understanding of Islam and the problems of Islamic Society. 
These books may well come to be regarded as Mutahharl's most 
lasting and important contribution to the rebirth of Islamic 
IranJ^ 
Mutahharl's work is enormous# He interspered with other 
porsuits-history, literary, educational, political and social 
studies. As he explains in his words: 
"My writings consist of philosophical, ethical 
social jurisprudential, and historical works, 
however they are differing in subjects but 
my goal was same." 
From his long list of publications the following are most 
important from the philosophical point of view: 
(1). Usul-e Falsefa wa Ravesh-e Riallsm (The principal of 
philosophy and the method of realism) in five volumes. 
(2). Maqilat-e Falsafl (Philosophical essays). 
(3). *Ilal«e Girayish beh maddlgarl (Reasons for the Turn to 
materialism)• 
(4), Sharh-e Mabsut-e Manzumeh (A detailed commentary on Mulla 
Had! Sabzawarl's Sharh-e Manzumeh). 
(5). Tairlkh wa Jami'ah (History and Society). 
(6). Naqdl bar Marxism (A critique of Marxism). 
(7). Ashnii'i ba ulume-e Islami (An Introduction to the Islamic 
Sciences). 
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CHAPTER - I I 
A - D I A L E C T I C S 
The word "dialectics" is derived from the Greek "dialektikos" 
which means "debate" or "argument". In ancient times dialectics 
meant revealing the truth through argument, through disclosing 
-1 
the contradictions in the thought of one's opponents. 
Mutahhari quotes from the book Dialectics written by Paul 
Foluque and says that the term dialectics originated in Eleatic 
school of philosophy, particularly in the philosophy of Zeno of 
2 
Elea. Later on Socrates and Plato used it in their conversa-
tional method of argument involving question and answer. In 
Plato's Republic. dialectic is supreme kind of knowledge which 
"gives an account" (logos) of every thing; that is, explain 
every thing by reference to the "idea of the Good". In Plato's 
later dialogues, 'dialectic' is the name given to the study of 
the inner-connection of the piatonic forms or ideas, and appears 
to refer to a method of definition by genus and species. In 
Aristotle's logical work, 'dialectic' refers to reasoning from 
premises that are probable in the sense of generally accepted. 
Kant asserted that in the ancient world, 'dialectic' was a type 
of specisous argument, dressing up fallacious reasoning in 
pseudological garb. He proposed to give the name 'dialectic' 
to a branch of philosophy that exposes such sophistries; so, 
for example, the part of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason called 
4 1 
"Transcendental Dialectic" includes a criticism of arguments 
put forward to prove the existence of God. "Dialectic" is 
Hegel's name for the logical pattern that thought must follow. 
Broadly Hegel argued that thought proceeds by contradiction 
and the reconciliation of contradiction, the over all pattern 
being one of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. For Hegel 
thought is reality. The laws that thought must follow are also 
the laws that govern reality. Marxists borrow Hegel's views 
about the pattern that thought and reality must follow; but 
since, unlike Hegel, they deny that thought is the fundamental 
reality, they distinguish between 'subjective' and 'objective' 
dialectics. Objective dialectics hold in nature; subjective 
dialectics is the reflection in thought of objective dialectics.-
Marx is indebted for his logic to Hegel and for philosophy 
to the 19th century materialists particularly to Feuerbach. 
Here dialectic means that all objects and phenomena are in an 
endless motion, taking place dialectically. Engels in his 
Dialectics of Nature quotes from page 20 of Karl Marx Capital 
Vol. I: 
The mystification which dialectics 
suffers in Hegel's hands by no means 
prevent him from being the first to 
present its general form of working 
in a comprehensive and conscious 
manner. With him it is standing on 
its head, it must be turned right 
side up again, if you would discover 
the rational kernel within the mystical 
shell.^ 
4^ 
Materialism of the 19th century was stagnated, trite 
and superficial, for it was not dynamic. Marx came and breathed 
a new life in it through dialectic. On the other hand, he 
turned Hegel's dialectic upside down, and made it materialistic 
instead of idealistic. Stalin interpreted it in another manner. 
He says: "Marx removed the idealistic shall of Hegel's logic 
and left its kernel."-^ Similarly he removed the metaphysical 
shell of the 19th century materialism and brought out its 
materialistic kernel, Mutahhari says that the question which 
arises is: How can this connection of dialectical logic and 
materialistic philosophy be Justified ? Does dialectical logic 
necessarily lead to materialism as its corollary ? Is materialism 
inherent in dialectics ? The answer is in affirmative as thry 
claim that dialectic is an inner necessity, which moves things 
from inside, not from outside as Aristotle believed. In other 
words, they demolish the Aristotellian "First Push" (or the 
first mover). The authors of the fxondamentals of Marxist-
Leninist philosophy says: 
"The interaction of cause and effect 
implies their constant influencing 
each other, with the result that 
both cause and effect are modified. 
This interaction becomes the internal 
cause (Cause of itself) of 
the changes in the phenomena of 
reality. If we see the world as 
the interaction of different 
phenomena, we realise that its m 
motion and development require no 
external push, no supernatural 
force, such as God." 
it; 
Mutahharl says that in Hegel's idealist philosophy the notion 
of inner movement was a logical necessity and not a causal 
relation. But in Marxism it does not fit. Marxists abandoned 
the logical ground of Hegel's philosophy, and logical necessity 
was replaced by the notion of causal connection. As a conse-
quence they had to recourse in pre-Hegelian philosophy and its 
connection of causality. However, they try to justify their 
claim that this connection is inner and therefore it is necessary. 
Engels in Dialectics of Nature says: 
"The first thing that strikes 
us in considering matter in 
motion is the inter-connection 
of the individual motion of separate 
bodies, their being determined by 
one another. But not only do wer 
find that a particular motion is 
followed by another, we find 
also that we can evolve a 
particular motion by setting up the 
condition in which it takes place 
in nature, that we can even produce 
motions which do not occur at all in 
nature (Industry), at least not 
in this way, and that we can give 
these motions a predetermined 
direction and extent. In this way 
by the activity of human beings, 
the idea of causality becomes 
established, the idea that 
one motion is the cause of 
another. True. The regular sequence 
of certain natural phenomena can 
by itself give rise to the idea of 
causality,7 
Thus causality in Marxism is something which can be 
produced by man, while it was not assumed in Hegel's logic. 
The first cause (or push) in Aristotlian philosophy is beyond 
the physical world. That is, it is metaphysical. When Marxists 
reconcile causation with Hegelian dialectics, they reconcile 
two contradictory notions. In order to understand this point 
it is essential to fully understand Hegelianism. Unless we 
know Hegel's philosophy, we cannot be in a position to evaluate 
marxist view of dialectics, and also cannot point out exactly 
where they made an error. In Mutahhari's view Hegel's philosophy 
also is not devoid of error, but his method is philosophical 
and the system that he constructed is also philosophically an 
original system. 
Marx and Marxists talk about inner contradictions also 
alongwith contradiction in the external world. Regarding the 
inner contradiction we have to trace their origin in Hegel's 
philosophy, Hegel holds that things have a meaning. The 
process in the world are rational: The planetory system is 
a rational order. The organism is rational, proposive and full 
of meaning, since reality is at its bottom a rational, necessary 
logical process of thought; and the function of philosophy is 
to understand the laws or necessary forms according to which 
reason operates. Logic and metaphysics are, therefore, one 
and the same. He declares that contradiction is the root 
of all life and movement, growth or development. 
Mutahharl says that Hegel rales out the causation and 
constracts a self-sufficient system on logical ground which 
does not depend on anything beyond. Even God is included 
in his system, for he is absolute reason. In his view 
contradictions have their origin in reason, which unfolds 
itself in both nature and history. It is the absolute reason 
which conceives both thesis and antithesis simulteneously and 
makes them to appear in the phenomena word. One thing does 
not give rise to its opposite. Contradiction is the result 
of the movement of opposites, not the cause of their movement. 
At least the first movement cannot be explained as the product 
of contradiction. Though Hegel rejects causation, yet he 
accepts God in whose thought all movement originates and gives 
rise to opposites. Marx and his followers do not accept God 
or any metaphysical principle as the first cause of motion. 
So they fail to explain the origin of motion. As pointed out 
above opposition or contradiction arises because of certain 
motions in Hegel's philosophy due to the very nature of 
reason or rather absolute reason, in which all contradictions 
have their origin. But Marxists cannot have a recourse to 
any such notion. Therefore, they make use of the causation 
without being able to trace the origin of causation. Mao also 
claims that dialectical materialism rejects the metaphysical 
notion of external cause. This Marxist claim is rendered 
meaningless, for two opposites cannot be caused by one another 
reciprocally; one should be the cause for the other. It is 
at this point that causation is introduced by dialectical 
4;' 
materialists. In Hegel's philosophy antithesis is logically 
deducted from thesis: that being idealistic logic. When 
Hegel's idealistic logic is set aside, the notion of inherent 
(or logical)contradiction also falls apart. It is for this 
reason that Marxists have recourse to causation and claim it 
to be intrinsic, which is a paradox in itself. The origin 
of cause is always external, beyond the object as Hegel 
constructed his system on the basis of logic. Inner motion 
is its necessary corrolary. But Marxism built their system on 
the basis of causation, and so inner contradiction and motion 
cannot be explained by it. It is to be accepted, according to 
the causal view of reality that contradiction is caused exter-
nally. Hegel in his system started from the most elementary 
concepts of being pure and simple which is equal to not being, 
In other words it is both itself and its oppoite. So being 
(thesis) is opposed by not-being (antithesis). The opposites 
are reconciled in new system i.e. becoming. Becoming means 
coming into being from not being. 
In this way Hegel's philosophical and logical system 
contains within itself a set of logical necessities within 
which there is no place for why, and how; and whatever exists-
even God-is accomodated within this system. God whom he 
believes to be pure and absolute reason, and not as ultimate 
cause. 
Mutahharl says that Marx divorced Hegel's logical groimd 
but retained its notion of necessity, and constructed his 
r) 1 
system on the basis of causality. The point is that necessity 
in Hegel's philosophy is rooted in his idealism. His system 
being rational and logical, requires such a notion of necessity. 
Accordingly if one rules out the idealistic trend of Hegel's 
philosophy, its notion of necessity also would be ruled out 
automatically. The opposites in Hegel's philosophy are connected 
by way of logical deduction. 
A = B 
B « C 
A » C 
The result of the first two premises leads necessarily to the 
same conclusion. In Marx's philosophy concepts are causally 
connected. The same notion in which philosophers other then 
Hegel used to believe, which gives rise to the same old question 
about the certain!ty of causation, as raised by some philosophers 
earlier. Further, according to the principle of causality motion 
is not a result of the synthesis of two opposites, but is the 
effect of two opposing forces. It is not the effect of 
contradiction itself, because contradiction is an abstract 
notion which is inferred from the conflict of two opposites. 
Therefore, it is absurd to rule out the idealistic core of 
Hegel's philosophy and retain the notion of logical necessity 
of his idealistic outlook and employ it in a materialistic 
philosophy. The necessary connection of cause and effect is 
not tenable. Unless one accepts the principle of logical 
ground, one cannot infer the principle of necessity. Hence 
the assertion that "Dialectic dispenses in a certain way with 
external cause" is absurd and nonsensical, 
DIALECTIC; LOGIC OF FORCES: 
Here the term dialectic does not mean the conversational 
method or argument, as Greek philosophers used it. In Marx's 
terminology it refers to conflicts of forces, and not to 
conflicts of ideas. 
Engels in Dialectics of Nature says: 
"Dialectics, so called objective 
dialectics, prevails throughout nature, 
and so-called subjective dialectics, 
dialectical though, is only the 
reflection of the motion through 
opposites which asserts itself everywhere 
in nature, and which by the continual 
conflict of the opptosites and their 
final passage into one another, or into 
higher forms, determines the life 
Q 
of nature," 
Mutahharl says that dialectical materialists are of the 
view that mind operates passively and serves like a mirror 
which reflects whatever it receives from outside. As a matter 
of fact, they v/ere influenced by Hume's empiricism, who consi-
dered sense perception only as the source of knowledge. David 
Hume accepted the empirical theory of the origen of knov/ledge 
and the Berkelyain view that esse = percepi. He said that 
we can know only what we experience. On this basis he refuted 
i ) 
the possibility of any defenite knowledge. After Hume^Kant 
realized the importance of the pressing need of an examination 
or ciriticism of human reason. He built his system of critical 
idealism on the basis of his critique of both reason and 
experience. He reconciled reason with experience, and asserted 
against the "skeptic" Hume that -we can have apriori knowledge 
in certain areas like mathematics. Hegel also arrived at the 
conclusion that sensation was not a reliable source of knowledge. 
Mutahhari concludes on the basis of his analysis of empiricism 
and rationalism that neither of them is correct. Experience 
(that is, sense perception) and reason both play a role in 
knowing. He says that every idea is not the result of the 
reflection of sensation. For instance, many philosophical 
notions like universality and all scientific laws are not arrived 
at by means of reflections of sense-data. He says that ofcourse 
our ideas reflect some kind of reality, but they are not direct 
representations or reflections of external things. We have an 
idea of a universal which has some relation with the external 
object, yet it cannot be described as direct reflection of 
some external reality. In other words there are no direct 
referents in the external word for our general ideas. For 
instance when we say "all A is B", we form an idea which has 
no referent in the external world. It is such a judgement which 
establishes a relation between subject and object, otherwise 
they are separate from each other. Judgements are not reflection 
but are the outcome of the active role of intellect, Mutahhari 
in History and Society says: 
).^ 
"In the beginning man lacks actual 
understanding and actual incinations, 
from within he moves in a dynamic way 
a series of primary judgements, v/hich 
are called a priori or primary principles. 
He also moves towards a series of higher, 
sublime values which constitute his ideal 
of humanity. After that a set of simplest 
ideas, which are the primary elements of 
thought (primary intelligibles), enters 
into his minds from outside; those principles 
emerge in the form of a system 6f theoritical 
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or practical judgements." 
He makes distinction between primary intelligible and 
'it-
secondary intelligible. Innhis view, when Marxists hold that 
dialectical thought is only the reflection of the motion through 
opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, they ignore 
the difference between primary and secondary intelligibles. It 
is not possible to arrive at the stage of concept formation 
directly through reflection. Locke also distinguished between 
the impressions of primary and secondary qualities. While the 
former may be called passively received impressions from outside, 
the latter are constructed by understanding. Mutahhari says 
that as in Hegel's philosophy primary and secondary intellifeibl 
mind and nature, subject and object are one, he had no need 
to discuss their differences-on the other hand Marxian philosophy 
does not accept the Hegelion iDOsition, They have no reason to 
* These two terms are universal concepts v/hich abstracted by 
intellect. For example man, when abstracted by the intellect 
from all its individualizing factor, is the primary 
intelligible, while when universality occurs to it, it is 
the secondary intelligible. For detail, please see Metaphysic 
of Sabzatyarl by Sabzavari Trans. Mehdi Mohaghegh anH 
Toshihco izvtsu. 
T)*. 
arrive at mental constructions directly from the external world 
through their concept of reflection. Further more they cannot 
say that there is complete correspondence and harmony between 
mind and nature. Their leap from reflection to such theories 
is illogical. Their attempt to discover harmony between nature 
and mind is unsatisfactory. If there is a conflict in nature 
and there is again a kind of conflict in mind both of them are 
not one and the same. The conflict (or dialectical process) 
in mind is not the reflection of the conflict in nature. They 
differ from one another in essence and character. For instance 
we can have two ideas in our mind and compare them by means of 
the argument by contradiction. We say that if a thing is so, 
if it is not so, it should be what is opposite. If its 
opposite is false it should be true itself. It is not possible 
to find in nature things corresponding to the propositions 
referred to above. Muthahharl argue that the very basis of 
Marxian epistomology is false, and illogic. It may be said 
that dialectics which is said to be the logic and methodology, 
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of Marxism has no ground to stand upon. 
B - METAPHYSICAL MATERIALISM 
Many of Mutahhari's seminal ideas are found, apart from 
his original works, in the many reviews and commenteries he 
provided on other people's work. Hence, if we want to cover 
Mutahhari*s views comprehensively we must approach them by 
discussing the ideas of certain other thinkers, and then 
subsequently modification by Mutahharl himself, what follows 
is Mutahhari's critical analysis of Andra Peter's conception of 
Marxist philosophy as developed in his Marx and Marxism. 
Mutahharl, though by no means entirely in agreement with Peter's 
views, used them as a point of departure to develop his own 
analysis of Marxist philosophy. 
To summerize the long history of development of philoso-
phical thought we can say that there are no more than two kinds 
of philosophy or outlook in the world: philosophy of being 
or philosophy of idea and philosophy of becoming or philosophy 
of life.''^ 
The former is rooted in Aristotle's philosophy, Roman 
schools of jurisprudence and the philosophy of scholasticism 
in Christianity, and also formed the foundation of Descarte's 
thought. The main characteristic of tlds world outlook is its 
theory of eternity and immutability of soul, reality and 
ethical principles, i.e. whatever v/as, is and ever shall be 
is based upon certain immutable ideas or essences. Truth, 
beauty, righteousness are entirely reflections of God who is 
r)' 
1 "^  
eternal and beyond the time. ^  
The latter, that is philosophy of becoming, initially 
started two hundred years before Aristotle, by pre-Socratic 
philosophers. Unlike the former it holds reality to be 
temporalized and effected by time, i.e. everything is in a 
state of flux. Heraclitus, the most ancient and important 
advocate of this philosophy states: 
"You cannot step twice into 
the same river, for fresh 
waters are ever flowing in 
14 
upon you." 
This philosophy that is based on the notion of trans-
formation of things, in a broad sense, leads to philosophy 
of history (of nature, society and man). It pays more 
importance to an account of socio-historical development 
rather then philosophical ideas. Vftiereas philosophy of being 
led to formal logic, formulated by Aristotle, the logic of 
stagnation and inertia, philosophy of becoming developed 
15 dialectics, the logic of dynamic reality. 
Two trends dominated the entire course of philosophical 
theorization in the west. On this basis the west divided 
all philosophies into two groups, philosophy of being and 
philosophy of becoming. Actually Plato is the most consistent 
advocate of the philosophy of being, holding that all reality 
rooted in permanent ideas. But Aristotle is chosen to be its 
chief representative by Marxists for he provided the formal 
logical ground to it. Mutahhari refers to the central 
position of Aristotle in the development of philosophy of 
being with reference to a book Marx and Marxism by Andre 
Peter. Later he critically examined this view, 
Regarding the eternity of soul, philosophy of becoming 
denies the independent existence of soul and accorded a 
secondary position to it. It holds matter to be the substratum 
of every thing and believes in its unrelatedness and indes-
tructibility, its eternal existence and infinite presence as 
well as its inexhaustible self-development, which necessarily 
leads at certain stages, to emergence of life and of sentient 
beings. In contrast to this philosophy, the philosophy of 
being believes in the eternity of soul, and according to it 
the fundamental dimension of human existence cannot be 
interpreted by means of matter or its modes alone. So soul is 
a fundamental reality. The spiritual forces, i.e. the 
intellectual process, faith, belief and emotions are regarded 
as independent factors at both the individual level and at 
16 the level of society. 
The eternity and immutability of reality is refuted by 
the advocates of the philosophy of becoming who maintain that 
reality is always changing, now this, now that; in this sense 
it is full of negations, contradictions and oppositions. The 
plant germinates, blooms, withers away and dies; man is born, 
r 'J" 
passes through various stages of youth, maturity, old age, 
and finally dies. This movement proceeds unconsciously in 
nature and even in history. On the contrary, philosophy 
of being believes in the eternity and immutability of 
reality. For instance it believes that change is impossible, 
because according to it, universal laws are eternal and 
immutable. According to it a thing is what it is, be it 
actual or potential. Mutahhari holds that the question of 
reality is more fundamental than that of soul. The problem 
of reality is a scientific issue. Nature is constituted by 
eternal reality that is ruled by eternal laws. If the 
reality as well as the laws of nature are not accepted as 
17 immutable, all scientific knowledge will become impossible. 
In the domain of morals too, most philosophies of 
becoming believe in changing values. They maintain that all 
moral theories have hitherto been the product, in the last 
analysis, of the material conditions of society obtaining 
at the time. Moral values are relative to both time and 
social conditions. There are no eternal moral values. 
Society has been hitherto moving according to the nature of 
class antagonisms, and morality has always been moving in 
the same direction. According to the Marxists all morality 
is class morality. The other philosophy opposed to it 
maintains that ethical predicates like justice, cruelity, 
truth, falsity, courage, cowardice etc, are not subject to 
change. The essence of justice is eternal and immutable and 
r):) 
has been approved at all ages and in different nations and 
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societies. Its content always remains the same. 
Andre Peter, after dividing philosophy into two groups 
attempts to trace the psychological grounds of these philoso-
phies. He says: 
"In so far as philosophy of being 
attracted the rationalists, to the 
same extent philosophy of becoming 
was suited to the minds which were 
close to nature and objective world 
and were more sensitive to changes 
in nature and environment." 
He says there are two types of people in the world, 
Some of them confine their attentions to nature and the 
objective world, "vriiile others concentrate on the rational 
issues. Those who are more concerned with external reality 
find motion and change to be real, while those immersed in 
thought experience reality as permanent. Mutahhari does not 
accept this view, though he accepts that men are of two types, 
one group more interested in nature and the other more 
interested in the world of reason. He cites the example of 
two Iranian geniuses, Abu-All Sina and Abu-Rayh"an Birunl. 
Abu-All Sina was more inclined towards speculative matters 
while Abu-Rayh^n v/as more interested in natural issues. In 
Mutahhari's view there was no diversity in their methods but 
they differed only on account of their tendencies. When 
Abu-All Sina discussed the issues of nature he adopted the 
GO 
same method that was followed by Biruni, and vice-versa 
according to Mutahharl the method that is employed depends 
on the subject matter. The empirical method suits the study 
of nature, while the rational method is more suited to the 
study of mind. It does not necessarily mean, in the view of 
Mutahharl, that all empiricists advocate the philosophy of 
2D being and all rationalists champion the philosophy of becoming. 
Peter wanted to find out the psychological roots of 
the two types of philosophers. So he assumes that human 
being are of two kinds. Some of them are inclined towards 
natural issues and some others towards theoretical issues. 
Therefore, idealist thinkers are inclined towards philosophy 
of being and naturalist thinkers are inclined towards the 
philosophy of becoming. As mentioned above, Mutahharl refutes 
this division, and does not accept that the ontological 
position of a thinker is determined by his interest in nature 
or mind, Mutahharl accepts peter's view that nations also 
differ from each other psychologically. The spirit of the 
Germans is different from the French. Both of them are 
different from the English people. On the whole westerns 
differ from easters in tendencies. The westerns generally 
concentrate their attention on natural issues, whereas the 
easterns pay more attention to metaphysical and speculative 
issues. Therefore, westerns are more advanced in natural 
science and easterns are more profound in mystical and 
metaphysical issues. Thus Mutahharl refutes generalizations 
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made by Andre Peter, He says that it may be said that as a 
general principle there is a difference in the intellectual 
attitudes of the people of the west and the east, but it 
cannot be stretched too far. It cannot be claimed on the 
strength of historical evidence that all western thinkers 
are naturalists and all eastern philosophers are rationalists. 
The rationalist thinkers and the rationalist tradition that 
is referred to by Peter is entirely western. Among the western 
philosophers themselves thinkers were divided into two groups. 
Similarly among the eastern thinkers we can find naturalist 
philosophers or rather scientists. It seems very strange to 
Mutahhari that as against the commonly accepted categorization 
of tendencies, Peter regarded eastern people as naturalists, 
while, as already said, they have been predominantly speculative 
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and rationalist. 
The logic of these two philosophies is also different. 
One of them founded its outlook on the notion of being, and 
the other on the notion of becoming. In other words two 
different types of reasoning are employed in these two philoso-
phies. The philosophy of becoming argues by means of dialectic, 
while the philosophy of being argues on the ground of formal 
logic, which is the analysis of the forms and the processes 
of thought by which we reach knowledge. The philosopher of 
being maintains that concepts embodied in correct words and 
forms according to the law of contradiction, law of excluded 
middle, and law of identity, constitute the basis of this 
logic. One of the logical principles in Aristotle's formulations 
WP 
states that "The same attribute cannot at the same time belong 
and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect." 
It may be stated more concisely as "It is impossible for the 
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same thing to be and not to be. So this philosophy denies 
that a thing can become what it is not. Hence it believes in 
immobility and permanence of things. It is pointed out by 
the advocates of the philosophy of becoming that in nature 
every thing is itself and at the same time other than itself, 
because there is no perraanance in nature. When a thing comes 
into existence, it can not remain in the same state forever, 
but grows and gives birth to others. Everything tends to change 
to pass over into its opposite. The seed has in it the impulse 
to become something else, to contradict itself and to transcend 
itself.^^ 
The question that arises here is whether the philosophy 
of becoming, which is based on birth and demise, contingency 
and decay of things, has nihilistic implications. As this 
philosophy does not believe in the eternality of anything, any 
motion would be pointless and aimless. In response to this 
question the advocates of this philosophy claim that they accept 
the principle of eternality in their philosophy in the form 
of continuity and evolution and a principle that is eternally 
true. They further say that decay and death which they emphasize 
do not represent nihilistic or pessimistic trends, but are 
integral parts of life that continues to evolve eternally. 
According to them in general, and Marxists in particular, 
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dialectics is the logic of this ever evolving reality, which 
gives birth to new forms through a dialectical process. 
So far as Marxist position is concerned, dialectics is 
their methodology as well as their ontology. Reality, that is 
becoming, moves through contradictions and attains synthesis 
of opposites at every stage of its evolution. This process is 
eternal, and it can be comprehended by means of dialectical 
reasoning only. The formal logic of Aristotle and other idealists 
reduces reality to something static, 
As this logic is based on the concept of a static reality, 
it is helpful in rationalism only. The logic of a school is 
based on its ontological position of a school can be understood 
with the help of its specific logic. Thus dialectics ontologi-
cally and methodologically is an integral part of Marxism, 
MUTAHHART'S CRITIQUE; 
It is to be noted that Mutahharl assailed the above classi-
fication of philosophies as superfluos for the following reasons: 
(1). According to Mutahharl, it is wrong to brand all 
philosophies as either being materialistic or idealistic. There 
are some systems which do not fit in this division. There are 
dualistic and pluralistic philosophies also, which in a way combine 
2k both materialism and idealism, 
(2). The other error is that, some historians of ideas 
divided all philosophies and outlooks into two groups, that is, 
they have placed "becoming" in contrast with "Being" whereas 
"Being" can be opposed by "non-being", while "becoming" is 
opposed to •non-becoming'. Actually they have borrowed this 
classification from Hegel who divided philosophies into these 
tvro groups. This kind of classification is rooted in the 
essentialist trend of Hegelion philosophy. But according to 
the Existentialist (the substantial reality of being) approach 
which Mulla Sadra initiated in later Muslim thought, being in 
its essence is divisible into the constant and the fluid and 
that constant being is one modality of being, while fluid being 
is another which may be called becoming in precise terms. 
Although, nominally speaking, we may regard becoming as a synthesis 
of being and nothing, their synthesis in actually, a kind of 
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notion or metapher. 
(3). Philosophy of being does not lead to eternality of 
soul necessarilly. For many philosophers of being deny the 
existence of soul itself as eternal essence. For instance, 
Democritus who is supposed to be a materialist believed in 
the duality of soul and matter. His philosophy is philosophy 
of being, which is essentially material, for he believed that 
everything is composed of atoms, which are indivisible: That 
between the atoms there is empty space; that atoms are indes-
tructible and eternal; that they always have been and always 
will be, in motion. 
Epicurus, the famous Greek moral thinker, whose philosophy 
of ethics was also the subject of the Ph.D. thesis of Marl Marx, 
advocated a philosophy of being despite being materialist, 
Even regarding Aristotle's philosophy, there is no explicit 
evidence to show that he believed in the eternity of soul, 
though he is considered by Marxists to be a champion of the 
philosophy of being. Muslim philosophy according to Mutahhari, 
advocates a philosophy of becoming, but in the course of its 
evolution, the soul attains a status which is so abstract 
that it cannot be defined in material terms. Thus, being in 
the process of becoming is almoct dissolved in non-being. 
(4). To believe that philosophy of being leads to logic 
and philosophy of becoming to philosophy of history, is also 
fallacious. But it is proper to say that philosophy of being 
leads to a static logic and philosophy of becoming leads to 
a dynamic logic. Logic and philosophy of history are different 
in nature. Logic provides a secure ground for a philosophy 
of history but it is nothing but a methodology, dealing with 
the modes of thought, while philosophy of history is more than 
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methodology and gives us a particular philosophical outlook, 
(5)» Peter maintains that those who concentrate on the 
everchanging external reality, evolve a philosophy of becoming, 
but those who concentrate on their self or inner reality which 
appears to be permanent, advocate a philosophy of being, 
considering becoming just as appearence. Consequently they 
become idealists. This distinction is again erroneous for 
philosophers like Plato and Hegel, staunch idealists, inspite 
of believing in the permanent reality of self, mind or idea 
G6 
never negated change in the physical world as illusory or 
unreal, but developed a philosophy of becoming, without which 
they could not have been able to deal with historical processes. 
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C - HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 
Instead of v/riting about Mutahharl's evaluation and 
analysis of historical materialism with reference to his various 
writings, it would be more worth while to reproduce his expo-
sition and critique of the subject from one of his major works 
dealing with Marxism, History and Society, The gist of the 
relevent portion of the Vllth chapter of the book entitled 
*Is History Materialistic in Nature?' is given below: 
In our age a theory which has attracted many supporters 
is that of historical materialism or the dialectical materialistic 
theory of history. Historical materialism, which is an economic 
interpretation of history and economic-historical view of man 
not a humanistic interpretation of economy or history that 
explains every human activity from the economic point of view. 
In other words, according to historical materialism, history is 
materialistic in nature and essence and follows a dialectical 
process. This means that the basis of all historical movements, 
revolutions, and manifestations in every society is its economic 
structure. These are the material forces of production of 
society and its relations of production which fashion history 
and give direction to all intellectual manifestation of society 
such as morality, science, philosophy, religion, laws and 
culture. These manifestations are determined by the changes 
2Q 
in the mode of production and relations of production, 
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The expression that history is dialectical in nature 
means that the evolutionary movements of history are dialectical 
movements caused by a series of dialectical contradictions, which 
are concomittant with those contradictions. Dialectical contra-
dictions are different from non-dialectical ones in the sense 
that every phenomenon is compelled to give rise to its own 
negation from within. As a result of a series of changes caused 
by this inner countradiction, the phenomenon undergoes a 
radical qualitative change at a higher level, wherein the two 
lower stages attain perfection through synthesis,^ 
Thus historical materialism is comprised of two basic 
stands: firstly, that the nature of history is materialistic, 
secondly that its movements are dialectical movements. The 
theory of historical materialism itself leads to a series of 
conclusions which are influential in practical social strategy: 
(1). The best and the most reliable way of analyzing and 
knowing historical and social events is investigating their 
economic foundations otherwise, no exact and valid knowledge of 
historical events is possible; because it is supposed that all 
social transformations are economic in identity, even though 
they may appear to have an Independent cultural, religious, 
or moral essence. It means that all these changes are reflec-
tions of the economic and material conditions of society, being 
their effects. Ancient thinkers also claimed that knowledge 
of objects by means of identification of their causes is the 
most reliable and the best way of understanding them. Hence, 
if we assume that the root cause of all social changes is the 
economic structures of society, the best way of studying history 
is socio-economic analysis. In other words, as the cause has 
priority over its effect, at the stage of study also priority 
lies with it. Hence the priority of economic base exists not 
only at the level of external reality. But it is also to be 
observed at the level of intellectual inquiry and study.-^  
In the book Revisionism from Marx to Mao, this problem has been 
discussed as follows: 
In analysing social revolution, one must 
not Judge social conflicts in political, 
legal or ideological terms; on the 
contrary, they are to be interpreted in 
terms of the contradiction between the 
productive forces and production relations. 
Marx has seriously warned us of the dangers 
of such a judgement. Since in the first 
place, they are unrealistic, placing the 
effect, that is, the political, juridical, 
and ideological forms, in the place of the 
cause, which are nothing but economic contra-
dictions and transformations. Secondly such 
an interpretation is superficial, as instead 
of probing deeply into the real causes, it 
only touches upon the surface, and what is 
apparently reality is considered to be 
sufficient for explanation thirdly, it is 
illusory; because the superstructures, which 
are on the whole ideological, are nothing but 
inaccurate images of the reality. Depending 
on inaccurate images instead of realistic 
analysis of the problem under study, will no 
doubt lead us into confusion and errors, 
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Here Khameni quotes from Marx and Engels: selected 
vrorks: "just as our opinion of an individual is not based on 
what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period 
of transformation by its own consciousness." -^  Marx strives 
to annul the role of consciousness, thought and innovation, 
often regarded as constituing the basic factor in evolution. 
For instance, Saint Simon, many of whose ideas Marx awailed 
himself of, said of the role of the "instinct for innovation": 
"Societies are subject to two moral 
forces of equavalent strength that 
exert their effects in alternation: 
one is the force of habit and the 
other is that which results from 
the desire for innovation. After 
a certain time, habit necessarily 
grows evil... It is then that the 
need for new things is felt and 
this need constitutes the true 
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revolutionary state"-'^  or consider 
Proudhan, Marx's other preceptor, 
who says of the role of beliefs and 
thought in evolving society: the 
political forms of nations are the 
expression of their beliefs. The 
movement of these forms, their modi-
fications and their destruction, are 
the solemn experience that disclose 
to us the value of these ideas and 
gradually release... the absolute, 
eternal and immutable truth. Now 
we see that every political institution 
tends to level our social condition 
on pain of death..."35 
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Marx would say that it is not this instinct for innovation 
or these stirring beliefs and faith that bring about social 
transformations. Rather it is socio-economic necessity that 
creates desire for innovation or stirring beliefs and faiths. 
Therefore, having drawn this conclusion from historical materialism 
If we wish to analyse, for instance. The Greco-persian wars, 
the crusades, the Islamic conquests. The European renaissance, 
or Iran*s constitutional revolution, it would be a mistake for 
us to study and analyse their overt incidents and formal 
aspect. 
Today fledgling Marxists will bluff their way through 
an explanation of any historical movement by saying a few lines 
about the economic conditions associated with that movement, 
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even if they know nothing about it# 
(2). The law governing history is deterministic, invio-
lable, being outside man's will. But the Marxist notion of 
historical determinism means economic determinism. It is a 
unique interpretation of philosophical necessity. This theory 
is a synthesis of two others: One is this philosophical 
necessity, that decrees that no event comes into being without 
necessity, that the existence of any phenomenon is certain and 
inevitable, given the appearance of its own special causes, 
and that, in the absence of these causes, its existence is 
impossible and absurd. The other is the theory, already 
outlined, of the priority of the material foundation of society 
over its other foundations. The two theories together imply 
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the material determination of history certainly and inevitably, 
As the infrastructure changes and transforms, the superstructure 
surely and inevitably changes and transforms. Without change 
in the infrastructure, changein the superstructure is impossible. 
This principle is what makes Marxist socialism, as the 
Marxists claim, "Scientific"; what makes it a natural law, 
alongside the rest of the natural laws of the Universe, because 
it is according to this principle that the tools of production, 
the most basic part of the economic structure of society, 
continuously develop in conformity to a series of natural laws, 
just as the various species of plants and animals, having 
undergone gradual growth over their histories of so many hundreds 
of millions of years, find new species indentities at certain 
stages. And just as the growth, evolution, and transformation 
in species of plants and animals are beyond anyone's will, 
whim, or desire, so the grovrth and evolution of the tools of 
production, Karl Marx, in his preface to the first German 
edition of The Capital, says: 
"The country that is more developed 
industrially only shows to the less 
developed the image of its own future 
... And even when a society has got 
upon the right trace for the discovery 
of the natural laws of its movement 
ultimately... It can neither clear by 
bold leaps, nor remove by legal 
enactments, the obstacles offered by 
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the successive phases <5f its normal 
development. But it can shorten and 
lessen the birth pangs." 
Marx himself has expounded certain points in the latter 
part of his statement, which either have been ignored or 
underestimated. He is actually trying to answer a possible 
question and objection. Someone might have said:, "The 
step-by-step development of society follows irresistibly the 
orderly step-by-step development in nature only, as long as 
man does not understand this process and fails to discover it. 
But as soon as man understands, it comes under his control 
and domination. It is said that as long as man does not under-
stand nature, it dominates him, but as soon as he understands 
it nature becomes his obedient servant. For example, a disease 
remains uncured as long as its causes and cures are known, but 
as soon as it is understood, it becomes curable and is eradi-
cated. In the same manner cyclones and other natural calamities 
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may be prevented."-^ 
(3)« Each historical period is quite different from 
the other periods in character and nature. As the process 
of evolution changes one species into another, in the case of 
historical epochs the same thing happens. Every period of 
history has its own specific laws. The laws belonging to an 
earlier period or any of the latter periods can never be applied 
to a certain period of history. Water, as long as it is water, 
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follows the laws governing liquids; but when the same water 
is converted into steam, it does not follow those laws but 
becomes subject to the laws of gases. Society also follows 
this principle; for example, as long as it is in the stage of 
feudalism it has to follow the laws peculiar to feudalism, 
but as soon as it leaves that stage behind and reaches the 
stage of capitalism, any effort to retain the laws belonging 
to feudalism would be absurd. Accordingly, a society cannot 
have any eternal and absolute laws. According to the theory 
of historical materialism and the doctrine that economy is 
the base, all the la\/s that are claimed to be 'eternal' are 
actually dependent upon the base and so are transient. One 
of the basic differences between historical materialism and 
religion, especially Islam, is that religion firmly believes 
in the eternity of a set of (Divine) laws. 
In the book Revisionism from Marx to Mao, Anwar Khameni 
quotes from an appendix to the second edition of The Capital: 
"Every period of history has laws of 
its own... accordingly as life passes 
from one stage to another stage, it 
evolves and is governed by a new set 
of laws. Economic life, in the course 
of its historical development, brings / 
forth a phenomenon that we come across 
in various branches of biology,,, social 
organisms are distinguished from one 
another in the same way as animal and 
plant organisms are differentiated." 
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(4), From the davm of history it is development in 
tools of production that is responsible for giving rise to 
private ownership and dividing society into the two classes 
of the exploiters and the exploited. These two main classes 
have represented the two basic poles of society from the 
beginning of history to the present day. There has been, and 
always there shall be, a struggle and antagonism between 
these two poles of society. But this bipolarization of society 
does not mean that all groups are either exploiters or exploited. 
Possibly there may be certain groups who are neither exploiters 
nor exploited. What is meant is that the important groups 
that influence the fate of society are these two groups which 
form the two basic poles of society. Other groups are dependent 
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on one of these two main groups. 
In Revisionism from Marx to Mao, the author writes: 
"We find two different patterns of 
division of society according to 
classes and their conflict; accord-
ing to Marx and Engels, one is 
bipolar, and the other is multipolar. 
Definition of class also differs in 
both the patterns. In the first 
pattern it is an imaginary class, 
while in the other it is a real 
class. The rules regarding the 
divisions of classes are also 
different. Engels, in his preface 
to the 'peasant's war in Germany' 
tries to reconcile these two patterns 
7f] 
by evolving a uniform standard for 
class division. He distinguishes 
various classes in society, and, 
within each class, he differentiates 
various subgroupss But according to 
his belief, there are only two classes 
who accomplish a definite historic 
mission: The bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat: because they form the 
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really opposite poles of society." ^ 
According to the philosophy of Marxism, as it is 
impossible for the superstructure of a society to precede its 
infrastructure, similarly it is also impossible for society 
to be considered as a unified whole at the level of super-
structure despite its being divided at the level of the base 
(Social and economic relations, and property relations) into 
two poles of the exploiters and the exploited. Social 
consciousness itself is also, in its turn, to be analysed into 
two types, i.e# the consciousness of the exploiters and the 
consciousness of the exploited. Thus two types of philosophy 
emerge in society. The only things that are not bipolar and 
which are specific to the class of exploiters are religion 
and state. Religion and state are invented by the exploiting 
class for the surrender and subjugation of the exploited. As 
the exploiting class is the owner of all material resources 
of society, they impose their own culture and their religion 
on the oppressed. In this manner the culture of the ruling 
class, i.e. the world outlook of tlie ruling class, their 
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ideology, their morality, their tastes, their sensibility, 
and more than every thing. The religion of the rulers, is 
predominant; and the culture belonging to the oppressed remains 
always dominated like themselves, obstructing their progress. 
The class of the rulers and exploiters is by nature 
reactionary, conservative, traditionalist and obscurantist. Its 
culture, which is imjxjsed by force is also reactionary, tradi-
tionalist, and obscurantist. But the oppressed and the 
victimized class is by nature revolutionary, anti-traditionalist, 
progressive, and futurist. Their culture, which is oppressed 
like them, is a revolutionary, rebelious and progressive culture. 
The condition of being oppressed is the essential condition 
for being revolutionary, i.e. this is the only class which is 
capable of being revolutionary. In the book Revisionism from 
Marx to Mao, after the passage which has been quoted from 
Engel's prefatory note to The Peasants' V/ar in Germany' is 
written: 
One year after the publication of this 
prefatory note, (Prefatory note to 'the 
peasants' war in Germany) the congress 
of the German socialists have written 
in its Gotha - programme that all classes 
form a reactionary front against the labour 
class. Marx severely criticized this 
statement. But if we are logical, we 
should admit the fact that since miserable 
socialists could not possibly differentiate 
between his -.bipol-arAZffoinH^ syjPolar patterns 
y4^v^-— ^f 
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after what Marx had written in the manifesto, 
In the Manifesto (Manifesto of the coramonist 
party), Marx presens the class conflicts of 
those days as the war between the proletariat 
and the bourgeoisie. He writes: "of all the 
classes that stand face to face with the 
bourgeoisie today, the proleteriat alone is a 
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revolutionary class." 
(5). The other conclusion we should draw is that all 
revolutionary figures, leaders, guides, and heroes essentially 
arise from the exploited class. After demonstrating that it 
is only the exploited class that has the aptitude for enlight-
enment, reform, and revolution only the condition of being 
oppressed and exploited can produce this aptitude, and at the 
most the superstructural factors may be credited for awakening 
class antagonism and self-consciousness it becomes obvious that 
those prominent individuals who came forward to make the ideas 
of enlightenment instrumental in awakening class consciousness 
should themselves be fellow suffers belonging to the same class 
and sharing its class consciousness. As it is historically 
imjwssible for a superstructural pattern to precede its base, 
and for a class to have a social consciousness that precedes 
its class character; in the some way it is not possible that 
a person as a 'leader' may precede his class, demanding more 
than what is required by his own class. Similarly it is also 
impossible for a person belonging to the exploiting class of 
society to stand against his own class in the interests of 
46 the exploited class. 
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In the same book, Revisionism from Marx to Mao, the 
author says: 
Another original contribution of The 
German Ideology is the analysis of 
class consciousness. Here Marx, 
contrary to his earlier works, regards 
class consciousness as the product of 
the class itself; it does not come from 
withovit. The real consciousness is 
nothing but an ideology, because it is 
bound to give a generalized farm to the 
interijsts of a particular class. But 
it doos not exclude the fact that this 
conscriousness, which is based upon the 
awareness of its own conditions, strengthens 
the interests of the class. In any case, 
the class cannot attain maturity without 
producing its specific class consciousness. 
Marx's view affirms the division of labour 
within the working class itself, i.e. the 
Intel].ectual work (The ideological work), 
leadej'ship and manual work. Some individuals 
become? thinkers or ideologues of the class, 
while others rather passively accept and act 
upon the ideas and concepts provide for 
them.^ *^  
In the same book, while discussing Marx's philosophy 
with reference to the Manifesto and Poverty of Philosophy, 
the author says; 
In this way, awakening class conscousness 
and organizing it in the form of a "class-
for-itself* is the task of the prolitariat 
80 
and also the result of its self-fulled 
economic battle. The upheaval is neither 
brought about by any intellectual theory 
which is alien to the workers' movement, 
nor by any political party. Marx condemns 
Utopian socialists who despite their 
proletarian inclination do not see the 
historical self-propulsion of the prole-
tarian inclination and their specific 
political movement.... and try to replace 
with their fancies the gradual and self-
motivated organization of the proletariat 
48 into a class. 
This principle is particularly important for understand-
ing the Marxist view point about society and social inclinations, 
and the Marxist criteria for evaluating individuals especially 
leaders and social reformers. From whatever has been said above, 
it is obvious that Marx and Engels did not believe in any 
independent groups of intellectuals free of and above classes. 
That is, there is no room in the principles of Marxism to 
allow for the existence of such a class of intellectual. If 
Marx occasionally makes statements contrary to this, it is 
because he himself does not remain a marxist. And such 
occasions, as we shall discuss later, when Marx has contradicted 
himself, are not rare. Now, the question arises as to how Marx 
and Engels explain their own position with regard to the 
intellectual in the light of the principles of Marxism. None 
of them belonged to the proletariat class, both of them were 
philosophers, not workers, yet they have produced the greatest 
theory of labour and working c l a s s , 
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Marx's answer to this question is interesting. In the 
book, Revisionism from Marx to Mao, the author says: 
Marx has spoken little about the intellectuals. 
He apparently does not regard them as a special 
stratum of society, but a part of certain other 
classes, particularly the bourgeoisis. In the 
'Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparts', Marx 
considers academics, journalists, university 
teachers, and lawyers as the part of the bourg-
eois class, like priests and army men. In the 
Manifesto, v/hen he wants to mention the names 
of the theories of the working class who by 
origin do not belong to it-like Engels and 
himself - he does not call them intellectuals, 
but regards them as 'groups of people from the 
ruling class,.., who have embedded themselves 
amongst the proletariat," and have brought many 
elements for the education and training of that 
class, 
8^ 
D - PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION 
Man is a being v;ho thinks, understands and acts. Is 
action prior to thought or vice-versa? Is the essence of 
man action or thought ? Does human nobility depend upon 
action, or does it depend upon thought ? Is man the product 
of action or thought ? 
The relevance of these questions consists in the fact 
that historical materialism is based on the substantive reality 
of vrork and its priority over thought. It considers \7ork 
primary and thought, derivative. Ancient logic and philosophy 
regarded thought as the key to thought. According to that 
logic, thought is divisible into "representation" and "assent", 
and each of these is divisible into the "axiomatic" and the 
"speculative." Then axiomatic thoughts were seen as keys to 
speculative thoughts. According to this logic and philosophy, 
the essence (the "I") of man is pure thought. Man's perfection 
and nobility were seen in knov/ledge. The perfect man v/as 
identified with the contemplative. 
But historical materialism is established on the principle 
that action is the key to thoqght as well as being the criterion 
of thought. The essence of man is his productive activity. 
Action is the source of man's identity and it also mould him. 
Marx says, "The entire so-called history of the world is 
nothing but the begetting of man through human labour". And 
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Engels says, "Man himself is the creation of action". From 
the very beginning man, instead of contemplating over natural 
environment by means of his hard labour, and in the same way 
(through revolutionary action) he over powered the powerful 
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aggressors to establish a society according to his own desires, 
In the book Marx and Marxism, Andre Peter says: 
"Whereas in the philosophy of being (a 
philosophy that interprets the world in 
terms of "being" as opposed to the 
philosophy of "becoming" which interprets 
the world in terms of motion, Marxism 
belongs to the group of the philosophies 
of "Becoming") it was customary at first 
to set forth the ideas and the principles 
from which practical conclusions are 
derived; praxis (practical philosophy), 
on the other hand, regards action as the 
origin and basis of all thought. It 
replaces the faith in thought by the 
philosophy of power. In agreement with 
Hegel, it asserts: "The real being of 
man, in the first instance, is his own 
action," In this belief he ^oins the 
German thinkers who reversed the famous 
phrase, "In the beginning there was the 
word" in which the word signifies spirit, 
for it is through the word that the 
spirit expresses itself - and declared 
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"In the beginning there '.vas the Act," "^  
This is one of the principles of the materialistic 
philosophy of Marxism, This principle is known as "Proxis" 
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in the Marxist terminology, and is borrowed by Marx from his 
materialist predecessor, Feuerbaoh, and his other master, 
Hegel. (However, this terra initially was employed by the 
Greek philosophers but afterward constituted the central 
doctrine of Marxist philosophy). Keeping in mind the primacy 
of collective labour, i.e. labour materialised v/hich is 
represented by the tools of production, and also considering 
the fact that Marx is one of those sociologists who regard 
sociology as being prior to psychology, who also consider man 
qua man as a social being or in his own words "Sui generis", 
the philosophical role of labour according to Marxism which 
is the essence of the Marxist philosophy and to which little 
attention has been paid becomes clear. 
Marx gives the same importance to human labour in the 
context of human existence that Descartes gives to the rational 
being of man and Bergson to the dynamic, temporal aspect of 
human existence, 
Descartes says, "I think, therefore I am" (cogito ergo 
sum). Bergson says, "I have continuity, therefore I exist. 
55 Marx would have said, "I work, therefore I exist," 
Apart from these diverse modes of existence (Thought, 
continuity, etc.), none of these thinkers tries to posit human 
existence or 'ego* in absolute terms. Some of them even 
maintain that man's existence cannot be conceived beyond and 
apart from one of these specific modes. Moreover, everyone 
8,^  
of them wants to define man's essence and reality of human 
56 
existence in these terms only. 
Opposed to the Marxism principle is the principle of 
the philosophy of ontological realism (idealism) that believes 
in the priority of thought over action and reciprocal inter-
action between thought and action. In this philosophy, man 
whose essence is consciousness, has a reciprocal relation with 
action and work: he creates work and his work in turn moulds 
him, Man, through his action upon the external world, acquires 
the data of his knowledge from the external world; until the 
mind becomes enriched with these primary data, it remains 
incapable of any intelligent activity. After collecting this 
data, the mind reciprocally exercises its powers on the data 
in various fashions as by generalization, abstraction, and 
inference. In this way, it prepares the ground for the correct 
understanding of objects. Understanding is not merely the 
reflection of external matter in the mind. It is only after 
the reflection of external matter is transformed inside the 
mind through a series of mental processes, which originate 
in the non-material substance of the soul, that understanding 
becomes possible. Hence, action is the origin of thought and 
thought is the origin of action. Action is the test of 
thought and at the same time thought is the test of action. 
This is not a vicious circle. Man's nobility lies in his 
wisdom, faith, and dignity and in turn his work is valuable 
because through it he acquires these virtues. Man is the 
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creator of his work, and at the same time, he is also its 
product. This is the distinguishing characteristic of man, 
which is not found in any other being, and which is derived 
from a mode of Divine creation special to his species. Marx 
says, "For a socialist person the entire so-called history of 
the world is nothing but begetting of man through human 
labour"* He distinguishes human consciousness from man's 
real existence, and says, it is not the consciousness of man 
that determines his being, but his social being that determines 
his consciousness," He further says that the premises with 
which we start are not self-willed or absolute conditions of 
existence. He explains the term "real individual" in the 
following words: "But the real individuals act not according 
to the whims which cross their imagination... but act on the 
basis of definite material conditions and certain limitations, 
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conditions which are independent of their will," 
Engels says; "labour is the source of all wealth, the 
political economists assert but it is infinitely more than 
this. It is the prime basic condition for all human existence, 
and this is true to such an extent that, in a way we should 
say that it is labour which has created man himself'.'"' All 
these extracts from the writings of the founders of Marxism 
indicate their emphasis on the role of labour. However, Marx 
and Engels have borrowed this idea regarding the role of labour 
from Hegel, who said, "The real being of man, in the first 
instance, is his action." -^  
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Hence, according to Marxism, existence of man is primarily 
social and not individual. Secondly, the social existence of 
man is synonimous v;ith his materialized labour, i.e. collective 
labour. All individual modes like feelings and emotions or 
all social modes such as morality, philosophy, art, religion 
etc. are only expressions and manifestations of man's real 
being; they are not identical with his being itself. Accord-
ingly, the actual evolution of man is indentical with the 
development of collective labour. But intellectual, emotional, 
and spiritual development or evolution of the social system 
Is only a manifestation and reflection of the real development 
and not the development itself. The material development of 
a society is the criterion of its intellectual development. As 
action is the criterion for judging thought. Truth or falsity 
of an idea is also judged through action and not by intellectual 
or logical standards. Hence, if the question arises as to 
which school of philosophy, morality, religion or art is more 
progressive, the intellectual and logical standards cannot 
provide the ansv/er to this question. The only criterion should 
be to see what are the conditions of v;hich that particular 
school of thought is the product and manifestation, and at 
which stage of development of social labour or tools of production 
.. , ,60 it lias emerged, 
This type of thinking of course, sounds very strange to 
those people who consider the real existence of man as liis own 
'self which is an immaterial substance and a product of 
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substantial movements of nature and not the product of society. 
But some one like Marx, who t'iinks in material terns and does 
not believe in any immaterial substance, is bound to interpret 
the essence of man and his actuality from a biological point 
of view and maintain that the essence of man is identical with 
the physical constitution of his body, as the ancient materialists, 
as well as the materialists of the eighteenth century, believed, 
But Marx has rejected the mechanistic view of life and has 
claimed that the being of man is grounded in society and not in 
nature. VAiatever has been formed by nature is the potential 
human being, not the actual one. Furthermore, either Marx 
should regard thought as the essence of humanity, and work as 
the manifestation and expression of thought or, on the contrary 
he should consider labour as the essence of humanity, and 
thought as the manifestation and expression of labour. Marx, 
being a materialist, not only does approve of the primacy of 
matter in the individual, but also rejects the idea of any 
supra-material essence besides the individual's material's 
existence. In the context of society and history also, he accedes 
to the priority of matter. As a result he has to adopt the 
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second alternative. 
Here a basic difference between the point of view of 
Marx and other materialists concerning the natui-e of history 
comes to light. Every materialist, since he considers man and 
other manifestations of his existence as material, inavitably 
tends to regard history also as materialir^tic. But what Marx 
8n 
says is more then this, Marx tries to say th-^tt history is 
essentially economic in character, and in economics, too the 
economic relations of production occupy the most important 
place. Since he considers the economic and production relations, 
i.e. the relation of workers with the product of their labour 
as a necessary relation derived from the stage of development 
of the tools of production, Marx's view point amounts to the 
claim that history is determined by the tools or instruments 
of production. Merely to say that history is materialistic in 
nature, or to say that history is economic in nature, is not 
enough to define the marxian view point. We should notice 
that according to Marx the essence and nature of history is 
"instrumentalistic". In some of his works, Mutahhari termed 
Marx's historical materialism as an "instrumentalist theory in 
contrast to his own "Humanistic theory" of history. 
o n 
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CHAPTER - III 
A - MUTAmARI'S ANALYSIS OF THE LAWS CF DIALECTICS 
It is, accordinp; to Marxism, from t;ie history of nature 
and human society that the lav/s of dialectics are abstracted. 
For they are nothing but the most general lav/s of these two 
aspects of historical development, as v/el"! as of t: ought 
itself. And indeed they can be reduced in t!ie main to three 
laws: 
(1). The law of the transformation of quantity into 
quality and vice versa; 
(2). The law of the interpenetration of opix)sites; 
(3)» The law of the negation of negation. 
These are developed by Hegel in his idealist fashion as 
mere laws of thought. The first, in the first part of his 
logic in the Doctrine of Being; the second fills the whole of 
the second part and by far the most important part of his logic. 
The Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures as the 
fundamental law for the construction of the 'vhole system. The 
mistake lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature 
and history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them. 
This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous 
treatment; the universe, v/il?.ynilly, lias to conform to a 
system of thought v/hich itself is only trie product of a definite 
stage of the evolution of human tliought. If we turn t'.e t'uing 
round, then every thing becomes simple, and the dialectical lav;s 
9,^  
that look so extremely mysterious in idealist philosophy at 
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once become simple and clear as the day. 
Mutahharl in his analysis says that the laws of dialectics 
are considered to be the logic of marxist philosophy. Here one 
may ask a question as to why these laws have been regarded as 
logical while these seem to be in domain of philosophy. For 
example, the law of motion is a philosophical issue rather than 
a logical issue, Mutahharl replies that since these laws consti-
tute the criteria and the tools of correct thinking, they are 
called logical issues. As logic deals with modes of thought 
and according to Marxists, if one follows the correct mode of 
thinking i.e., dialectical, he is considered to be on the right 
path. Logic is like the spectacles which help you see things 
2 in the world properly and more clearly. 
Mutahharl in his book Nagdi Bar Marxism (A critique on 
Marxism) in one chapter traced the principle of contradiction 
in Muslim philosophy, and then analysed and examined the Marxist 
approach to reality and logic. 
(1), The_Principle_of_Contradiotion^-
The Marxist concept of the principle of contradiction is 
rooted in Hegelian philosophy. Accordingly Marxists believe 
that contradiction serves as the motive force, the source of 
development which moves from inside. Every tuinc negates 
itself from within, that is, the internal contradiction is 
Q Q 9 • 
inlierent in all things and processes. Lenin called the study 
of contradiction the "nucleus" of dialectics. The authors of 
the book The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy say: 
\Vhen dialectical theory maintains 
that an object simultaneously exists 
and does not exist, that it contains 
within itself its ovm non-being, this 
must be understood in only one sense: 
an object is a unity of stability and 
changeability, of the positive and 
the negative, of what is dying out 
and what is entering life, and so 
on. 
With reference to Marxist philosophy, Mutahhari says 
that, so far as scientific experimentation is concerned there 
are always two opposing forces in everything; one is const-
ructive and the other is destructive. For instance, while 
cancer grows in a man's body, at the same time this growths 
destroys other parts of the body too. Similarly the growth 
of a chicken inside an egg is simultaneous with the destruction 
4 
and demise of that egg. Quoting Lenin the authors of book 
The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, says: 
What has been said about each of the 
elements, the elements of dialectical 
contradiction, the elements of "Unity" 
and struggle of opposites allows of an 
important conclusion. This conclusion 
was formulated by Lenin in the following 
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words: "The Unity (concidence, identity, 
equal action) of opposites is conditional 
temporary, transitory, relative. The 
struggle of mutually exclusive opposites 
is absolute, Just as development and motion 
5 
are absolute. 
Mutahhari rejects the idea of spontaneous grov/th from 
v;ithin due to the laws of the interconnection, interdependence 
and interpenetration of opposites that are at work within 
every object or phenomenon. He says that it is absurd to believe 
that an egg grows from within v;ithout the interference of any 
external factor. He adds that this principle is justifiable 
in Hegelian philosophy because of its idealist base, but not 
applicable to the materialist Marxist philosophy. 
Among Muslims philosophers Ibn-Sina holds that there are 
external causes always at work causing old age and death. He 
says that it is the external cause which causes decay in human 
beings and make the body weak and old, and finally lead it to 
death. He maintains that if there were no contradiction in 
the external forces, man could live in the state of youth forever. 
But Mulla Sadra who expounded the theory of the substntial 
motion within physical objects disagrees with the view of Ibn-
Sina. He holds that the movement of a body towards death is 
a natural process for every being, and even if there had been 
no external cause the object would have moved gradually tov/ards 
death due to its internal or substantial movement. 
With reference to marxist philosophy, Mutahhari says 
that everything in nature possesses the seed of its negation 
in itself. Here Mutahhari raises a question: Is that seed 
potential or actual in the object ? If it is actual, it 
means that every tiling is composed of two elements from the 
beginning; that is, thesis and antethesis which are concurrent 
with each other. Marxist theinkers, being monists, v/ould 
reject this dualist view. They may say that every thing 
possesses its negation in itself potentially. That is, tna 
opposite of a thing grows up gradually and clashes with the 
existing object and ultimately results in the disappearance 
of the old and the emergence of the new. Mutahhari says that 
even the concept of the new and the old denotes that the 
antithesis of everything would emerge at a later stage, that is, 
it is not concurrent with the thesis. Because of this, the 
later form of a thing is called new as compared to the earlier 
stage. If the new and the old were simultaneous, then, the 
concept of new and old would be redundant. Hence, the emergence 
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of the new means a particular process of motion. Earlier 
Mutahhari made out the point that motion always requires some 
external moving force. On this basis Mutahhari refutes the 
first law of Marxist dialectics, and says that opposition is 
not inherent in things and that motion witliin a thing is 
impossible v/ithout any external moving force. He makes out 
this point in the light of Marxist logic itself. 
on 
Mutahharl says that both Marxist and muslira philosophies 
apparently arrive at the same conclusion that in becoming, 
being and non-being are synthesised. This view leads to the 
conclusion that the physical v/orld is in the state of motion. 
Marxist philosophers infer from this conclusion that the world 
is independent, self-moving, self-developing, i.e., developing 
as a result not of any external causes but by virtue of its 
own laws, i.e. dialectical laws. Muslim philosophers, parti-
cularly Mulla Sadra, on the other hand, concludes that both 
the being and the system of this universe stem from the 
supernal. Were it not for the governance of the other world, 
this world which is always in flux and mutation, would be cut 
off from its past and, future. 
The authors of the book The Fundamentals of Marxist-
Leninist Philosophy say: 
Every thing is in motion and passing 
from one into another. Elementary 
particles, atoms, and molecules move 
within all material objects, every 
object interacts with its environment, 
and this interaction is bound to invole 
motion of some kind or another. Motion 
means the same th.ing as change, as 
any transition from one state to 
another. Motion is the universal 
attribute, the mode of existence of 
100 
matter. Nowhere in the world can 
there be matter, without motion, just 
as there can be no motion without 
matter. 
They further say: 
Since it is inseparably bound up v;ith 
motion and possesses intrinsic actj.vity, 
matter does not need any external, Divine 
Q 
"first push" to set it in motion. 
Among the Muslin philosophers Miilla Sadra is considered 
to be the champion of the principle of motion. He concluded 
from the new and pov/erful principles he had forged, that in 
addition to the overt accidental and sensible motion governing 
the visible phenomena of the world, there is a deep, substantial 
motion inaccessible to the senses that is the principle of 
these overt and sensible motions. 
Mutahhari in his book Ashnai ba Ulum-e Islami (An intro-
duction to Islamic sciences) throws light on this issue and 
says: Mulla Sadra effected a major transformation in Islamic 
philosophy by demonstrating substantial motion. He demonstrated 
that even on the basis of the Aristotlian principle of matter 
and form, we must accept that the substances of the world are 
in continuous motion; there is never so much as an instant 
of constancy and uniformity in the substances of tlie world. 
The accidents (that is, the nine other categories) as functions 
of the substances, are also in motion, Accordin,'^  to i-iulla 
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Sadra, nature equals motion end motion enuals continuous, 
uninterrupted creation and extinction. 
Through the principle of substantial motion, the visage 
of the Aristotelian universe is wholly transformed. According 
to this principle, nature or matter, equals motion. Time 
consists in the measure or Tensile force of this substantial 
motion, and constancy equals supernatural being. V/iiat exist 
is, on the one hand, absolute change (nature) and, on the 
other, absolute constancy (the supernatural). The constancy 
of nature is the constancy of order, not the constancy df 
being; that is, a definite, immutable system governs the 
universe, and the contents of the system are all mutable 
(they are change itself). Both the being and the system 
of this universe stem from the supernal. Prior to Mulla Sadra, 
the topic of the mutable and the constant was felt to belong 
to the natural sciences, in that any determination or any 
division that applies to a body qua body belongs to the natural 
sciences. It was said that it is such-and-such a body that 
is either constant or mutable or that is either still or in 
motion. In other words, motion and stasis are among the 
accidents of a body. Therefore, the topic of the constant and 
the mutable ought to fall wholly within the domain of the 
natural sciences. 
All this changed with Mulla Sadra's realization of 
existentialism (the substantive reality of being), his 
realization of substantial motion, and his demonstration 
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that the nature of the universe constitutes tlie mobile qua 
mobile and the mutable qua mutable (that is, that a body 
is not something to which motion is merely added as an accident, 
whereby at times this motion can be annulled, leaving the 
motionless state we call stasis). Rather, the nature of the 
universe is motion itself, and the contrary of this substantial 
motion is constancy, not stasis. Staiis holds for the accidental 
motion the state of whose absence we call stasis but is incon-
ceivable in the case essential, substantial motion. The contrary 
of this substantial motion that is the substance itself consist 
of substance for which constancy is the very essence. These 
are entities beyond space and time, devoid of spatiotemporal 
forces, potentialities or dimensions, therefore, it is not 
the body that is either constant or mutable. Rather, it is 
being qua being that appears either as constancy itself (as 
supramaterial being) or as continuous flux, becoming creation 
itself (the world of nature). Therefore, just as being is in 
its essence devisible into necessary and possible, so is it in 
its essence divisible into the constant and the fluid. 
Thus, according to Mulla Sadra, only certain kinds of 
motions-the accidental motions of a body having stasis for 
their opposite-ought to be studied under the heading of the 
natural sciences. Other motions, or indeed these very motions 
when not regarded from the standpoint of their being accidents 
of natural bodies, ought to be discussed and studied in first 
philosophyo Mulla Sadra himself brought in his discussions 
io.i 
of motion under "general phenomena" in the Asfar in the course 
of discussing potentials and actuals, .although it warranted 
a chapter to itself. 
Among the key conclusions arising from this great 
realization the most basic is that being in its essence is 
divisible into the constant and the fluid, an;; tl\"t constant 
being is one modality of being, while fluid being is another; 
and that becoming is precisely a plane of being. Although, 
nominally speaking, we nay regard becoming as a synthesis 
of being and nonbeing, this synthesis is actually a kind of 
notion or metaphor. In truth it is the realization of the 
substantive reality of being and of the nominal status of essence 
(mahiyat) that permits us to perceive this key reality. V/ithout 
a grasp of the substantive reality of being, the conception of 
flux and becoming as a plane of being too would be impossible. 
Motion has recovered its proper place in the modern 
philosophy of Europe through other avenues. Some philosophers 
came to believe that motion is the cornerstone of nature, that 
nature equals becoming. However, because this idea was not 
based on existentialism (the substantive reality of being) and 
the primary division of being into the constant and the fluid, 
these philosophers supposed that becoming was the same union 
of opposites that the ancients had deemed absurd. They likewise 
supposed that becoming falsified the principle of identity 
(hohuya), v;hich the ancients had taken for granted. 
KM 
These philosophers said that the presiding principle 
in the thought of the ancients was the principle of constancy 
and that, in deeming being constant, the ancients had supposed 
that either being or non-being must hold sway over things. 
That is either there is always being or there is always non-
being; no third alternative obtains. Similarly, because the 
ancients thought things constant, they supposed of every thing 
that it is itself (the principle of identity). But with the 
realization of the principle of motion and change in nature, 
the realization came that nature is continually in a state of 
becoming which is a union of being and non-being; A thing in 
the state of becoming both is and is not at every instant, 
its self is at once its self and not its self; the self of 
its self is prdgressively negated. Therefore, if the principle 
governing things were that of being and non-being, both the 
principle of the impossibility of the union of opposites and 
the principle identity would hold true. But because the 
principle governing things is the principle of becoming, neither 
of these other principles holds true. 
The principle of the impossibility of the union of 
opposites and the principle of identity, which held unrivaled 
away over the minds of the ancients, arose from a further 
principle that they also accepted implicitly: the principle 
of constancy. As the natural sciences showed the invalidity 
of the principle of constancy, these two principles too, lost 
their credibility. This development represents the concpetion 
05 
of many modern philosophers, from Hegel onwards, 
Mulla Sadra invalidated the principle of constancy by 
other means. Motion, according to his realization, implies 
that nature equals in constancy and constancy equals abstraction, 
Unlike modern philosophers, however, he never concludes that 
because nature equals flux and becoming, the principle of the 
impossibility of the union and cancellation of opposites is 
falsified. Although Mulla Sadra regards becoming as a kind 
of union of being and non-being, he does not treat this as a 
kind of a union of opposites because he has realized a more 
important principle: that being is divisible in its essence 
into tJie constant and the fluid. Constant being is a plane 
of being, and not a synthesis of being and non-being. The 
synthesis of becoming from being and non-being is not a union 
of two opposites, just as it is not the negation of the self 
of a thing, 
K 
The modern philosophers' confusion has two roots: their 
failure to perceive the division of being into the constant 
and the fluid and their inadequate conception of the principle 
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of contradiction and contrarily, 
(3)• The_Princi2le_of_Mutual_Interaction_of_0bjects^-
The conception of development cannot be 
understood without the concepts of 
the connection and interdependence, 
the interaction of phenomena. No 
motion would be possible without 
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this connection and interaction 
between different object, or 
between the various aspects and 
elements within each object. This 
is why Engels calls dialectics also. 
The science of universal inter-
connection. Lenin, in his article 
"Karl Marx", characterised the most 
essential features of dialectics, 
particularly emphasising the inter-
dependence and the closed and indisso-
luble connection between all aspects of 
any phenomenon (history constantly 
revealing ever new aspects), a connect-
ion that provide a uniform and universal 
process of motion, one that follows 
definite laws."'''' 
Mutahharl says that, early philosophers also believed 
in this principle of dialectics. They held that every object 
possesses its own essence (other existence or quiddity). In 
addition to this essence it also possesses relations. They 
even believed in unity of the world. Aristotle also had the 
same view. So our early philosophers to some extent believed 
this principle that is, nothing is isolated in the world. 
But Hegel came and said that the essence of everything consists 
in its relations. Marxists upheld this principle and said 
that the reality of an object was characterised by its relations. 
Accordingly they deny the principle of "what is, is", for they 
define everything in terms of its relation to other things. 
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They maintain that nothing is absolute and isolated, but 
every thing is conditioned by its environment. Nothing can 
be knovm about an object without a knowledge of its inter-
action with the world, and it is this interaction that reveals 
the properties of things. Even human beings and their thoughts 
are conditioned by their social and economic conditions in 
any age. Here Mutahhari raises a question: Are principles 
of dialectic included in this law? If it is so, it means the 
principles of dialectics are not absolute for these laws belonged 
to Hegel's time. Hegel put forwarded these principles, because 
his philosophy was conditioned by his particular socio-economic 
circumstance* Therefore, in Mutahhari*s view, laws of dialectics 
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are not applicable to all ages, 
(4), The Principle of the Transformation of Quantity into 
Quality and Vice Versa:-
"This law states that there is an 
interconnection and interaction 
between the quantitative and quali-
tative aspects of an object thanks to 
which small, at first imperceptible 
quantitative changes, accumulating 
gradually, sooner or later upset 
the proportion of that object, and 
evoke fundamental qualitative 
changes which take place in the form 
of leaps and whose occurrence depends 
on the nature of the objects in question 
and the conditions of their development 
in diverse forms. Knowledge of this 
law is vital to the understanding of 
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development. It provides a 
guideline for examining and studying 
phenomena as the unity of their 
qualitative and quantitative aspects, 
for seeing the complex interconnections 
and interactions of these aspects, and 
the chanfTes in the relationship between 
them."''^ 
As we have discussed earlier, Muslim philosophers, 
particularly post Ibn-Rushed philosophers in Iran believed 
that every thing was subject to motion. But this philosophy 
14 does not hold that laws are also in a state of change. 
Mutahharl says that since we are human and possess the 
faculty of reason and will, we may think and decide as to 
what is wrong and what is right in different ages. Hence, 
men are not subbordinated by the means of production as Marxist 
philosophers believe. According to Marx, "The essence of man 
is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. Inaits 
reality it is an ensemble of the social relations. Mutahharl 
says that animals live in the almost stable state throughout 
their lives because these are deprived of will and reason. 
But men are endowed with such faculties. Therefore, they can 
15 decide and act, and are not expected to be have passively. 
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B • REALITY; PERI^ ANEIir OR CHANGING 
From ancient times philosophers have asked whether 
what we perceive of an object by means of our senses or our 
reason corresponds to its actuality, the thing in itself. 
Some postulate that some of our sense perceptions or rational 
conceptions do correspond to actuality, and some do not. 
Those ideas or impressions that correspond to actuality are 
termed "True" while those that do not are termed "erroneous". 
Sight, hearing, taste, touch and smell are all subject to 
error, though most of our sense perceptions correspond fully 
to reality, and through some of these senses, we distinguish 
night from day, far from near, large from small, rough from 
smooth and cold from hot etc, 
Our reason is likewise subject to error. Logic was 
developed in order to avoid errors in our rational apprehension 
of facts. Usually logical inferences are true. When we add up 
all the debits and all the credits in the account of reason 
and subtract the former from the latter, we perform a mental 
and rational procedure. In this calculation if we are careful 
enough, the net result of it will correspond to reality. 
However, the sophists of Greece denied the distinction between 
truth and error. They said that whatever some person feels 
and thinks is for that person the truth. They said that man 
is the measure of all things. They basically denied reality 
and having denied it, they did not refer to any thing else, 
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corresponding to which man's perception and sensations could 
be true and in failing to correspond to which they could be 
16 
erroneous. 
The sophists were contemporaries of Socrates, Protagoras 
and Gorgian are two famous sophists. In Aristotle's time 
another group appeared in Alexandria called the skeptics, the 
most famous of whom is Pyrrhon. The skeptics did not deny 
actuality in principle but denied that human perceptions 
correspond to it. Rather they said that one perceived an 
object in a certain way under the influence of his internal 
states and certain external conditions. Some times two people 
experiencing different states, or viewing from different angles, 
will see the same things or events in two different ways. A 
thing may appear ugly in one's eyes and beautiful in another's. 
17 The air may feel warm to one and cold to another. 
Some put forwarded pragmatism as a theory of truth. This 
lable for a doctrine about meaning was first used as a philoso-
phical term in 1878 by C.S.Pierce. The term was soon borrowed 
by William James, F.C.S. Shiller and John Dewey, who in their 
different ways interpreted pragmatism as a theory of truth. 
In his pragmatism William James said, "Ideas become true just 
so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relations, with 
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other parts of our experience." They hold that ideas have 
"cash-value". An idea is right and true if it has fruitful 
consequences. Russell assailed the pragmatist notion of truth 
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as obscruantist. 
The other approach is that of veriflability principle, 
The criterion of meaningfulness applied by the logical positi-
vists to any empirical proposition involves verification. 
Verification is any procedure carried out to determine whether 
a statement is true or false, A statement v/hich mi,'^ ht be shown 
to be true is said to be in principle verifiable. This theory 
too failed to give a comprehensive difintion of truth. Modern 
physicists demolished this approach and proved that science is 
incapable of discovering a factual and objective \vorld. So 
modern science turned back toward Idealism. It not only doubted 
the law of causation, but also questioned the very validity of 
the concept of matter.^ 
The dialectical materialist concention of consciousness 
is based on the principle of reflection. That is, the mental 
reproduction of the external object in the brain of the individual 
In the form of sensations and perception, giving way to certain 
propositions, inferences and concepts. The content of conscious-
ness is a product of the brain activity and yet is arises only 
due to external influence reaching the brain through the sense 
organs. The sense organs are the apparatuses that reflect and 
inform the organism of change in the external environment or 
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within the organism itself. 
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MEINITAL EXISTENCE 
"A thing" besides "existence" in the 
external world has an "existence" by-
it self in the minds".^'' 
The philosophers of Islam have held that the basic 
approach to resolving sophism of some ancient thinkers consists 
in distingmishing the mental existence of the external objects 
from theobjects themselves. Muslim philosophers made a clear 
distinction between the external and mental existence. The 
Hukama of Islam first define knowledge, or perception, as 
consisting in the awareness of a kind of being for the object 
perceived within the being of the percever. They go on to 
cite certain arguments in support of this position, and then 
they recount certain difficulties and objections to the notion 
of mental existence by their opponents. Subsequently they 
refute them on epistomological grounds. 
This problem was not dealt with in this form during the 
period of early Islamic thinkers who were under the influence 
of Hellenic philosophy. Nasir al-Din Tusi (D-1273) was the 
first Muslim thinker to speak of the objective and the subjective 
knowledge in his work of philosophy and Kalam. Thereafter it 
came to occupy a major place in the works of later philosophers 
such as Mulla Sadra (1571/2 - 1640) and Mulla Hadi Sabzawari 
(1797/8 - 1878), Farabl, Avicenna (980 - 1037) and even Shaykh 
Al-Ishraq Suhrawardl (1155 - 1191) as well as their follov/ers. 
Their predecessors never embarked upon the subject of mental 
existence, rather they never used the term in their v/orks, 
The term made its first appearance only after Avicenna's time. 
However, what Farabi and Avicenna said on other issues 
shows that they believed perception to consist of an analogous 
to the reality of the object perceived within the being of the 
perceiver. But they neither sought to demonstrate this point 
nor conceived of it as an issue independent of that of existence 
or as one of the grades of existence. 
Muslim philosophers maintain that a thing is either 
objective or subjective. Objective existence means being 
external to and independent of man's mind. We know for instance 
that the mountains the sea, and the plains have existence 
external to our minds and independent of them. Indeed whether 
we and our minds exist or not, the mountains,the sea and the 
plains exist. But those mountains, seas, and plains have an 
existence in our minds as well. When we imagine them, we 
attribute them a kind of existence in our minds. The being 
things find in our minds is called subjective existence or 
mental existence. 
Certain questions arise here: one is, why the image of 
things appearing in our minds should be conceived of as a kind 
of existence. Since they are only images, one might say that 
the image of a thing painted on a wall or printed on a sheet 
of paper may well deserve to be called another Kind of existence, 
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If we term mental images a form of existence for the 
thing imagined, we have only employed a metaphor and not spoken 
the literal truth, but philosophy ought to deal with the literal 
truth. 
According to Mutahhari, the relation of a mental mountain 
or sea to an external object is far more profound than the rela-
tion of the picture of a mountain or a sea on a sheet of paper 
or a wall to that external mountain or sea. If what appears 
in the mind were only a simple image, it would never give rise 
to consciousness, Just as the image on the wall does not give 
rise to consciousness in the wall. Rather, the mental image 
is consciousness itself. 
The other question is whether mental existence, as a 
concept actually relating to man and the human psyche, belongs 
to the realm of psychology. Philosophy deals with general 
questions and such particular questions pertain to the sciences. 
Philosophers have demonstrated that we are conscious of 
an external object, because our mental images, far from being 
simple, are a kind of realization of existence in our mind of 
the essence or quiddities (Mahlyah) of the object. 
Although, from one stand point, the question of mental 
images is a question of the human psyche and so belongs to the 
field of psychology, from another stand point, man's mind is in 
fact another emergence (Nash'a) of existence, resulting in its 
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essence into a dualistic entity (subjective and objective) 
it is a question for philosophy, 
Avicenna and Mulla Sadra have said (The former allusively 
in the beginning of the raetaphysic (llahiyat) of his shifa, 
and the latter explicitly and at length (in his commentary on 
the same work) that at times a question may pertain to two 
different disciplines from two stand points. For instance, a 
question may pertain to philosophy from one stand-point and 
25 to some natural science from another. 
On the basis of this distinction between an external 
object and its mental existence (quiddity), muslim philosophers 
since the time of Mulla Sadra have been adopting a position 
that may be called realistic. Mental existence, according to 
them, refers to the essence of the things or a class of things, 
and serves as an intermediary between the subject and the 
object. This is the same position which was taken in the 
twentieth century by the critical realists, who consider 
sense data as the means of knowing external objects. Among 
the predecessors and teachers of Mutahhari,Allameh Tabatabal 
elaborated this issue in his major philosophical work, Usul-e 
Phalsafa wa Rewish~e Realism (The principle of philosophy and 
the method of realism) is a topic upon which Mutahliari wrote 
a detailed commentary. So far as the Marxist view of the world 
is concerned, they are also realists in so far as they accept 
the physical world as real when they describe knov/ing as a 
reflectionof the external world. Further, they also accept 
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an intermediate stage between the subject and the object. But 
usually they hold that the reflection of an object is identifiable 
with the object itself. In contemporary terms, this position can 
be called New-realism. 
But in reality the denial of the independent existence of 
mind, self or spirit by the dialectical materialists leads them 
to a position radically opposed to that of Islam. If the 
position of Marxists regarding the physical world is stretched 
to its logical consequence, the reflection theory makes them 
idealistis. If knowledge is reflection of the external world 
and both are identical, then the world itself is reduced to 
mental reflection. This is an idealistic position. Moreover, 
this position leads to relativism also, for reflection of two 
persons may differ from one another, and yet both may be true 
according to Marxists. Thus there is no absolute objective 
reality, reality being subjected to the reflection of individual 
and hence, being relative. This point has been very clearly 
raised by Mutahhari in his commentary on 'Usul-e Falsifah wa 
Rawishe Realism' (The principle of philosophy and the method of 
philosophy) Volume One; 
A critical analysis makes it explicit 
that the position of Modern relativists 
is incorrect, and actually the term 
relative reality has no meaning,,. if 
two persons perceive a body as having 
two different states, the body itself 
should have either one of those states 
•J <• f - M 
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or none of two, but may have a third 
state. Of course it is impossible for 
a thing to possess two different states 
at one and same time. In the first case 
perception of one of the two persons is 
absolutely in correct and that of other 
is absolutely true. In the other case 
both of those are wrong. In any case 
the notion of relative reality is 
illogical and irrational. 
REALITY: ABSOLUTE OR RELATIVE 
A certain group of scholars deny the absoluteness of 
reality. They are called relativists and their doctrine 
relativism. In the dictionary of pnilosophy this term has been 
explained as follows: 
There are many sorts of relativism, 
and senses of relativism. But all 
are best Uiiderstood when seen as 
reactions stimulated by advance in 
anthropology and the sociology of 
knowledge. To the sort of fact 
noticed in Aristotle's Nicomachean , 
Ethics; "Fire burns both in Hellas 
and in Persia; but men's idea of right 
and wrong vary from place to place." 
The relativist recognizes: first, the 
importance of the social environment 
in determining the content of belief, 
both what is and what ought to be the 
case; and second, the possible diversity 
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of such social environment. To be 
a relativist about value is to maintain 
that there are no universal standards 
of good and bad, right and wrong. One 
difficulty is to avoid saying that what 
is right is whatever actually is 
commended whenever and wherever anyone 
happens to be for, whatever its other 
faults, the general maxim 'when in Rome 
do what the Romans say' expresses, not 
unbridled individualistic idiosyncrasy 
but a specific and categorical universal 
standard. To be a relativist about fact 
is to maintain that there is no such 
thing as objective kno^ vledge of reality 
independent of the knower. The parallel 
difficulty here is to eschew the incon-
sistent claim that the relativistic 
thesis is itself an item of objective 
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knowledge." 
Advocates of this view, take recourse to new scientific 
discoveries in biology and physics in order to justify their 
doctrine but in respect to reasoning and conclusions they are 
precisely similar to sceptics with this difference that scepticis 
denied the cognative value of perception, and made their denial 
the ground of ai intellectual dogmatism. The philosophical 
sceptic says, "nobody knows, and nobody ever can know." It is 
this element of dogmatism that makes the system vulnerable. 
But relativists on the other hand do not deny the cognitive 
value of sense perception, but they maintain that cognition 
is relative. 
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Dialectical Materialism approves of the assertion of 
relativists regarding reality. Marxists, of course deny, that 
they are sceptics, but their denials are not convincing. 
In his book Anti-Duhring Engels writes: 
When I say "of human knowledge" I do 
not use the phrase with the intention 
of insulting the inhabitants of other 
celestial bodies, whom I have not 
had the honour of knowing, but only 
for the reason that animals also 
have knov/ledge, though it is no way 
sovereign. A dog acknov/ledges his master 
to be his God, though this master may be 
the biggest scoundrel on earth. 
Is human thought sovereign? Before we 
can answer yes or no we must first 
enquire: what is human thought ? Is 
it the thought of the individual man? 
No. But it exists only as the individual 
thoiight of many milliards of past, 
present and future men. If, then, I say 
that the total thought of all these 
human beings, including the future one 
which is embraced in my idea, is 
sovereign, able to know the world as 
it exists, if only mankind lasts long 
enough and in so far as no limits are 
imposed on its knowledge by its perceptive 
organs or the objects to be known, then 
I am saying something which is pretty 
banal and, in addition, pretty barren. 
For the most valuable result from it 
would be that it should make us extremely 
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distrustful of our present knowledge, 
in as much as in all probability we 
are Just about at the beginning of 
human history, and the generations 
which will put us right are likely to be 
far more numerous than those v/hose 
knowledge we often enough with a 
considerable degree of contempt have 
29 the opportunity to correct. 
EVOLUTION OF REALITY 
Is reality subject to evolution ? Here again Marxists 
reply in affirmative, for they believe that their philosophy 
is based on the philosophy of becoming. In fact if we look 
at reality in the sense to which Marxism and some other 
schools take it we would conclude that evolution and trans-
formation of reality have a meaning only in their frameworks. 
But from the Islamic view-point, according to which reality 
is permanent and absolute, evolution of reality is meaningless. 
We shall have to make a distinction between reality 
(Haqlqat) and actuality (Waqaiat). The world outside our mind 
is actuality, and we see that it undergoes changes. We are 
not here concerned with the issues whether what we call mind 
is composed of nerves, which are also in a process of change. 
When we say that what is actual is changeable, we compare the 
external occurance with our mental iaage of it. Our mental 
image of a thing corresponds to the actual state of a thing. 
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Human mind always compares actuality with the idea it has of 
actuality and accordingly verifies it. But what we mean by 
knowledge always refers to a reality that is in itself. In 
the external world it may assume different forms but the 
reality in itself is objectively independent of all the changes. 
Whenever we refer to an external thing, we actually refer to 
its mental existence that exists in our minds but also through 
it we refer to thing in itself, which is independent of its 
mental existence. Mutahhari accepts that both the external 
phenomena and their corresponding mental images undergo a 
gradual process of change. That is, they undergo evolution. 
He does not deny the evolutionary process, but emphasises 
that the reality in itself remains absolute and permanent. 
Our ideas of things correspond to various changing states of 
them, so they may be true for a moment but not eternally. He 
also refers to a kind of relativism by saying that a transitory 
picture is eternally true with reference to a particular moment, 
but it may be at the same time false with reference to another 
moment. The core of a thing, which may be defined as external, 
is what we call reality. Thus in Mutahhari's view reality 
is absolute but its mental representations and external conditions 
undergo a process of evolutionary changes. Hence reality, 
in Mutahhari's view, is unaffected by changes. When we say 
that truth is that which corresponds to reality, we refer to 
the essence of things which is absolute, A thing may be the 
same and permanent but its successive states or stages reflect 
our own ability of perceiving it. According to another sense, 
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evolution is also a reality in the scientific world, for a 
scientific theory gradually evolves and reaches its latest 
form. Mutahharl says that this also does not refer to the 
evolution of reality itself, but reveals the evolution of 
our ovm scientific knowledge. He holds that it is the mis-
conception of both reality and evolution which makes reality 
appear changing and relativistic, and thus reduce it to 
something transitory and contingent. Mutahharl has discussed 
various arguments advanced in favour of the relativist 
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conception of reality and refuted them. 
The real problem is how to reconcile permanence or 
absolutism of reality with the phenomenon of evolution. If 
we accept every transitory picture of a thing as permanently 
true, we regard, actuality as static. But if we accept that 
every picture of a thing is partially true in a particular 
condition ofat a particular time, we shall have to accept that 
actuality is not static. But what is behind actuality is the 
ultimate reality, which remaining absolute, unfolds its various 
phases and aspects through changing actuality. In this manner 
Mutahharl reconciles absolutism of reality with the phenomenon 
of evolution. The reality is permanent but actuality, that 
is the various aspects of reality are evolutionary. 
In order to trace the origin of belief in the evolution 
of reality in Marxist philosophy, we have to study the underlying 
factors which caused the advocates of this view to develop such 
an idea. They hold that reality is reflected in the brain 
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which is a part of nature. Since nature is subject to motion 
accordingly the content of the brain also undergoes the same 
process and possess as a similar property of nature, 
In "The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy" 
the authors vrrite: 
The relati onship between knowledge 
and objective reality is expressed 
in the concept of reflection. This 
concept was proposed by philosophy 
in ancient times. The modern 
materialists have developed and 
enriched it with content, but in some 
cases gave the process of reflection 
a mechanistic colouring; reflection 
was regarded as the influence of 
objects on man, whose sense organs, 
the brain registered their imprint, 
their form, like waz. 
Although reflection is not a concept 
peculiar to the Marxist-Leninist 
theory of knowledge alone, it has 
gained its place there, been 
rethought and acquired new content. 
But, why is such a concept needed? 
When discussing the content and source 
of knowledge how and in which form it 
is connected with objective reality, 
we cannot uphold the positidns of 
materialism without understanding 
knowledge as a reflection of the 
things, properties and laws of 
objective reality, 
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Materialism as a theory of knowledfre 
proceeds from recognition of the 
existence of an objective reality 
Independent of man's consciousness, and 
of the knowability of that reality. 
Recognition of objective reality, which 
forms part of the content of knowledge, 
is directly connected with the concept 
of reflection. Knowledge reflects the 
object; this means th«t the subject 
creates the form of thought that 
ultimately reproduces properties and laws 
governing the given object, that is to 
say, the content of knowledge is 
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objective. 
In The Capital, Karl Marx says: 
"The ideal is nothing else than the material 
world reflected by the human mind, and 
translated into forms of thought." 
This very position of Marx marks not only knowledge but also 
what he calls objective reality. 
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THE PROBLEM OF CONTRADICTION IN ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY 
A P P E N D I X 
This is the English translation of Mutahhari's persian 
article translated by Shahyar Saadat in Al-Tawhld, Vol. 1 No.1, 
PP. 66-81. 
Conflict, collision and strug::le are some of the fixed 
characteristics of this world. This condition is clearly 
perceived through superficial observation and nrofoundly revealed 
through scientific and philosophical enquiry. We live in a 
world of creation and destruction, making-; and breaking, weaving 
and tearing apart, birth and death. Here v;e see a whole series 
of opposites paired in an eternal eir.brace: good and evil, being 
and non-being, pleasure a.nd pain these are the stuff of 
reality. As the Persian poet, Sa'di says: 
The treasure and the snake, 
The flower and the thorn, 
Happiness and sadness are inseparable. 
Therefore, in each case, two opposite forces are observed 
existing side by side. Many people consider this world imperfect 
because of this duality. They say that this is not the best of 
all possible worlds, that this is not an ideal v/orld. They wish 
that it were a world in which there was only li-:':t, life, 
goodness, happiness, peace and tranquility. They wish that 
sickness, darkness, death, evil, misery and anxiety did never 
exist. These people are amazed that the Creator did not fashion 
the v;orld in the iina;'':e of the iiieal.ized notions v.'i'ich t'ney 
happen to conceive. 
The idea of dualism v/as born from precise ly tliis percept ion, 
I t was thought tha t if tlie world had one source and was ruled by 
a s ingle p r i n c i p l e , two opposite tendencies would never e x i s t . 
The opposite way of i n t e r p r e t i n g tl i is dual i ty i s that 
ev i l and non-being are s u p e r f i c i a l and r e l a t i v e aspects of 
goodness and per fec t ion . In other words, ev i l i s only super-
f i c i a l l y bad. Opposition, s t r ugg l e , and conf l i c t a re , if not 
the bas ic , at l e a s t a necessary condi t ion for a l l progress and 
development. All beauty, subl imi ty , exa l t a t i on , per fec t ion , 
movement and evolut ion i s the outcome of con f l i c t , disharmony and 
imperfection. Conformity and harmony c rea te peace and s tagnat ion, 
which are always follov/ed by death and ann ih i l a t i on . 
Dividing objec ts in to two d i s t i n c t and separate groups 
and c a l l i n g one group good and pe r fec t and the other ev i l and 
imperfect , and t r a c i n g eac-: group 's o r i g i n to a separate source 
i s the extremity of supe r f i c i a l th ink ing . \Vhen looked at from 
a higher pe r spec t ive , the th ings which were formerly regarded 
as ev i l and imperfect are seen to be good and pe r f ec t . All 
th ings , i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r des ignat ion as good or bad, share 
equally in the make-up of the per fec t order and equally cont r ibu te 
to the beauty and u l t imate goodness of the macrocosm. Fur ther-
more, they emanate from a common source and are the manifestat ions 
of an i n v i s i b l e wi tness , 
Laughter tells of her benevolence and grace 
Lamentation is a complaint of her wrath. 
These tv/o opposite songs of the vrorld. 
Tell of only one Beloved. 
Issues regarding tiie question of opposition such as the 
tendency of a pair of opposites to cancel and neutralize each 
other or to combine and synthesize, the tendency of one to 
beget the opposite of itself, have always occupied the minds 
of men, although the intellectual responses to such phenomena 
have not always been the same, taking sometimes an optimistic 
view and at other times a pessimistic interpretation has been 
adopted. At times men v/ere led by this apparent dualism to 
deny the existence and the unity of God, and at other tines 
to believe in the all-pervading v/ill and power of the Creator. 
Sometimes it has led to theological dualism and at other times 
given birth to belief in absolute unity of the Divine attributes, 
The Holy Quran, that ultimate source of Divine revelation, 
which has had the most significant role in forming the views of 
Muslim philosophers and scholars, always speaks of opposition 
and contrast as the "signs" of God: 
Why do you not acknowledge the 
magnificence of your Creator, 
when He made you in somany 
different kinds. (71:1.4) 
Among His signs is the variety 
(difference) of your languages 
and colours. (30:22). 
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Especially, there are numerous references to one opposite 
giving birth to its own opposite. The Quran also considers 
this condition to be a sign of the v/isdom and craftsmanship of 
God. 
He makes the night to enter into 
the day and makes the day to enter 
into the night and He brings forth 
the living from the dead and brings 
forth the dead from the living. 
(The Holy Quran) (3.26). 
In the Nahj al-balaghah we frequently encounter the 
combination of the opposites treated as an issue relating to 
the question of the oneness of God: 
The fact that He has made sense 
faculties proves that He has no sense 
faculty; the fact that He has made 
things which are opposite to each 
other, proves that he has no opposite: 
the fact that He has made things similar 
to each other, proves that there is 
nothing like Him. He made the light 
the opposite of darkness, clarity the 
opposite of ambiguity, solidity the 
opposite of fluidity, hotness the 
opposite of coldness. He reconciled 
the homogeneous things and associated 
the heterogeneous. Things which were 
far apart He brought close and things 
which were close. He made distant from 
each other. 
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Modern philosophers have attributed great sii^ nificance 
to the question of controdiction, holdin:: the viev/ th-^ t contra-
diction is the cause of every movement and evolution. They 
believe that evolution is nothinrr but the synthesis of opposites 
and contradictories and the replacement of simple pairs of 
opposites by more complex ones. Some of these thinkers went 
so far as to deny the oldest law of lo,f^ ic i,e, the Principle 
of Contradiction, which holds that the contrH^dictories are always 
mutually exclusive. They removed the distance betv/een being 
and non-being, existence and non-existence. This distance was 
believed by the ancient philosophers to be infinite and therefore 
the greatest of distances, 
Hegel, the famous German philosopher, is the champion 
of the philosophy of contradiction. It is he who formulated 
the triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, which was 
suggested by other philosophers as the description of the birth 
and synthesis of contradictions. Also, it was Hegel who intro-
duced contradiction into the concept of dialectics and founded 
the new dialectics. 
In his treatise on dialectics, Paul Foulquie says: 
Hegel did not invent the triad of 
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, 
Fichte and Shelling, Hegel's con-
temporaries, had also based their 
metaphysical views on these concepts. 
Hegel, however, made utmost use of 
this principle and considered it to be 
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the ultimate explanation of reality. He 
designated it as "Dialectics" which iTiade 
the theory strange to the minds of his 
contemporaries, because, up to that time 
the term "dialectics" designated th<- art 
of proof and disproof, which were b'^ th 
based on the Principle of Contradic'-ion. 
Hegel's dialectics, however, meant 'he 
"synthesis of opposites". 
In another part of Foulquie's treatise he says: 
The difference between the old and the new 
dialectics is in the way they treat the 
principle of the mutual exclusivity of the 
opposites is the absolute lav/ of bo • h objects 
and the mind. A particular entity f.annot 
both exist and not exist at the sam*- time. 
And if the human mind encounters tW' contra-
dictory propositions in succession, '^ ne of 
them must necessarily be false, Th<- new 
dialectics, however, holds the view that 
contradiction is a quality of the things 
themselves and that an object "is" •''^d "is 
not" at the same time. This quality of self-
contradiction is the cause of the Cf.'inge and 
development of things, so the new d : "^ lectics 
believes, and without it, they woul' he fixed 
and unchanging. Therefore, if man is forced 
to accept two contradictory stateme. '-Sf it is 
wrong to believe that he is making -•. :nistake. 
Of course, it is necessary to resolv.^  the 
contradiction, but neither of the c^ -^ 'tradictories 
should be denied. 
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Also, Foulquie says that, "the reconciliation and 
synthesis of contradictions in things and in the mind is called 
dialectics by Hegel. The dialectical method consists of three 
stages which are usually called 'thesis', 'antithesis', and 
'synthesis'. However, Hegel calls these three stages 'affirm-
ation', 'negation', and 'negation of the negation'." 
In Hegel's view, becoming is neither being nor non-being. 
It is the synthesis of both. As Paul Foulquie puts it: 
The first triad of Hegel's philosophy, which 
is the most famous is this: Being "is", i.e. 
exists. This constitutes the 'affirmation' 
or the 'thesis' of the triad. But pure un-
specified being without a particular content 
of some sort is equivalent to nothing at all. 
It is the same as non-being. Our ' af f irihation', 
therefore, is necessarily followed by its own 
negation. Therefore, we say that being "is 
not" or does not exit. Is there a further 
concept that will overcome this contradiction 
and prove to be a synthesis of the ideas of 
being and non-being? Hegel fines such a concept 
in that of becoming, 
We find a view similar to that of Hegel expressed in 
Islamic philosophy. That is, inthe state of becoming, being 
and non-being embrace each other and become one and the same, 
And that a thing which is becoming, both is and is not. The 
Islamic philosophers, however, never posited %*thi£ fact in 
opposition to the Principle of Contradiction and never believed 
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that it cancels the validity of tiiis principle of lo ,ic. 
Now, let us take a closer look at what the Islamic 
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philosophers say on the question of contradiction and examine 
whether it is the same as the views of the .Vestern philosophers; 
or, if it is not the same, what are the similarities and 
differences between their views, 
Islamic philosophers were well aware of the role of 
conflict and contradiction in evolution and development, and 
believed that conflict betv/een creatures is a necessary condition 
for the continuation of Divine Grace, 1^ulla Sadra in Al-Asfar 
says; 
If there was no conflict, none of the 
creatures would have emerged. 
Or 
If there were no opposition, the emanation 
of existence from the First Principle 
would not have occurred. 
That is, no new beings would have been born, 
At this point, we should determine whether the Islamic 
philosophers shared the view of the European philosophers 
regarding the role of opnosition (contradiction) in the process 
of natural evolution, or if they held a different position, 
Now, we shall continue our discussion in two parts: 
(1), The unity of being and non-being in the process of becoming, 
(2), The role of opposition in change, movement and evolution, 
THE UNITY OF BEIiX AND NON-BEIMQ IN BECOMING; 
We have already considered Hegel's concept of the re-
conciliation of tlie contradictory concepts of being and non-being 
in becoming. Now, we shall turn our attention to the treatment 
this subject receives in Islamic philosophy. There are numerous 
references to this topic by Muslim thinkers. 
Fakhr al-Din al-Razl has a famous paradox concerning the 
problem of becoming. He believed that gradual emergence of 
things is meaningless. All the things that we think emerge 
gradually, are in fact born in a sudden manner. The illusion 
of gradual emergence of a thing is caused by the fact that the 
object in question is made up of a number of parts. As each 
part emerges suddenly and these emergences follow one another 
in succession, we are deluded into thinking that we are witness-
ing the emergence of one whole object, while in reality we are 
witnessing the creation of a number of things, each of which 
is born quite spontaneously; each part being quite separate 
and independent of the anterior and posterior parts. From 
this analysis, al-Razi concludes that all movements are in fact 
a combination of independent parts none of which is a movement 
and gradual emergence from potentiality into actuality. 
Al-Razl defends his position in the following manner. 
Anything that does not exist and then comes into being, it^ 
being must have a beginning. Furthermore, this beginning is 
simple and indivisible. It has no beginning, middle, or end. 
If the beginning had a beginninf-, middle, and end, then the 
real beginning would be the beginning of the beginning, and its 
middle and end would cease to be the part of beginning. We apply 
the same argument to the new beginning; if it were not simple 
the same difficulty would arise. Therefore, we are forced to 
conclude that beginning is simple and indivisible. 
Next we say, anything that comes into being, must either 
be in a state of existence at its beginning or in a state of 
non-existence. If we say that a thing was in the state of non-
being at the beginning of its existence, then we cannot say that 
it was at the beginning of its existence; rather, we must say 
that it was in the state of non-being and is still in the state 
of non-being. It would be impossible to say that such an object 
is in the beginning of existence. We are forced to conclude 
that a thing exists at the beginning of its being. 
Now, either something of that object remains to come into 
being or it does not. If nothing remains to come into being, 
then we have admitted that the thing in question was fully and 
completely existent at the beginning of its being. Since the 
beginning is simple and indivisible, the object in question 
must have come into existence suddenly not gradually. If some 
of the object still remains, the question arises: is the thing 
remaining which did not exist at the beginning of the existence 
of the object, identical with that v;hich existed at the beginning, 
or, are they two different things? It is impossible for them 
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to be identical because a narticular thing cannot both be at 
one and the same time. If on the other hand, the thing remaining 
which is to come into being is different from that which has 
come into being, then that which came into being in the beginning 
has come into being fully and instantaneously and nothing of it 
remains to emerge later. The thing which is yet to come into 
being, then is something completely different, distinct and 
independent of what has already come into being. Gradual 
emergence and 'becoming', then, are meaningless notions, 
The views expressed by al-Razi caused a great stir among 
the Muslim thinkers and led to renewed efforts to better 
understand the nature of movement and time. The theory of time 
as the fourth dimension of matter, which was forwarded in the 
Muslim world by Sadr al-Din Shirazl (Mulla Sadra), came in the 
wake of these intense philosophic efforts, 
Mir Damad is the first Muslim thinker to have solved 
properly the problems raised by Fakhr al-Din al-RazI, Mir Damad 
first tackles the problem of beginning. He says that when we 
talk of a gradually emerging object having a beginning, this 
does not mean that the object in question came into being 
instantaneously and then continued its existence so that some 
instant should be taken as the starting point of its being. Such 
a beginning is appropriate for things which come into existence 
suddenly and instantaneously, not to gradually emerging things, 
J3n 
Being in the gradually emerging tilings means that since 
the thing that comes into being has extension and dimensions, 
which in turn corresponds to a temporal dimension, its being 
possesses the dimension of time, and since its existence is 
finite, it must have two ends, each end corresponding to a hypo-
thetical point in time. One of these points is its beginning 
and the other is its end. Therefore the beginning and the end 
of the gradually emerging object both exist in the instant and 
not in time. The extremities i.e. the beginning and the end of 
a continuous entity, whether spatial or temporal, can never 
be considered as parts of that entity. So the question whether 
the end points of a continuum are simple or not does not arise. 
For example, the end point of a line is not part of tl.e line, 
In fact, the limit of any extended thing has no existence of 
its own; it is a concept abstracted from the limitation of being. 
The instant is also nothing but a hypothetical point in time. 
Mir Damad then turns his attention to the ontological mode 
of the temporal and gradually emerging entities and probes into 
the nature of time itself. He claims that because this kind of 
objects are existentially v/eak, the stages of being and non-being 
are mixed in them. Every stage of their being is associated with 
the non-being of another stage. Therefore, the answer to the 
question raised by Fakhr al-Din al-Razl that if a part of a 
gradually emerging thing becomes existent wliile another part is 
still non-existent, does the object in question exist or not, 
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is that every part of that object exists in a particular 
segment of time. And in another segment of time where another 
part of the object exists, the first part is non-existent. The 
totality of the object as a wholly complete unit exists in the 
totality of time and not in any particular segment of it, and 
not in any instant. 
In his book al-Asfar, Mulla Sadra expresses the same view 
in a more forceful manner. In the eleventh chapter of his book 
(the chapter dealing with potentiality and actuality), he says: 
Movement and time are among those things 
which are existentially weak, i.e. things 
in which being and non-being are intervoven. 
Their actuality is associated with their 
potentiality, and their coming into being 
is the same as their annihilation. The 
existence of every part necessitates the 
annihilation of some other part, or rather, 
it is none other than the non-being of some 
other part. 
Discussing the relationship of the changing to the un-
changing inchapter twenty-one of the discussion on "potentiality 
and actuality", he first says: "The kinds of actuality and 
stability that various objects possess are different from one 
another, and the Ultimate Source has given every object the 
distinctive form of stability peculiar to itself. And v/henever 
the stability which an object has is the stability of change, 
and the actuality of it is the realization of its potentiality 
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and pov/er, inevitably, tliot would be the sort of stability 
and actuality which would be granted to it," 
Nulla Sadra continues his discussion by saying: 
The thing whose perpetuation or continuity is 
identical with its becoming ever new is nature. 
And the thing whose actuality is identical with 
absolute potentiality, is the primordial, 
formless matter. And that thing v/hose unity 
is identical with its actual multiplicity is 
the number. And the thing whose actual unity 
is idential with its potential multiplicity is 
the body and its physical properties, 
In the twenty-eighth chapter of the discussion on poten-
tiality and actuality, Mulla Sadra draws a delicate inference 
from verse 61 of the sixth chapter of the Holy Quran which is 
as follows: 
And He is the Supreme, above His servants, and 
He sends keepers over you; until when death 
comes to one of you. Our messengers cause him 
to die, and they are not remiss. (6T61) 
The inference that Sadr al-DIn Shirazi draws from the 
above quoted verse is this: "A thing, the being and non-being 
of which are intermixed, and its mere persistence and continuity 
entails its destruction and annihilation, inevitably, the means 
of its continued existence are identical with the causes of its 
destruction and annihilation. Therefore, in the Quranic verse 
the same entities that have the duty of guardin,"; the individual 
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are entrusted with the duty of bringing about his death and 
oblivion, when the time for it comes. In other words, the 
agents of survival and preservation of life are transformed in 
time into the agents of death and decay." 
How is it that such thinkers who so explicitly defend 
the view that being and non-being are united and intermixed 
in the natural world, still defend the validity of the Law of 
Contradiction and call it umra al-qadaya, or "the mother of all 
theorems"? 
The fact of the matter is that in the view of tliese 
philosophers, the interwovenness of being and non-being, which 
is a necessary characteristic of all changing and transitory 
things, in no way negates the validity of the Principle of 
Contradiction. In their view, the difficulty has been caused 
by failing to distinguish between the various ways in which we 
perceive non-being. In other words, the problem is caused by 
a failure to adequately understand the mind's tendency to 
distort and miscomprehend the meaning of non-existence. 
In order to comprehend this matter properly, two things 
must be kept in mind: 
(a). It is well-known that logicians divide propositions 
into two general categories of affirmative and negative propo-
sitions. In the case of the affirmative propositions, the, 
judgement of the mind is clear: that is, our minri either affii-ms 
the existence of the subject of the Disposition or its having 
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a particular predicate or pr-operty, as, for example, in such 
statenen's as "John is", or, "John is stanclin,:,," 
Now, how about the negative propositions? For example, 
if we say, "John is not standing", what is the purport of this 
proposition? and what is the mental process involved in reaching 
a conclusion about it? At first, we might think th't the 
purport of this proposition is that, John is in a non-standing 
position. Such an inference is certainly false. "John is non-
standing" is an affirmative proposition. That is, its essence 
and nature is affirmative. The negation in the proposition is 
made a part of the predicate and it is called an 'affirmative 
proposition with a diverted predicate.' iVhether a proposition 
is negative or affirmative cannot be determined by its subject 
or predicate. It is a question the answer to which muSt be 
sought beyond the subject and the predicate. Failure to make 
distinction between these tv/o can cause numerous errors in the 
reasoning process and in making inferences. Of course, those 
who are familiar with logic do not mistake these two kinds of 
propositions with each other and there is no difference of 
opinion among logicians regarding this matter. 
Those who consider the affirmation and negation in propo-
sitions to be beyond the scope of the subject and the predicate, 
belong to two different groups. One group believes that the 
difference between these two types of propositions is a question 
of "relationship": affirmative relationship and neg-'tive 
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relationship. IVhen we say, "John is standing", John and 
standing are related to each other with a copula which is of 
the kind that may be design,';ted as "being". And when we say, 
"John is not standing", the relationship between them is of 
the "non-being" kind. This group holds the view that the 
Persian words, ast (is) and nist (is not) represent the 
relationship between subject and predicate in a proposition. 
However, another group which includes Ibn Sin'a and Mulla 
Sadra maintain that the "relationship explanation" is completely 
erroneous. In their opinion, the same sort of relationship 
and copula exists in both affirmative and negative propositions, 
And the kind of copula in both kinds of propositions is affir-
mative, however, is related to concepts (subject-predicate 
terras) rather than to judgements. The difference between the 
affirmative and the negative propositions is that in the affir-
mative proposition the mind judges and affirms the existence 
of the relationship between the subject and the predicate in 
the external world, whereas in the negative proposition the 
existence of such a relationship is denied by the mind, 
The purport of the negative proposition, therefore, is 
not that there exists in the external world a certain thing 
and that thing is a "relationship of non-being" between the 
subject and the predicate, V/hat the negative proposition 
indicates is that the affirmative relationship which exists 
in the conceptual form in the mind does not exist externally, 
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In other words, whnt is judged nnd affirmed in the affirmative 
propositions is the occurrence of the relationship in the 
external reality, v/hile in negative propositions what is Judged 
is the non-existence or the non-occurrence of the same relation-
ship. The affirmative proposition tells of the correspondence 
of the relationship with the external reality, v/hile the negative 
proposition tells that such a correspondence does not occur. The 
view that has been expressed while defining declarative statement 
as opposed to non-declarative ones that "if the truth or the 
falsehood of the relationship (between the subject and the 
predicate) can be ascertained through reference to the external 
reality, the statement is declarative, otherv/ise it is non-
declarative" and that this also applies to the negative propo-
sitions, is false. 
In the view of these scholars, the content of the negative 
proposition is salb al-rabt (denaial of a relation) and not 
rabt al-salb (a negative relation). In other words, the content 
of the negative proposition is the negation of the affirmative 
relation, not the affirmation of a negative relation, which 
constitutes the content of an affirmative proposition with a 
diverted predicate (mujabat ma'dulat al-muhmul). 
The truly negative proposition is precisely as has just 
been described, and this is the only expression for the 
contradictory of existence. The purport of the negative propo-
sition is nothing other than the negation of the content of 
the affirmative proposition. Furthermore, the negative 
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proposition does not assign any conditions to the act of negation 
itself, he they temporal or spatial, iVhatever terms of specifi-
cations that exist in the negative proposition are subject to 
negation and are part of the predicate v/Mich is being negated. 
Only with this consideration could non-being be said to 
exist as a contradiction and negation of being. To put it in 
another way, if we have two propositions one of which negates 
all the contents of the other and has no other function than 
this, then these two propositions are contradictory. For example, 
if we say that "Ahmad is standing at such and such a place at 
such and such time", its contradictory v/ould be: "It is not the 
case that Ahmad is standing on such and such a place at such and 
such a time," If a thousand conditions and terms be added to 
the first proposition the second proposition negates the first 
proposition with all its myriad of conditions and terms; and 
this is the real meaning of the logical axiom that the contra-
diction of everything is its negation (naqid kull shay' raf'uh). 
Such two propositions, the real and logical contradictions of 
each other, are mutually exclusive, and the law of the mutual 
exclusivity of the contradictories applies to them, 
Non-being, interpreted and used in this way which is, by 
the way, the main interpretation and use of this concept has 
no external realit\ and inht-rent existence of its own. It can 
be neither a subject nor a predicate. The dimensions of time 
and space do not apply to it; time and space are not a veliicle 
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for non-being; they belong to the particular object that it 
negates. Therefore, in the sense just mentioned, non-being 
is pure negation. Here, the intellect is t-iking an overview 
of the world and concludes that a particular conceptual entity 
simply does not exist in the external reality, i.e. it has no 
denotation. 
There is another interpretation of non-being which is in 
reality a figurative one. In this interpretation, non-being 
has a denotation and exists in time and space. It can be both 
a subject and a predicate. liVhat we have in t is case is that 
when the mind surveys the external world and perceives that 
a certain thing is not in it, it supposes that negation has 
taken the place of affirmation and that non-being has occupied 
the place of being. In other words, when it perceives the 
absence of a particular object in a specific location, our mind 
imagines that its place is empty and its non-being occupies it. 
Thus interpreted, non-being comes to occupy its own space just 
as being does. It also comes to possess its own essence and 
the capacity to be either the subject or the predicateo Therefore, 
there is a difference between the propositions, "X does not 
exist in the world", and "X is non-existent in the world". In 
the second proposition for the "non-existence" of "X" in a 
particular space in the external world is posited. Of course, 
we know ^hat non-being has no real denotation. Inevitably the 
existence of other things is figuratively taken to denote the 
non-existence of the hypothetical object. It is because of 
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this that it is said: every stage of being marks the annihilation 
of another stage. 
Now that the two interpretations of non-being have been 
considered, it can be clearly perceived that in its fundamental 
interpretation and meaning non-being has no inderendent and 
inherent existence of its own, being purely a negation and 
denial of being. In the second interpretation, non-being is 
granted independent existence metaphorically; hov/ever, in this 
sense it is not the contradictory of being. 
(b). Now let us consider the question of becoming, 
Becoming refers to the continuity, gradualness and the fluidity 
of being. A thing that comes about gradually, possesses a sort 
of extension and continuity which is parallel to time. In fact, 
the extension of time is none other than the extension of the 
continuous and gradual stages of existence which are sequentially 
related to each other in the relation of potency and act. 
A quality of the extended thing is that while it possesses 
a continuous and actual unity, the intellect is able to divide 
it into mathematical parts and segments. Since the extension 
in question is temporal and it has its roots in potentiality 
and actuality, inevitably, the hypothetical parts and ser;raents 
precede or succeed one another with no possibility of existing 
simultaneously. Furthermore, since these segments have no 
simultaneity, they are devoid of each other, they lack each 
other. To put it another way, since no two segments can exist 
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in the same time-frame each p-?rt presupposes the non-existence 
(according to the second interpretation) of the other part. 
Or we may say that in the duration of the preceding part "non-
existence' of the succeeding part is true, and in the duration 
of the following part "non-existence" of the precedin;-; part 
is true. 
On the other hand, we know that these divisions are 
imaginary and hypothetical ones, not really disconnected and 
discrete parts. Furthermore, every extended object is infinitely 
divisible by the mind, and this divisibility (ioes not come to 
an end. Every segment can be divided into two smaller parts 
everyone of which is the "non-being" of the other part. Each 
of these new parts can in turn be divided into smaller parts 
everyone of which is the "non-being" of all the others. These 
parts can be divided into even smaller ones, and so on ad infinitum 
It is therefore inevitable that segments and stages are posited 
on an infinite scale. Furthermore, as degrees and parts are 
conceived infinitely, it follows that non-being is also posited 
infinitely because each part implies the non-being of all the 
other parts. Since no end to division can be conceived, being 
and non-being are so closely interv/oven that it is impossible to 
imagine any boundary between them. 
In objects with a gradual existence, v;e cannot find any 
stage inthe existence which remains constant in a c!uration of 
time irrespective of its length. V/e cannot find any sta^e of 
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the existence of an '^ volvin/^  object remainin, ri:-ed in any 
particular duration of time, irresnectivo of ii':nv siiall the 
duration in nuestion iiap'-ens to be. Every sta^e and section 
of the evolving object can be divided into past and present 
and into preceding and succeeding parts. Every one of tiie 
newly defined stages can in turn be divided into a past and 
a future, v/hile any one of the new segments can be divided 
into a r-receding and a succeeding section, and this process can 
be continued ad infinitum, V/liat cannot be found anyv/here here 
is now, that is, the duration of time lying between the past 
and the future. The past and the future are all there is, and 
every past is a combination of a future and a past, while every 
future is also a combination of a past and a future. vThatever 
exist is either preceding something or following something, and 
everything which is preceding is itself a combination of a 
preceding thing and a following thing, while everything which 
is following is itself made up of something which pre«edes and 
something that follows. Everything is made up of being and 
non-being. Anything that exists contains both being and non-
being within itself, just as everything that does not exist 
is also complex, both of being and non-being, 
Evidently, when we speak of the intermixing of being and 
non-being, we are not talking about the mixing of two real 
elements. The kind of mixture we have in mind involves one 
real element (being) and one hypothetical element (non-being). 
Inevitably such a mixture takes place in the mind and the 
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imagination, not in the external world and the external reality. 
As far as the external and the real world is concerned, all 
there is, is an existence which is slippery and fluid in nature. 
There is nothing outside of such existence. 
From what has been discussed, it can be clearly understood 
that non-being taken to mean the negation of being has no external 
reality. Therefore, it v/ould be meaningless to speak of its 
mixture with existence. On the other hand, v/hen non-being is 
interpreted as having a sort of hypothetical existence and 
reality of its own, and the capacity to mix v;ith being it does 
not contradict existence. The claim, therefore, that the union 
of being and non-being in process and becoming is equivalent to 
a coupling of contradictions and reconcilement of opposites, and 
that it negates the Law of Contradiction, and furthermore, that 
Hegelian dialectics has succeeded in disproving the validity 
of the Law of Contradiction, is caused by not having paid 
sufficiently close attention to the real meaning of the problem 
and the different interpretations of the concept of non-being. , 
The truth of the matter is that it is impossible for 
someone to understand and real meaning of the Law of Contra-
diction and deny its validity. If someone were to make the sort 
of claim that has been just mentioned and interpret arbitrary 
metaphors as contradicting the Law of Contradiction, it must 
be taken more as a joke than a serious argument. Such claim 
merely indicate an over-abundant appetite for new ways of 
philosophizing, 
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Besides the Islamic philosophers who have been mentioned, 
it should be kept in mind that our mystics and poets exhibited 
dialectical thinking long before Hegel, and had discovered 
the very core of dialectical thought which is the compatibility 
of being and non-being. It was one such poet who said: 
The man of reason speal^ s of being, 
While the mystic speaks of notl.ingness; 
In the midst of V'/ater and mud of being and 
nothingness, 
I both am and am not. 
Much the same idea is expressed in the following poem: 
Like the rays of light 
Which are separate from the sun, 
And yet are not separate, 
The universe is a sign of God, 
And yet it is not God. 
You all see your image in the mirror, 
Yet the image in the mirror 
Is both you and not you, 
Wherever you look, 
you shall see the unveiling of the hidden witness 
How can one say where He is or where He is not ? 
The dervish, who is a king in the land of poverty, 
Is looked on as a baggar by the masses, 
But in reality is no beggar at all, 
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This nothingness which appears as being, 
Seems to have permanence in the eyes of you and I, 
But in reality it has no permanence at all, 
Kindness and indifference given out by the 
the Beloved as "warning", 
\Vhy is it? I don't know if it is justified or not, 
Hegel himself had understood the fact that v;hat he called 
•the compatibility of contradictions' is something other than that 
that which is deemed impossible by all reasoning minds. 
In his Treatise on Dialectics, under the heading "Hegel 
and contradiction," Paul Foulquie says: 
In Hegel's view, the dialectical method, 
according to which, the idea (absolute 
form) is acutalized in mind and nature, 
is based on contradiction. It should be 
kept in mind, however, that Hegel's dialectics 
do not completely reject the Principle of 
Contradiction, and between it and the old 
dialectics v^/hich considered the Principle 
of Contradiction its foundatioh there is 
no difference in this regard,,,Although 
Hegel appears to say the opposite, inv.'ardly, 
like all other human beings, he accepts the 
Principle of Contrxiiction, 
Furthermore, in his Treatise on Metaphysics, page 369, Paul 
Foulquie says: 
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Synthesis of contradictions is about ap>^ arent 
contradictions, not re?! ones. Hegel believed 
that whatever is regarded as truth by the human 
mind, will always remain true, and is wholly 
contained in the later synthesis. In Hegel's 
view, intellecti.ial progress means that only 
those elements of science the falsity of v/hich 
has been demonstrated, be rejected, 
The difference of opinion that prevails between the 
Islamic philosophers and V/estern thinkers like Hegel regarding 
the problem of becoming is not limited to the conclusion that 
Western scholars have tried to draw regarding the union of 
contradictions. Although both of these modes of tliought appear 
to reach similar conclusions in that they say 'in becoming, 
being and non-being are in an embrace,' the foundations and 
roots of these two modes of thought are completely different, 
and they have emerged from completely different origins. 
From the point of view of Hegelian dialectics, "Every 
conception is a combination of relations. We are able to 
conceive something only when we can imagine its relationship 
to some other object and know their similarities and differences, 
Any conception devoid of relationship would be meaningless, 
This is what is meant by the dictum 'pure existence is identical 
with nothingness,' The sort of being that is devoid of all 
attributes and relationships does exist, and is meaningless," 
The first triad of Hegel's philosophical system, which 
is also the most famous, is: being exists. This is the stage 
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of thesis or affirmation. However, being wJiich is undefined 
and has an unspecified nature so that we cannot say it is this 
or that, is equal to non-being or nothingness. Thus, following 
our affirmation it becomes necessary to negate it. Therefore, 
we say: being is not. This negation is itself negated, and 
we re^ :Ch the third sta^e: that of synthesis. Thus we say that 
being is becoming." (Paul Foulquie's Treatise on Dialectics) 
In Hegel's view, therefore, pure beiag cannoi: be real, and 
being becomes a reality through synthesis v/ith non-being, 
In the opinion of the Islamic philosophers, especially 
Mulla Sadra, what possesses reality is pure being, and the 
determined and manifested beings derive their reality from pure 
being. In the opinion of these thinkers, when being reaches 
its eweakest point in the order of its descent, it takes on a 
fluid quality, mixes with non-being, and takes the form of 
becoming. This is precisely the opposite of Hegel's notioa of 
being, 
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CHAPTER - IV 
A - ISLAMIC VIEW OF ETERNITY OF KORAL VALUES 
The problem of the eternity of moral values is an old. 
and debatable problem which is traceable to the very beginning 
of the history of philosophy. Thinkers from all over the 
world have been interested in discussing this problem. 
The origin of this subject in Muslim philosophy is 
traceable to the period of Ash'arites and Mutazilites contro-
versies regarding the ethical predicates. Later on scholars 
of 'Usui' (branch of islamic science dealing with the principles 
of the islamic (Figh.) also took up this issue at the philoso-
phical level. Allameh Mohammad Husayn Tabatabai (1902 - 1981) 
the most original thinkers of the contemporary Muslim world, 
inspired by the scholars of 'usul', particularly the late 
Shykh Mohammad Husayn Isfahan!, threw a new light on this issue 
in a manner unprecedented throughout the History of Muslim 
philosophy. The outcome of his philosophical contemplation 
occurs in the sixth chapter of his book Usule Falsifeh we 
Rewish~e Riyalism (the principles of philosophy and t^ e method 
of realism). Murtada Mutahhari, a pur)il of 'Allameh Tabatab~ai, 
wrote detailed explanatory notes on this book, adding his own 
views in the form of critical comments on Tabatabi's view. He 
seems to have certain basic differences v/ith Tabatabai regarding 
the moral issues, which shall be presented below: 
SPECULATIVE vaSDGM mP PRACTICAL v/ISDOM (HIKI-IAT-E HAZARI AI'ID 
HIKMAT-E AMALJ);-
Reality is the subject of speculative wisdom v/hlle ethics 
comprises a part of practical v/isdom. According to Mutahharl, 
by reality we mean theoretical principles and by ethics we mean 
practical principles. Practical wisdom consists of normative 
sciences, and the study of reality is included in speculative 
wisdom which may cover theories of positive science too. It 
is not possible to bring the principles of practical wisdom 
under the study of reality, for speculative wosdom addresses 
things as they are while practical wisdom addresses man's actions 
as they ought to be, 
In the texts of Muslim thinkers, practical reasons and 
speculative reason are regarded as two different types of 
potentialities of man. But they did not discuss in detail 
their features and differences. However, they did suggest that 
the former potentiality is inherent to the self, which by means 
of this potentiality attempts to discover the external v/orld, 
whereas the latter consists of a series of preceptions that 
are controlled by the self, v/hich is the administrator of the 
body. Practical reason is the physical aspect or power of 
the self, while speculative reason constitutes the metaphysical 
aspect or power of the self. Therefore, some t linkers are of 
the view that tv;o forms of attainments are open to man, specula-
tive attainment and practical attainment. Regarding the concept 
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of potential and practical reason they hold that the self has 
a series of laws vmich enable it to administrate better. This 
is considered to be an elementary step towards attainment of 
2 
perfection, 
Early Muslim philosophers defined justice in terms of 
freedom. Since the self fails to attain speculative perfection 
without the proper use of the body, the self ought to establish 
a balance between those two potentialities in order to utilize 
the body justly. The potentiality which establishes such a 
balance between self and body is an efficient or active force. 
In case the balance takes place, self is not dominated by body, 
contrarily body will be subordinated to self. They considered 
justice to be a kind of co-ordination between the body and 
the self in which the body is controlled by the self and self 
is kept in check by the body. 
Ibn-Sina (980 - 1030), in his book Kitab al-Shifa (the 
book of healing (of the soul) divided philosophy into two 
branches: speculative v/isdom and practical wisdom. He dealt 
with these issues in detail, yet there exists some ambiguity 
in his approach to practical reason. Some Muslim philosophers 
consider practical reason as the self's faculty of perception, 
They say that our reason is capable of two kinds of perception 
one is the faculty of perception used in speculative sciences 
and the other is the faculty used in practical sciences. But 
others like Mulla Hadi Sabzevari (1833 - 1910), hold that the 
1 n'" 
term 'reason' is used for both theoretical and practical 
aspects of the perceptive or cognitive faculty. But it can 
be maintained that it is an efficient faculty canable only of 
4 
action. 
ALLAMEH TABATABAI'S ETHICAL VIEV/S AHD I^ UTAHHARI'S CRITIQUE; 
Allaraeh Tabatab"al maintained that, v/hatever we relate to 
practical v/isdom is connected with the world of norms or non-
factual ideas, which comprise commands and prohibitions and 
all those notions which are dealt with in ilm al-usul« By 
speculative wisdom is meant real thoughts v;hich consist of the 
ideas of facts, which are real representations of the actual 
things and the objective world. He thus makes a distinction 
between two types of philosophy, one which deals with "what is" 
and the other that deals with "what ought to be". Regarding 
the concept of 'ought* he says: nature has in itself some ends 
towards which it moves. In the domains of inert things, plants, 
animals and man, all activities so far asthey fall under inst-
inctive activities, it is nature that moves towards its goal. 
At the human level also, so far as they fall under instinctive 
activities, it is nature that moves towards its goal. There is 
a set of acts at the human level which talce place by means of 
volition and contemplation. In such acts, man has his own 
objectives which should be attained by volition. These ends 
are also the ends of nature, but nature cannot achieve them 
directly but has to make use of man's will and thought. 
inn 
It is here that a need for "ought" or values arises and they 
come into existence autom;:it ically. For instance, man's nature 
like that of plants needs food, but he should acquire it by-
means of velition and contemplation, Unlike plants which 
acquire food directly tlirough roots like animals which are 
attracted towards food innately, man performs the same act by 
volition and not by instinct only. Here Tabatabai says that 
instinct is not exactly defined so far, Man is unaware that 
the system of his ideas itself is constructed on the system 
of nature, and nature uses man as its instrument in order to 
achieve its goals. Man innately possesses some systems: The 
system of nature as well as the system of choice and will. The 
latter is subject to the former. The natural end is reflected 
in a form of a need or desire in man's soul, e.g. inclination 
towards food. Tabatabi concludes that at the back of every 
voluntary act there is a hidden command of nature as to "what 
one ought to do" or "what one ought not to do". It is this 
very "ought to" which motivates a person to move towards his 
natural objective. Mutahhari comments that Tab"atabi has probably 
reduced all willed acts to ideas or values. Mutahhari also 
compare this view of Tabatabi v;ith the moral theory of Bertrail 
Russell, and is surprised to know that Allmeh Tabatabi, without 
having read Russel, developed a theory similar to that of 
Russel, 40 years ago, probably at the same time when Russel was 
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developing his moral philosophy, 
u;o 
Russell in his History of 'Western Philosophy elaborates 
his view in the context of his analysis of plato's view regarding 
ethics. He says that according to Plato, practical wisdom and 
speculative wisdom are identical. He holds that morality means 
that man should desire .^ ood and good is independent of human 
self, therefore, good is cognizable, such as the objects of 
the study of mathematics or medicine, v/hich are independent of 
human mind. Russell further says: 
Plato is convinced that there is "The good" 
and its nature can be asce^^tained: when 
people disagree about it, one is making an 
intellectual error, just as much as if the 
disagreement were a scientific one on some 
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matter of fact. 
Russell himself holds that "good" or "bad" are relative 
terms whose meaning is determined by man's relation to things 
or objects. When we have a goal to achieve, we say "it is 
good". Hence it is wrong to hold that "good" is an objective 
quality inherent to the nature of a thing like whiteness or 
roundness. Plato held a view opposed to this, for he regarded 
"good" as an objective fact. Mutahhari concludes from this 
discussion that "goodness" and "badness" are not concrete and 
objective qualities of objects, which can be discovered like 
other natural matters. If one treats moral issues like the 
objects of scientific study. He cominints, this error then 
gives rise to another issue. Whether such norms are mutable 
or are there two types of norms, one chan-eable and the other 
permanent? In this issue Mutahhari's view is opposed to that 
of western philosophers. Incidently Allameh Tabatabai is of 
the view that values are of two kinds: Mutable and immutable, 
He has given the example of justice and cruelty and said, 
beauty of justice and ugliness of cruelity are self evident, 
There are, hence, some values which are iminutable, while 
there are other values which change v.dth time,^ 
There is no doubt that some "ought" are particular and 
individual. For example, if one needs a certain kind of 
education, he might say, "I ought to stud}'- this subject", while 
an other does not need that education and says,"I ought to 
study some other subject." Accordingly individual and particular's 
Q 
"oughts" are relative, 
The question in ethics is: Is there any universal and 
absolute 'ought* which is generally shared by all human beings ? 
Tabatabai says that in case there is such an "ought", as every 
ought is directed towards some goal, we have to ascertain if 
there is such a common goal that may be the basis of the 
universality of value. If we could prove such universality and 
eternity of values, we shall have to accept tliat they originate 
in an abstract self, and that man is not confined to physical 
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nature only, 
Allameh Tabatabai holds that animate beings and inanimate 
beings are different in terms of their movement towards their 
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objects, i.e. inanimate bein/^ s move towards their ends in one 
direction alone which is predetermined. Nature in the course 
of its normal process is equipped with the means through which 
it moves towards its goal. Animate beings also in respect to 
their physical being (not as mental and rational beings) in 
their own world move like plants directly towards their end. 
But as the laws and means of nature do not suffice to direct 
animate beings tov/arus their desired goals, they employ their 
mental and perceptual faculties also to achieve their goals. 
In fact, there emerges a kind of harmony between physical 
nature (v/hich is unconscious) and the mental processes which 
enable a being possessing consciousness to attain the end 
desired by nature. Consciousness directs a being to move tov/ards 
certain other ends also, which are supposed to be different 
from the ends of nature. Man thinks that perhaps the harmony 
betv/een the movements towards natural and willed ends is 
accidental. But Tabatabai believe in a kind of "pre-established 
harmoney "between the physical and mental processes." 
The natural mental make up of man and animals is such 
that as they perceive and conceive an object, there arises a 
deiire for it, and he seeks pleasure in attaining it. In case 
he fails to do so he feels some pain. For instance, by nature 
man seeks pleasure and avoids pain. The past experience of 
pleasure in eating some food stirs his appetite for it, and 
he moves in the direction of satisfying it. This act is 
governed by particular mental processes, but at the sane time 
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it also serves to attain tiie end of nature too, for a body 
requires food by its own nature. Eating serves both the ends; 
the person takes pleasure in it and at the same time nature 
satisfies its need also. Hence the question arises: Are tliese 
two acts unconnected with each other and accidGntly occur to 
together? Is it the natural urge to seek pleasure which 
requires certain natural means to serve it or is it the natural 
urge which makes a man feel pleasure in satisfying an appetite? 
In other words, it may be asked v/hether pleasure seeking serves 
the end of nature of nature serves the purpose of attaining 
pleasure ? It is difficult to decide which one of the tvro is 
fundamental and which one is secondary. Hov/ever, Mutahhari 
holds that there is some kind of harmony between the natural 
and conscious ends, and this harmony is pre-planned and not 
accidental. Further, dealing with this issue, he refers to 
Ibn-Sina's view, according to which the purposive movement is 
confined to conscious beings only, Tabatabal says that nature 
itself persues certain ends, so all the beings moved according 
to those ends. Hence all movements in nature are purposive, 
that is, governed by some ends. Man's pruposive activity is 
also a part of the general purposive scheme of nature. But 
Mutahhari does not agree with this generalization made by 
Tabatabai.'''' 
Tabatabal says further that one of the values is that 
of employment (istikhadam), which is concerned with man's 
relation to his limbs and faculties and this relation is 
objective, real and creative. The power of my hands is under 
my control, which is a natural matter, that is, this pov/er is 
naturally and genetically at my disposal. All bodily organs 
of man are owned by man and form an integral part of his being 
and are at the service of man. He says th??t all external 
objects may be considered to be tools for survival used by man. 
Not only inanimate beings, plants etc., are means for man, but 
even other men are supposed to be at an individual's service. 
In other words, all beings, including men, who fall in the 
field of one's activity, are tools for a human being. Man thus 
extends his limited existence to the spheres of other beings, 
Mutahhari says that according to Tabatabai this human tendency 
or approach to other beings is instinctively n?*ural, which 
is not confined to non-human beings but includes a man's attitude 
towards other men also. Mutahhari does not agree with Tabatabai 
and says that Allaraeh in this respect seems to agree with the 
evolutionists and accept the Darwinian principle of the struggle 
for existence. In his view, Tabatabai has used a more respectable 
term for the Darwinian term. In the struggle for existence 
every man uses others as his tools and creates them as his 
employees. 
Perhaps both Tabatabai and Mutahhari were unacquainted 
with Heidegger's similar notion. According to Heidgger's 
existential philosophy, all oth r beings falling in the filed 
of human existence are tools or means of extending and developing 
one's existence. The quality of ot};er bein'j,s as distinquished 
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from human beings is their 'Handiness' th-t is how .f r hey 
are useful for a human being. Had Mutahliarl been familiar 
with tills principle in Heideggar's philosophy, le would have 
claimed for him an affinity with the existantialists. It is 
to be noted that Tabatabaii developed his orinciole of • istikhi'am' 
in the eouriS of about twenty years unaware of a similar theory 
being hformulated by a European existentialist. Not only in his 
major philosophical work Usul-e Falsifeh wa Rawish-e Riyalism 
(The principle of philosophy and the met- od of realism) put also 
in his scholarly exegesis (Tafsir) of the Quran, Al-Mizan, in 
ten volume in Arabic (translated into persian in twenty volumes) 
he has referred to the principle of employment on many occasions 
in the course of dealing with various aspects of human existence. 
Mutahhari seems to be more conservative on this issue, for 
his dubbing him as a Darwinism shows his disphasure with the 
basic idea of employment of other human being by every individual 
human being. Similarly Mutahhari is not accepting Tabatabai's 
doctrine of relativism of certain moral values reveals his 
adherence to the platonic tradition as well as the traditional 
islamic philosophy. In these respects Tab'atabai is more modern 
then him. 
Mutahhari infers the Darwinian principle of the struggle 
for existence from Tabatabai's philosophy in the context of 
his view that a man has to make adjustments v;ith other human 
beings in the form of friendship and co-operation or other 
means, so that he is able to survive in the struggle in w'riich 
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every human being tries to use other men as his tools. 
Mutahhari says, that though Tabatabai has not said explicity 
such a thing, his principle of employment leads to such a 
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conception. 
Tabatabai regards his principle of exployment as the 
criterion of good and evil, right and wrong. Here two questions 
arise. One is,: as to whether man has a natural inclination 
towards evil, or in other words, is evil inherent to his nature. 
Mutahhari. answers that from Tab'atabal's view-point every 
individual has a natural tendency to attain his own desired 
ends, which makes him treat others as if they are in his 
employment to serve his ends. This tendency not to treat other 
men as equals to one's own ends, is in Mutahhari's view, nothing 
but evil.''^ 
The other question is related to the possibile identity 
of employment and the principle of the struggle for existence. 
Mutahhari does not say that both are identical, but holds that 
as both of them lead to the same end, that is, an individual's 
growth (here in the moral sense), they may be described as 
14 having a close affinity with each other. 
However, Mutahhari does not totally reject Tab'atab'ai's 
views regarding man and morality. Vfliat he disagrees with is 
Tab'atab'ai's generalization of the principle of employment. 
Mutahhari, in his analysis of his own position, says that a 
distinction is to be made between inclination (natural tendency) 
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and will. Animals act instinctively by natural inclination, 
while human beings act voluntarily. Here Mutahhari criticizes 
Tabatabai for saying that animals also act voluntarily. Mutahhari 
makes a further distinction between two types of human acts by 
adding food, while other are willed acts, in v/hich a man can 
refrain from having food or certain kinds of food willingly 
though he has an inclination to eat. Instinctive acts are 
passively done under the compulsion of nature, and w'lile perform-
ing these acts, man's reason is suspended. Therefore they are 
determined acts. On the contrary voluntary acts are done under 
the guidence or reason. He, therefore, maintains that will is 
freedom, Man is free because he can act according to his v/ill, 
and his acts are not deterministic like those of animals. 
Mutahhari makes another significant point regarding 
willed acts. He says that in his natural or impulsive behaviour 
man is under the control of the external world, v/hile in willing 
he withdrav/s himself from the external v/orld and internalizes 
his being to make a choice and a resolution. In willing man 
re-collects his being together, while in impulsively acting 
his being is scattered. Regarding the question as to whether 
will is totally absent while acting impulsively or it is only 
weak, Mutahhari says that will is there, but it is weak. V/ith 
the increase in impulse will weakens proportionately. He 
criticizes Mulla Sadra, Hadi Sabzawari and Ibn-Sina for consider-
ing desire and will as one and the same thing. Though Ibn-Sina 
occasionally made some distinction between the two, his criterion 
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of demsrcation is ambiguous, 
Nov/ the question which arises is: how can ethical issues 
be demonstrated? How can we argue as to "V/hat is good" and 
"What is bad"? Allameh Tabatab"ai is of the view that these 
are undemonstrable, for non-factual matters cannot be proved 
either by deduction or induction. V/e can only explain them on 
a linguistic basis and that also v/ould be relativistic with 
views differing from man to man. Moral values are not a factual 
or objective matter, V/e can prove rationally or empirically 
ideas or theories only concerning objective reality. On this 
basis he regards moral values as subjective and relativistic, 
Practical philosophy is concerned with "good" and "bad" 
and these concepts are inferred from "Oughts" and "ought nots" 
these terms depend upon loving or desiring something or otherwise, 
In the matter of loving or liking, individuals differ from one 
another. Therefore, moral values, which depend upon loving or 
hating some objects depend upon the individual's subjective 
experience. Hence they are both subjective and relative. Here 
it can be pointed out that Allameh TabMabai is close to 
G.E.Moore on the one hand, who regards values as indefinable 
and similar to Russell on the other hand, 
Bertrand Russell is of those thinkers who arrived at 
the same conclusion in his book History of Western Philosophy, 
He analyses plato's view regarding justice in the follov/ing 
words: • 
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"There are several points to be noted 
about Plato's definition, First it nakes 
it possible to have inequalities of p 
powers and privilege without justice, 
The guardians are to have all the pov/ers, 
because they are the wisest members of 
the community; injustice would only 
occur, on Plato's definition, if there 
were man in the other classes who were 
v/iser than some of the guardians. That is 
why Plato provides for promotion and 
degradation of citizen, although he thinks 
that the double advantage of birth and 
education will, in most cases, makes the 
children of guardians superior to the 
children of others. If there were a more 
exact science of '^^ •overnment, and more 
certainity of men following its percepts, 
there would be much to be seid for Plato's 
system. No one thinks it unjust to put 
the best men into a football team, although 
16 they acquire thereby a great superiority," 
At another place Russell says: 
"The difference between Plato and Trasymachus 
is very important, but for the historian 
of philosophy it is one to be noted, not 
decided, Plato thinks he can prove that 
his idea republic is good; a democrat who 
accepts the objectivity of ethics may 
think that he can prove the republic bad; 
but anyone who agrees with thrasymachus v/ill 
say: There is no question is whether you 
like the kind of state th'-:t Plato desires, 
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If many do and iririny do not it is 
bad for you. If many do and many 
do not, the decision cannot be 
made by reason, but only by force, 
actual or concealed this is one of 
the issues in philosophy that are 
still open; on each side there 
are men who command respect. But 
for a very long time the opinion that 
Plato advocated remained almost 
17 
undisputed." 
There are two points on which Mutahhari disagrees with 
Allameh Tabatabal.'^^ 
» • 
(1). Mutahhari holds that we cannot attribute value -
oriented activity to all animate beings as Allameh Tab"atabal 
does. Consciousness of values is confined to man, who possess 
practical reason. 
(2). Mutahhari rejects the principle of employment as 
put forwarded by Allameh. His rejection of it is based on 
three arguments, which he elaborated in Akhlaq wa Jawidanagl. 
On the basis of these arguments he proved his idea of the 
universality and eternity of good and evil, 
THE FIRST ARGUMEl'JT:-
Man has c e r t a i n motives v/ijich serve to f u l l f i l h i s 
ind iv idua l needs and demands. Human a c t i v i t y i s also stimul^^ted 
by another kind of motivation which i s ca l led by Mutahhari 
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species motives. These are different from individual oriented 
motives v/hich serve the interests of the individual only. They 
may be connected v/ith one's mate and offspring. The species 
oriented motives are general and embrace the whole of humanity. 
These are not confined to a particular environment, situation 
or time period. Because of these motives one can place the 
welfare and happiness of his fellowfeeings ahead of his ovm 
welfare. These motives may be described as humanitarian 
motives due to which one is painted if he sees another man in 
pain. This kind of motive may be also defined as gregarious 
or social motivation. He commiserates with other, he rejoices 
at their joy and grieves at their grief, Mutahhari says that 
if we accept the role of these species oriented motives, Allameh 
Tabatabai's view is reputed, for he believes that man's natural 
mental make up acts in accordance with his natural and biological 
urges. Tabatabai considers his theory of employment to be 
applicable to all human beings as a general principle. According 
to Mutahhari's view this principle is in conflict with our 
accepted criteria of morality. It is generally held that ego-
centric or selfish motives and acts are morally inferior, or 
rather evil, as compared to attributic motives and acts. 
Morality liberates man from the confines of his selfish interests 
and is, therefore, universally applicable to all cases, all 
times and all situations. Thus he affirms the principle of 
the universality and eternity of noral values. To the question 
"V/hy righteousness is good"? The reply is: because it fullfils 
the interests of all. 
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SECOND ARGWENTt-
While Mutahharl based his first argument on the duality 
of motives, he bases his second argument in favour of the 
universality and eternity of morality on the duality of human 
self. This view is similar to that of some contemporary 
thinkers, who hold that it is impossible to seek a thing unless 
that thing is linked with his own self. Whatever seems to be 
pleasent for the individual is ultimately accepted as good for 
the whole human species. Durkhim and some other sociologists 
on this basis argue that man has two selves: one is the 
individual self, while the other is the collective self. Man 
from the biological point of view is an individual but from 
the social point of view he is a social being, and has a social 
self also. Therefore each man possesses two selves. Mutahhari 
with reference to Tabatabai's writings, says that he had also 
confirmed this theory without being aware of sociological 
theories, and accepts that society has a real self, which is 
not relative. The sociologists also attribute a personality 
and a self to society, which is real, objective, and independent 
of individual selves: It is not the sum total of the selves 
of its individual members, but something different from it, 
Every man is possessed of a social self alongwith his individual 
self. 
Mutahhari here refers to the mystical doctrine of a 
universal self. According to sufis and other mystics, there 
]7:\ 
is an underlying connection among human selves, of which man 
becomes aware when his self is purified. Sharing a universal 
self and realizing that through it all men are related to one 
another leads man to attain spiritual unity with the universal 
self. 
Sociologists are of the view that a society is constituted 
of individuals, who have a common social or cultural self which 
is a fact. They say that sometimes a man's acts are motivated 
by individual motives, while on other occasions his acts are 
prompted by social motives. The individual and social motives 
belong to an individual and social self respectively. The 
former is natural and biological, while the latter is collective. 
It is here that from the duality of motives sociologists infer 
the notion of the duality of self. Arguing from the socialogical 
view point Mutahhari concludes that any act which stems from 
the social self is regarded as morally good and is determined 
by a universal and eternal value-system. Contrarily, any act 
that stems from the individual self is devoid of moral good. 
Hence morality cannot be relative, individual and changing. It 
is governed by values which are universally and eternally 
valid.20 
THIRD ARGlME^]T;-
Mutahhari begins his third argument with the assertion 
that man does not do anything which is not related to the 
universe of his self. On this basis he refutes Tabatabai's 
principle of employment, according to which human acts are 
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Imposed upon him by some other self. In elaboration of this 
argument he takes recourse to the traditional division of 
human existence into two selves, of which one is superior (or 
spiritual) and the other is inferior or (carnal). Man is also 
an animal, and his inferior self is ruled by animal desires 
and motives. Morality consists in subbortinating the animal 
self to the higher self. Whatsoever is done for the lower 
self is not moral. Moral acts have their origin in the higher 
self. Animal selves are subject to nature, while the higher 
self, which is universally shared by all men, is subject to a 
system of higher values. According to Mutahharl the higher 
self is universal and the values to which it is subjected are 
also universal and eternal. He wonders why Tabatabai forgot 
to refer to this concept, though he was acquainted with it. 
He says that had he referred to it, he would have accepted 
that moral acts are those which are done for the satisfaction 
of the higher self. In that case he would have rejected the 
relativistic doctrine of morality as well as the principle of 
employment. 
Furthering his argument, Mutahharl says that he agrees 
with Tabatabai, Russell and others that good and evil; "oughts" 
and "ought nots" are based upon man's love for certain ends 
and his dislike for other things. He asks, "But whicli self's 
love or hate is the criterion of good and evil"? and answers 
that if one says that it is the lower or animal self whose 
liking or disliking an object is the standard of morality, he 
17,^  
is wrong for he negates the very spirit of morality. The 
interests of lower selves may differ from individual to 
individual, so on their basis there cannot be any universal 
and eternal moral value. But on the other hand if we believe 
that it is the higher self which is the basis of morality, we 
will have to concede that its values are universally and 
eternally valid. 
Mutahharl says at the end of his article "Akhlaq wa 
Jawidangi"; 
"I would like to refer to an Islamic 
doctrine which is very significant for 
resolving the issue of morality, and is 
neglected by philosophers. That is man 
has an innate nobility and excellency 
which may be defined as a spiritual 
faculty or a Divine spark. Every man 
unconsciously experiences it. V/hile 
doing certain acts he contemplates 
whether they are compatible with his 
innate nobility or not. Whenever he 
finds an act compatible with it, he 
regards it as good and virtuous; if it 
is incompatible with it, it is regarded 
as a vice or evil. As animals know what 
is beneficial or harmful to them 
instinctively, the human self that has 
metaphysical virtues recognises what is 
good and what is evil what he ought to do 
and what not... human beings are created 
alike so far as spiritual faculties and 
virtues are also alike, their views are 
also alike. Biologically and philosophi-
cally man may be different from each other, 
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and under different conditions their 
physical needs may also differ. But 
so for as the ability to attain 
spiritual sublimation,(is concerned) 
they are alike and necessarily have 
similar likes and dislikes as well as 
similar standards of good and evil. 
All moral virtues, whether individual or 
social, such as patience can be explained 
21 from this view." 
Mutahharl concludes that the above quoted orinciples 
can explain in a much better way the criteria of good and 
evil, and social and individual virtues as compared to all 
other moral theories discussed above. This principle also 
provides the most secure ground for believing in the eternity 
and universality of moral values. 
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B - ISLAI^ lIC VIEV/ OF SOCIO-HISTORICAL CHANGE 
Islam is neither a school of sociology nor a philosophy 
of history. In the Islamic scriptures, no social or historical 
topic is addressed in the usual languages of sociology or 
history. Likewise, no other topic, such as morals, Jurisprudence, 
or philosophy, is addressed in conventional language, couched 
in current terminology, or elaborated according to customary 
classificatory schemes. Nonetheless, many of the questions 
these sciences deal with can be fully deduced and derived from 
22 the Quran. 
Mutahhari says that, in his view, the Quran has referred 
to certain principles that explicitly point to the priority or 
the ideal bases of society vis-a-vis its material bases. The 
Quran says, "Truly God does not change the condition of a 
people until they change v;hat is in their souls" (13:11). God 
does not change the condition of a people until they v/ith 
their owi hands, their own will and resolve, change what pertains 
to their own behaviour. In other words, a people's fate is not 
changed until they change what pertains to their own psyches 
and mentalities. This verse denies economic determinism in 
history. Following are the criteria that Mutahhari singles 
23 
out in order to test the logic of Islam against them, 
(1), The Strategy of Summons: 
Every school that has a message for society and calls 
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upon the people to embrance it must use a method that relates 
to the primary aim of the school on the one hand and to that 
school's manner of envisioninf; the identity of historical 
movements on the other. A school's summons consists in 
imparting a consciousness to the people and in pulling the 
right lever to set t):iem in motion. 
For instance, August Comte's religion of humanity purports 
to be a kind of "Scientific religion"; it envisions the essence 
of man's evolution as inhering in his mind and holds that man, 
having traversed the two stages of myth and philosophy in his 
mind, has arrived at the stage of science. Thus the forms of 
consciousness it deems necessary are "Scientific" and the 
levers it would pull are those of science. The forms of 
consciousness, marxism the revolutionary theory of the 
working class, imparts are of the class contradictions it 
raises to the self-consciousness of the workers. The levers 
it pulls are those of ressentiment and feeling of being 
24 deprived and cheated. 
Schools differ in how they envision the nature of society 
and history and, accordingly, in their modus operandi. In 
having these various visions of history, historical evolution, 
and man they arrive at various theories of the compass of 
their summons and the relation it bears to force and its morality 
25 
or immorality, 
According to Christianity, the relation of the school 
to opposing groups it sees as antievolutionary is a simple 
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one of sumiTions coupled with .':;entleness; only ti.is relation 
is moral. According to Nletzsclie, the only moral relation is 
what the powerful bear to theweak; nothing is more moral than 
power, and nothing is more immoral, criminal, or sinful than 
weakness. According to Marxism, the relation of two groups 
opposed in their economic foundations can be none other thc^ n 
one of force, and the exercise of pov/er by the exploited is 
moral. The relation the newly arisen force bears to the old 
one is always militant and moral. 
Islam rejects all these theories. Morality is not 
summed up in what Christianity envisions; peaceful relation, 
gentle summons, reconciliation, serenity, sincerity, and love. 
Mutahhari holds that force and power, too, are moral. Therefore, 
Islam sanctions struggle against tyrannical force and oppression 
as a duty; it prescribes 'jihad'(holy war), that is, armed 
uprising under certain conditions. 
The Marxist theory is based on that same mechanism it 
posits for historical evolution. According to Islam in contrast 
to the marxist theory, the confrontational relation of facing 
antievolutionary groups with force comes second, not first. 
The relation of wisdom and good counsel comes first ("Summon 
to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good counsel"(l6:125). 
The exercise of force towards the antievolutionary block 
becomes moral when the stages of intellectual persuation 
(Wisdom equals reasoning) and of spiritual persuation (counsel 
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equals reminding) have been trave^ s^ed and proven fruitless. 
Now we shall discuss the other aspect. Let us see what 
kind of consciousness Islam strives to awaken and what means 
it employs to invite people for erabracinr^  its message. 
Islamic consciousness attaches formost importance to the 
belief in the Divine origin and resurrection (al-mabda wa Al-
maad)(of men). This method of cultivatin,;; tiiis consciousness 
has been used by the Quran and, according to it, also by the 
prophets of the past. The prophets awakened among the people 
the awareness of their origin and goal through queries such as: 
Wherefrom have come; where have you come; to where are you 
bound? From v/here has the world emerged, which course does it 
pursue, and in v/hich direction is it moving? 
The most Noble prophet Launched his summons with "say, 
"La ilaha illa'alah, and prosper", that is, with a credent 
movement, with a purification of thought. It is true that 
'tawhid' has many dimensions, that all the teaching of Islam 
if analysed, reverts to tawhid, and that tawhid, when elaborated, 
culminates in those teachings. The prophets mobilized society 
by awakening this feeling, bringing this intelligence into 
bloom, dusting off this conscience, and imparting this 
28 
consciousness. 
Next, a humanistic consciousness is felt in Islamic 
teachings, which draw man's attention to the grandeus and 
nobility of his own essence, to his own essential greatness, 
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According to this school man is not that animal who exists 
because, having first been on a level with the other animals, 
over hundreds of millions of years of struggle for survival 
heproved so wily that now he has reached this level. Rather, 
he bears within him a ray of the divine spirit. The angels 
prostrated before him and call to him from the battlements 
29 
of the Empyrean. 
Next is consciousness of social rights and responsibilities, 
We encounter instances in the Quran where it would create 
movement through an appeal grounded in one's ovm alienated 
rights or those of others. "And what is the matter with you; 
why do you not fight in God's way and for these oppressed men, 
women, and children who call out, our Lord. Rescue us from your 
presence a guardian; give us from your presence a guardian; give 
us from your presence a supporter" (4:75). 
(2), The Designation of a School; 
Some school marks out its adherents by some special 
designation that marks out the adherents of a race t'iOory, a 
racist school, according to which they become a special "We", 
hinges on for instance, being Aryan. When the adherents of 
that school say "We". They mean whites. Marxist tieory. The 
theory of the v/orker, marks out its adherents as workers; that 
is their identity. The christian religion defines its adherents 
as the follov/ers of one individual. It would seem its adi.erents 
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have no interest in the v/ay or tiie intended destination; their 
v;hole sense of collective identity lies iiere: ".vliere is Jesus? 
There we must be". 
Islam refuses to accept any racial, class, occupational, 
regional, personal, or other designation to identify itself 
as a school or its adherents. The adfierents oi this school 
are not marked out as Arabs, Semites, poor, rich opnressed, 
v/hites, blacks, Asians, Easterners, Westerners, Muhammadans, 
Qur'anians, or people of the qibla. None of these designations 
truly defines the unifying adherents. V/hen the true identity 
of this school andits adherents emerges, all these designation 
are obliterted. Only one thing remains: The relation between 
man and God. This is Islam: being surrendered to God, surren-
dered to reality. 
(3)• Conditions for and Obstacles to Acceptance: 
Each school in its 'teachings explains conditions and 
causes as well as obstacles and constraints, in accordance with 
the mechanism it poses for (historical) movement. If a school 
that sees this movement arising from the pressure of class 
upon another class sometimes sees this pressure or construction 
as insufficient to move society, it will augment it artificially 
to draw society out of st sis and stagnation. Marx has noted: 
"Where, theij, is the positive possibility of German emancipation? 
Our answer: in the formation of a class with rydical chains... 
a class that is the dissolution of all classes... This 
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dissolution of society existing as a particular class is the 
33 
proletariat". 
Such a school conceives of reforms as obstacles because 
reform reduces pressure, and to reduce pressure obstructs or 
at least delays the eruption of revolution. Contrast this with 
a school that upholds an innate and essential movement for 
society. Such a school never judges a class to be enchained 
to a necessity of its nature because it does not regard pressure 
as a necessary condition for revolution. Likewise, it does 
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not conceive of gradual reform as an obstacle to progress.-^ 
In Islam, these conditions and obstacles mostly or even 
always, turn on the primordial nature (Fitrat), Sometimes 
the Qur'an suggests that survival is contingent upon preserving 
one's original and primal purity: Sometimes it su;:gest that 
it is necessary to feel that anxiety and apprehension arising 
from a conception of one's responsibility towards the system 
of being indicated in "Those who fear their Lord in secret" 
(21:49, 35:18), "Those who fear (Gk)d)"(20s3 ), "Those who fear 
the merciful in secret"(36:11), and similar expressions. And 
sometimes it suggests it is necessary that the primordial nature 
be alive and remain alive: "To warn whoever lives" (36:70). 
Islam views acceptance of its summons as conditional upon purity, 
feeling of apprehension and anxiety, a sence of responsibility 
towards the creation, and being alive with the life of the 
primordial nature. Conversely, it names the following phenomena 
as obstacles and as representing spiritual and moral corruption: 
184 
Sin of the heart (2:283), rustinp; of the heart (83:14), sealing 
of hearts (2:7), blinding of the eye (of insight) (22:46), 
dearness of the ear (of the heart) (41:44), corruption of the 
book of the soul (91:10), following the customs of (pagan) 
forefathers (43:23) idolizing great men and presonages (33:67), 
reliance upon supposition and conjecture (6:116), and similar 
phenomena. Extravagance, affluence, and indulgence in pleasure 
are also conceived of as obstacles in that they reinforce animal 
propensities and turn a person into a grazing animal or a 
predatory beast. According to the Quran these phenomena obstruct 
movement towards goodness, well-being, and the evolution of 
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society.-^ -^  
That the Quran presents the conditions and obstacles in 
this form confirms the idea that it regards the mechanism of 
social and historical transformation as more spiritual than 
economic and material. 
(4). The Rise and Decline of Societies: 
Every social school offers a methodical study of the 
causes for the rise and progress of societies as well as for 
their decline and fall. The Noble Quran has taken note of this 
subject, especially in its stories and narratives. liVhat does 
the Qur'an regard as constituting an infrastructure and a 
superstructure? 
The Quran advances four factors as effective in the rise 
and decline of societies. The first is justice/injustice. The 
1 8 T) 
Quran has re f lec ted upon t h i s subjoct in many of i t s verses , 
among them verses : "Truly pharaoh exalted himself in the land 
and arrayed i t s people in f a c t i o n s . He oppressed a t r i b e among 
them, s laughter ing t he i r sons but sparing t he i r women, for he 
was one of the c o r r u p t e r s . " 
The second fac tor i s u n i t y / d i s u n i t y . In Al-Imran:105 
we are expressly comiiianded to un i te and accord on thp basi r. 
of f a i t h , through holding fas t to God's firm rope. V/e are to 
shun d i sun i ty and discord (3 :103) . In th.e next verse save one, 
we are commanded not to be l i k e our predecessors , v/ho pract iced 
d i sun i ty and discord (3:105).'^ 
The th i rd fac tor i s performance/non-performance of enjoying 
good and forbidding e v i l . The Quran has spoken much of the 
necess i ty of enjoying good and forbidding e v i l . I t can be 
c l e a r l y deduced from one verse t h a t to abandon t h i s major 
ob l iga tory p r ac t i c e wi l l effect a peop le ' s des t ruc t ion , and in 
verse 79 of the Sura Maida i t i s said t h a t one of the reasons 
the unbelievers among the I s r a e l i t e s f e l l far from God's mercy 
was t h e i r f a i l u r e to r e s t r a i n one another from reprehensible 
a c t s , tha t i s , the abandonment of the p r a c t i c e of forbidding 
e v i l : "Nor did they forbid one another the ev i l s tiiey committed; 
e v i l indeed v/ere the thin^^s they d i d . " ( 5 : 7 9 ) . 
The fourth fac to r i s debauchery and moral cor rupt ion . 
There are many verses on t h i s subject as we l l . One set of 
them also speaks of affluence as a source of ru in . Another 
I8C 
encompasses most of the verses that include t:;e word Zulm 
(injustice, oppression). In the language of the Quran, 'Zulm' 
applies not only to the encroachments of a person or group on 
the rights of anoth(?r person or group, it also applies to the 
injustice an individual perpetrates upon himself or that a 
people perpetrates upon itself. All debauchery, all departure 
from the right road of humanity, is zulm. Zulm has an inclusive 
sense in the Quran in comprehending injustice towards others 
•59 
as well as debauchery and immoral acts, 
One may grasp the outlook of the Quran towards the basis 
of society and history by reference to the sum of these criteria. 
The Quran maintains a decisive and definitive role for a number 
of phenomena, some of them the so-called "Superstructural" 
40 phenomena, 
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CHAPTER - V 
MUTAHIiARI'S CONCLUSIONS AUQ THEIR VALUE IN 
CONTEMPORARY ISLAI-IIC THOUGHT 
Martyr Murtada Mutahhari in many respects is the most 
prolific and versatile writers of recent times. He combined 
his philosophical, theolocical scholarship with a unique insight 
into modern western philosophy as well as contemporary socio-
political theories to develop a philosophical outlook that 
despite being firmly rooted in Islamic metaphysical tradition 
-1 
was modern to the core. It is necessary to refer here to two 
of the main sources of his thought. 
His principle philosophical themes ejid techniques are based 
on sublime philosophy (hikmat-e mutaali) v/hich is an attempt to 
synthesise mysticism and peripatetic philosophy on the basis laid 
down by Suhrawardi (1155-91) and Ibn-Sina (980-1037). 
Nulla Sadra's philosophy is a culmination of the sublime 
philosophy. Mulla Sadra was a student of Mir Damad and, in 
the first phase, borrov/ed from him the principle of the priority 
of essence over existence and defended it vehmently. But later 
he abandoned it and developed the theory of priority of existence 
over essence. Before Mulla Sadra, of course, mystics also 
believed in the fundamental reality of existence, and considered 
essences as mental derivatives and abstractions, but their 
doctrine v/as based on mystic intuition and not on any philosophical 
arguments, besides malting use of mystic intuition, Mulla Sadr'a 
1 ,; V) 
established his conclusions also by means of rational arguments. 
He proved that the substance of material thing's also is subject 
to motion. The theory of substantial movement (Haraket al-jaw 
harlyyah) is associated with Nulla Sadra's name in the same way 
as relativity theory is associated v/ith Einstein, and the law 
of gravitation with Newton. 
Henry Corbin, with reference to Roberts Avens, points 
out: 
"Mulla Sadra brought about a revolution 
in the metaphysics of being by reversing 
the order of priorities professed by the 
venerable metaphysics of essence. 
Essences or quiddities were in the world 
of Aristotelian metaphysics, immutable 
and prior to existence. Sadra on the 
contrary, gave priority to existence: 
It was the act and mode of existing that 
determined v/hat an essence was. The act 
of existing was indeed capable of many 
degrees of intensification or degradation.""^ 
Further he says: 
"Sadra's 'existentialism' however, must 
be carefully distinguished from its 
western counterpart. In the west, 
existentialism (especially its Sarterian 
version) is a philosophy of the alienated 
man-a man who has been tnrown into an 
'incurable isolation' as a result of an 
all-pervasive assault on nature by the 
combined forces of modern science and 
technology."-^ 
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One of the original contributions of Mulla Sadra is his 
proof of movement in the substance of all material objects. 
To understand v/hat is meant by substantial movement, it is 
necessary to refer to the belief of the peripatetic philosophers 
in the category of substance and the nine categories of accident. 
They defined substance as an essence which does not require a 
substratum for existing as an external reality. But accidents 
are essences which whenever they exist outside the mind, require 
a substratum. In other words, the existence of an accident is 
dependent on a substratum; it cannot exist independently. On 
the other hand, substance, when it comes into existence, unlike 
accidents, exists independently. Although it is an effect and 
is dependent on a cause for its existence, t' ere is a difference 
between one effect and another. One, like colour and shape for 
instance, is dependent on another, while another, like a body, 
is a receptacle on which colour and shape depend. It is clear 
that the first one is weaker than the second and is dependent 
on it, 
Before Mulla Sadra, philosophers held that movement could 
tal<e place only in four out of the nine categories of accident, 
and the remaining five categories of accident as well as substance 
do not undergo movement or change. The four categories to which 
motion applied were: quantity (Kamm), quality (Kayf), position 
(Wad), and place (Ayn). The quantitative motion is marked by 
increase or decrease in quantity. The qualitative motion by 
change in colour, taste, odour, or any one of the qualities 
1^)::^ 
of a material t h ing . The movement in place i s spa t i a l d i sp lace-
ment, during which a body occupies a d i f fe ren t place in space 
a t d i f ferent moments of t ime. The movement in pos i t ion i s 
subject to moment-to-moraent changes in the pa r t s of an object 
i n r e l a t i o n to i t s surroundings as well as in r e l a t i o n to one 
another . According to t h e i r be l i e f , substance, which is the 
receptable of these accidents remains s tab le and unchanged 
throughout these changes in accidents and always remains constant , 
In other words, t'ne essence of a substance does not change, 
but only one of the four q u a l i t i e s , t h a t i s , the four acc idents , 
undergo change. This i s because i f the substance i t s e l f changed, 
then no judgement could be made about any th ing , as i t v/ould 
have changed before we passed a judgement. Also, i t would not 
be the same thing to which we had a t t r i b u t e d something before . 
I n other words, the subject of a p ropos i t ion would not remain 
cons tan t , and, the re fore , no a t t r i b u t e could be predicated to 
i t . Therefore, when Bahmanyar, a pupi l of Ibn-Sina asked him 
why motion was not poss ib le in substance, the teachr.r repl ied 
t h a t i f motion were to occur in substance, he would not remain 
the same Ibn-Sina of a moment ago while ansv/ering the question, 
for i f motion in substance were pe rmiss ib le , h is substance vrould 
change during the in t e rva l between the p u p i l ' s question and 
the t e a c h e r ' s r ep ly . 
The second source of Mutahliarl 's thought i s Allameh 
Taba taba i ' s work, upon wliich he wrote an e laborate commentory 
which now forms an in sepa ra t l e and i n t e g r a l par t of Usul-e 
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Falsafeh wa Rawish-e Rlyalism (The Principle of philosoiihy and 
the method of realism). This book is considered to be the 
major work in the refutation of Marxism, and it is also an 
exposition of Sadranian philosophy. That is, Tabatabai and 
Hutahhari approached Marxism from this stand point in order to 
criticize its philosophical principles. The term realism as 
used in this book does not seem to be the same in its sense as 
tl'e term of western philosophers, particularly contemporary 
philosophers. Mutahhari confronted t:is issue from the ontolo-
gical point of view. In his view external objects are considered 
to be having real substantial existence. There are many kinds 
of realism in western philosophy such as: neo-realism, native 
realism, representative realism and critical realism. In the 
dictionary of philosophy the term realism has been defined as 
follows: " 
"The term realism in scholastic philosophy 
contrasted with nominalism, that universals 
have a real substantial existence independ-
ently of being thought. Duns scotus was the 
most able supporter of this position. Most 
comTiOnly the view contrasted v/ith idealism 
that physical objects exist independently 
of being perceived. Thus understood, 
realism obviously reaffirm the stand point 
of common sense and it achieves the status 
of a philosophy only because a case against 
it has been seriously argued. But nany 
thinkers have, on various grounds, been 
puzzled over hov/ perception or exr^ erience 
of any sort can yield knov;ledge of a mind-
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independent world. And some !iave concluded 
that such a vrorld is unlmowable or non-
existent, And that what we call physical 
objects are infact mind-dependent as Berkeley 
said. Their being consists in being perceived." 
Mutahhari says that there are two points which are not 
distinguished in scholastic philosophy that is (l) The mnotion 
of universal existence (2) The noti-'n of idea in Plato's philoso-
phy. He says that those who are acquainted v/ith Muslim philosophy 
are well aware that these two notions have been discussed both 
in philosophy and logic. As for the former in both philosophy 
and logic almost all Muslim philosophers were agreed upon the 
idea of universal being. The latter was discussed only in 
philosophy but not in logic. In this regard Muslim thinkers 
were of different views, Mutahhari concluded that the scholastic 
approach adopted in Europe in the medieval ages in this regard 
was absurd and meaningless. He redefine's the notion of realism 
in the following words: 
"The notion of realism in our philosophy 
carries the same sense in which it is 
used in recent philosophical terminology, 
that is substantial reality of external 
objects. It is in this sense that realism 
is contrasted with idealism, as in literature 
also realism is contrasted v/ith idealism; 
for realist writers base their views on 
social facts aiid phenomena, v/hile realist 
writers rely on their speculative ability 
and immagination and remain confined to their 
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ovm subjective vrorld." 
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It may be said that Mutahiiari refuted idealism as a 
valid theoi^ y of reality as v/ell as a philosophical approach 
to it. He attempted to prove that Marxist v;ere sophists and 
idealists. The title of Tabatabai's and Mutahhari joint work 
The Principle of Philosophy and the Method of Realism is indica-
tive of this position. The aim of tl is book is to prove that 
it is wrong to assume that all non-materialist thinkers are 
idealists. 
Mutahhari was one of the most severe critics of Marxism 
in the contemporary Muslim world. Nevertheless his works are 
not unique in this respect. Among contemporary Muslim critics 
of Marxism, Shahid Mohammad Baqir Sadr should not be overlooked. 
His works on this issue are remarkably original and to some 
extent more profound than those of Mutahhari. He remained 
unknown to the world as a philosopher for he was assasinated 
while quite young. He has written two books on critique of 
Marxism, Falsafatuna (our philosophy) and Iqtisaduna (our 
economics). The first is a philosophical critique of Marxist 
metaphysics and the second is a critical examination of Marxist 
economics. 
Mutahhari der>ended on the -nor si an and Arabic translation 
of Marxist texts as well as books written in these two languages 
on Marxism, Yet he shows an amazing understanding of and 
insight into this philosophy despite the limitations of Arabic 
and Persian translations, especially in view of the fact that 
J i) {] 
usually in Persian books are translated by non-professional 
men, who neither know t'-ie subject as an excpert nor have full 
Q 
command of the foreign language. 
In some cases Mutahharl based his critical analysis of 
western theories in general and Marxism in particular on the 
basis of defective translations. Sometimes he quoted certain 
passages out of their actual context, such as in History and 
Society while refering to Feaurbach's philosophy and his 
impact on Marx, But it may be mentioned to his credit that on 
the whole he made out his points clearly and logically. It 
means that the shortcommings of the sources, referred by him 
for his study of Marxism, did not hamper his philosophical 
understanding of this philosophy. It is to be noted that 
Mutahhaii's attempt was not to criticise Marx's theories in 
their totallity based upon the entire bulk of his v/ritings which 
belong to the different periods of his life, but examined 
certain definite principles of marxism. In his book History 
and Society Mutahhari says: 
I intend to criticise neither all the 
theories that have appeared in Marx's 
work nor Marxism as a v;hole, I shall 
criticise historical materialism, one 
of the pillars of marxism. It is one 
thing to criticise Marx's theories 
and another to criticise Marxism as 
such or one of its principles such as 
historical materialism. To criticise 
Marx's theories means to reviev/ the 
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aggregGte of his theories that 
have appeared in the various books 
and writings, dating from the various 
periods of his life,, with all their 
numerous contradictions. This task 
has been carried out by numerous 
persons in the west... to criticise 
Marxism or one of its principles means 
to criticise marxism or one of its 
principle considered the base of the 
marxist school and considered by Marx 
himself to be inviolable or to criticise 
and or more of the principles tH?t, 
although not necessarily conceived of 
by Marx as altogether final, and in 
instances contradicted by Marx in certain 
of his works are necessary concomitants 
to the principles of Marxism, in opposing 
which Marx in a v/ay departed from Marxism. 
This is the approach I have adopted for 
this volume in regard to Marx's historical 
9 
materialism." 
In the follov/ing paragraphs v/e summerise the points of 
his analysis and criticism of marxist philosophy: 
(1). A philosophical theory of history ought to be based 
upon observation of contemporary events and historical facts, 
and should be applicable to other times also. Either it should 
be formulated on the basis of historical evidence, being ih 
addition applicable to events of the present and the future, 
op 
or it should have boon deducted and inferred from a priori 
premises based upon a series of scientific philosophical, and 
logical principles. The theory of historical materialism 
does not fulfil the conditions of any of the above mentioned 
methods nor the historical events of the time of Marx and 
Engel can be explained on its basis (as Engels himself has 
admitted)• 
(2). According to the principle of reciprocal causation, the 
cause - effect relationship should not be regarded as a one-
sided process. If 'A' is the cause of change in '3' in the 
same way 'B' also in its turn becomes the cause of 'A'« 
According to this principle, there is a kind of reciprocal causal 
relation between all parts of nature and all parts of society, 
According to this principle, the suggestion of priority of one 
thing over the other is meaningless with regard to causal 
relation betv/een two things like matter and spirit, or action 
and thought, or economic basis and all other institutions. 
Because if two things are inter related and dependent upon each 
other for their existence, and the existence of one is conditioned 
by that of the other, the question as to which is prior or 
fundamentals is meaningless. Marx, in some of his statements, 
considers all social processes, as based upon economic factors 
and has not suggested the effect of superstructure on the 
infrastructure. 
(3). The notion of necessary correspondence between super-
structure and base as upheld by historical materialism is nothing 
liV.) 
but a mere illusion. For example the coimtri(-S of Eastorn 
Europe, Asia, and South America have become Socialist despite 
the fact that they have not yet attained the stage of giving 
birth to a socialist state. 
(4). It should be noted that the means of production are not 
capable of developing automatically xi^ ithout human intervention. 
The means of production develop in the context of man's 
relationship with nature and his curioBity, inventiveness, and 
endeavour. The development in the means of production is 
accompanied by the grov/th of science and technology. But the 
question arises as to which of them comes first: '.Vhether man 
first invents something, or his inventions determine his life. 
It cannot be denied that the second alternative is correct. 
(5). Regarding the notion of dialectics, Mutahhari says that 
in Hegel's idealist philosophy the notion of inner movement 
was a logical necessity and not a causal relation. But in 
Marxism it does not fit. Marxists abandoned the logical ground 
of Hegel's philosophy, and logical necessity was replaced by 
the notion of causal connection. As a consequence, they had to 
take recourse in pre-Hegelian philosophy and its connection 
of causality. Hov/ever, they try to justify their claim that 
this connection is intrinsic and therefore necessary. 
(6), V.Tien marxists hold that dialectical thought is only the 
reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself 
every where in nature, they ignore the difference between 
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primary and secondary intelligibles. It is not possible to 
arrive at the stage of concept formation directly through 
reflection. 
(?)• A critical analysis makes it explicit that the position 
of modern relativists is incorrect, and actually the term 
relative reality has no meaning... "if two persons perceive 
a body as having two different states, the body itself should 
have either one of these states or none of two, but may have 
a third state". Of course it is impossible for a thing to 
possess two different states at one and sometimes. In the 
first case perception of one of the two persons is absolutely 
incorrect and that of the other is absolutely true. In the 
other case both of them are wrong. In any case the notion of 
relative reality is illogical and irrational, 
(8), Mutahhari refutes the Marxist view that all morality is 
class morality and moral theories have been hitherto the product, 
in the last analysis, of the material conditions of society 
obtaining at the time and so moral values are relative to both 
time and social conditions. 
(9). According to the Marxists, if any change takes place in 
the economic foundation of a society, the transformation of all 
other social modes is also accompanied. But the theory is 
based on an "if". The main question, hov/ever, remains unanswered; 
supposing that economy is the foundation of society, "if" 
economic infrastructure changes, the v;hole society also change 
2i)l 
with it. But the question as to v/hen and undei' what circums-
tance and by means of which factors the infrastructure changes 
followed by changes in the superstructure, is not touched. In 
other words, to say that economy is the basis is not sufficient 
to explain the dynamic and changing character of society. 
Instead of saying that society is the base, the advocates of 
this theory may properly formulate their position in this 
manner: by stating that economy is the motivating factor of 
history, which is materialistic in essence. The contradiction 
between the economic infrastructure and the social superstructure 
(or between the two tiers of the infrastructure, viz, the tool 
of production and the relation of production) is tie moving 
force that pushes history forv/ard. There is no doubt that this 
is what the advocates of the above mentioned view mean v/hen 
they say that economy is the moving force of history. VAiat they 
mean to assert is that all change in history originates from 
internal contradiction betv/een the tools of production and the 
relations of production. But hei'e we are only concerned with 
the proper formulation of the theory, not with conjecturing 
the inner purpose and objective of its advocates. 
(10)• Historical materialism contradicts itself, for according 
to this view, all thought, all philosophical and scientific 
theories, and all ethical systerr!S represent certain rn':terial 
and economic conditions, and are inseparably connected v;it;4 
their ov/n specific objective conditions. Hence tb.eir value 
and validity are not absolute, but dependent upon a specific 
'cl^:2 
period. V/ith the lapse of a particular period ar.'J chan^ .es in 
the material, economic, and social conditions, v/hich are 
necessary and inevitable, every idea or thought or etiiical 
system is ultimately bound to be replaced by a different idea, 
t ought or theorj''. According to this principle, historical 
materialism, too, is subject to tiiis universal law. Because 
if it eis not subject to this universal law and is an exception, 
it would mean that there are some scientific and philosophical 
laws v/hich are fundamental and independent of any Rind of 
economic base; and if iiistorical materialism is subject to the 
general law, its value and validity are confined to one period 
and it is applicable to that period alone which has given rise 
to it. It is not relevant to an earlier or later period. Thus, 
in both cases, historical materialism is contradicted by 
itself. 
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